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I. INTRODUCTION 
Policies to promote development strategies are undoubtedly partly 
guided by policymaker's conceptions of the behavior of the people for 
whom the policies are directed. In agricultural development, better 
understanding about farm-level behavior, therefore, should be a crucial 
factor in formulating decisions that could affect the welfare of 
farmers. 
In the early 1960s, the Government of Indonesia established a 
program called the BIMAS (Bimbingan Massai = Mass Guidance) following 
several seasons of successful small localized extension programs. The 
five essential components of which the program comprised are: (1) 
fertilizer application, (2) improved seed application, (3) pesticide 
application, (A) improved water control or irrigation, and (5) better 
cultivation practices. This was an outgrowth of the "green-revolution" 
technology that swept most of South and Southeast Asia. Since that 
time, the program has often been modified and even expanded in response 
to improvement in the government's ability to coordinate a larger 
multifaceted program and to accommodate for availability of inputs and 
the means to distribute them and changes in production technology. But 
the ultimate goal has always been to increase agricultural production, 
which in turn, is expected to increase the income of the bulk of the 
population through crop intensification. 
As implementation devices, the government created agencies 
responsible for; (1) agricultural extension. (2) credit provision, (3) 
input distribution, and (A) irrigation improvement. Credit was provided 
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by the government through village units organized by Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (an assigned public bank). The procedure is that loans are 
made to individual farmers in the form of vouchers redeemable for seed, 
fertilizer, and pesticides at a retail outlet in the village area. The 
presumption is that farmers might be reluctant to use modern inputs 
because of unavailable cash credit to purchase inputs. By using this 
procedure, the cash constraint can be alleviated and the adoptions of 
modern inputs would be enhanced. Despite these efforts, some farmers 
are still hesitant to take the opportunity, partly due to 
"unfamiliarity" with the new inputs. 
New seed varieties, which are also called high-yielding (HYV) or 
modern (MV) varieties as opposed to traditional (TV) or local (LV) 
varieties, are developed in the Agricultural Research Experiment Station 
through breeding selection and years of local adaptation trial. Due to 
other intentions of this program, however, these seeds are developed in 
a very controlled environment which requires adequate fertilizer, 
pesticides, and water applications and better cultivation practices that 
are not generally available on a farmer's plot. 
These technologies which are often also called "seed-fertilizer" 
technologies are undisputably responsible for a tremendous increase in 
aggregate agricultural production. Average national yields also have 
increased (Table 1). Even when evaluated in the farmer's field in 1970-
71, the new technologies demonstrated potential (Widodo et al., 1979). 
Yet, the average national yield and the potential yield in the farmer's 
field do not approach the levels obtained in experiments conducted on 
Table 1. Rice production and intensification program in Indonesia, 1964-1978^ 
Year 
Harvested area (thousand ha) Yield^ (t/ha) 
Aggregate 
Total 
production 
(thousand t) Intensi­
fication 
Non-
intensi­
fication 
Total Intensi­
fication 
Non-
intensi­
fication 
1964 .1 6,980 6,980 3.69 1.21 1.21 8,420 
1965 10 7,318 7,328 2.57 1.21 1.22 8,877 
1966 340 7,351 7,691 2.55 1.15 1.21 9,339 
1967 522 6,994 7,516 2.28 1.12 1.20 9,047 
1968 1,597 6,423 8,020 1.51 1.39 1.45 11,667 
1969 2,130 5,884 8,014 1.89 1.40 1.53 12,249 
1970 2,153 5,982 8,135 2.18 1.41 1.62 13,140 
1971 2,788 5,537 8,325 2.05 1.45 1.65 13,724 
1972 3,160 4,729 7 ,8 9 8  2.26 1.27 1.67 13,183 
1973 3,988 4,415 8,403 2.20 1.32 1.74 14,607 
1974 3,723 4,786 8,506 2.27 1.42 1.80 15,276 
1975 3,637 4,858 8,495 2.22 1.43 1.80 15,185 
1976 3,614 4,754 8,368 2.38 1.52 1.90 15,845 
1977 4 ,249  4,111 8,360 2.27 1.52 1.88 15,876 
1978 4,834 4,059 8 ,893  2.34 1.55 1.98 17,598 
^Cited by Herdt and Capule (1983). 
^Milled rice. 
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research stations. Worse yet, even in the irrigated areas farms* yields 
are well below the yield potential (Barker, 1979). 
A. Statement of the Problem 
Knowing that increased rice production or farmer's income is still 
a major goal of the Government of Indonesia and realizing that there is 
a large gap between farmer's yields and potential yields under most 
conditions in experiment stations, empirical investigations have to be 
undertaken to identify and quantify major constraints affecting input 
applications as well as economic and technical performance at the farm 
level. 
Recently, a number of studies have been able to define the gap. 
They also have attempted to identify factors affecting the gap. Herdt 
and Wickham (1975) defined the gap as the difference between the yield 
potential at the experiment station during the dry season in a good year 
and the average national level. They found that approximately 40 
percent of the yield gap was estimated to be the result of socioeconomic 
factors classified as economic constraints, lack of available inputs, 
and nonadoption of technology. 
In a different setting, Gomez et al. (1979) conceptualized the gap 
as exhibited in Figure 1. The model breaks the difference between the 
actual farm yield and the experiment station yield (the yield gap) into 
two distinct parts by introducing an intermediate yield level 
representing the potential farm yield or yield obtained in farmers' 
fields using modern technology. The first part, yield gap 1, is the 
difference between experiment station yield and potential farm yield. 
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—1 , 
Yield gap 1 
Yield gap 2 
experiment potential actual 
station yield farm yield farm yield 
Figure 1. The concept of yield gaps between an experiment 
station yield, potential farm yield, and actual 
farm yield 
It is due to environmental differences between experiment stations and 
the actual rice farms. There may also be some components of the 
technology that are not transferable from the experiment station to the 
farmers' fields. The second, yield gap 2, is the difference between the 
potential farm yield and the actual farm yield. This could be assumed 
to be made up of two constraints, that is, biological and socioeconomic 
constraints. 
Generalizing, we could say that the determinants of "seed-
fertilizer" adoption could be grouped into three categories: (1) 
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technological and physical factors, (2) economic factors, and (3) 
institutional factors. The question, however, still lingers: (1) Why 
are some farmers still reluctant to adopt modern technologies while many 
others have adopted?, (2) Why are many farmers unable to achieve the 
full potential yields of the new technology? 
One possible explanation could be the lack of information and 
imperfect knowledge about modern technologies on the part of the 
farmers. Hence, a complete analytical framework for investigating 
adoption behavior at the farm level should be of interest since farm-
level observations reduce potential problems with aggregation bias and 
because the effects of farmer socioeconomic variables can be examined. 
This is the first subject focused on in this research. 
Another important aspect that should not be neglected in analyzing 
the agricultural production process is the risk factor. Farmers are 
faced with many risky and uncertain prospects when making decisions on 
the allocation of their resources. They are clearly confronted with: 
(1) price (in both input and output) uncertainty, (2) technology or 
production uncertainty, (3) weather variability and other physical or 
biological hazards like pests and diseases, (4) institutional 
arrangements uncertainty, and (5) government policies and control. One 
specific issue that needs to be addressed in research is the evaluation 
of the marginal effect or elasticities of new inputs on the variability 
of output and the estimation of optimal input demands under the 
assumption of production risk. The degree of risk associated with new 
inputs may have been a major problem in their adoption in Indonesia. 
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Variability of input supplies such as seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides 
contribute to a high variability in yields per hectare, and therefore, 
to the farmers* income. For example, HYVs are believed to be more 
demanding of adequate moisture at the right time and more susceptible to 
pests and diseases. It might be appropriate, therefore, to hypothesize 
that the farmers production decisions are influenced by their attitude 
toward risk and uncertainty. Yet, this issue has never been explored in 
the context of Indonesian agriculture. Most studies in the area have 
always implicitly assumed the neoclassical profit maximization without 
risk consideration. This hypothesis is applied to data available from 
three-year (six seasons) observations of output and input use by 
representative rice farmers in the Cimanuk River Basin, Jawa Barat, 
Indonesia.^ 
B. The Research Objectives 
1. To develop a model of the adoption decision for new 
agricultural innovations emphasizing the role of economic 
factors reflected by the potential difference between the 
associated costs of new technology and that of old technology. 
In addition, to estimate elasticities of demand for inputs in 
this model, allowing seed choice adjustment in line with the 
induced—innovation hypothesis in part of farm producers. 
Inability to recognize this selection model will overestimate 
those elasticities derived from the seed-unadjusted model. 
2. To develop a model incorporating risk in the production 
process. Then, to evaluate the effect of input use upon the 
8 
variability of output. 
3. To test the hypothesis that risk may be important in the 
decision-making process among farmers. Specifically, optimal 
implied input demands under the production risk model would be 
contrasted with that of risk-neutral model. 
4. To examine the existence and the extent of risk aversion of 
rice farmers. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a 
brief background of Indonesian economy and agriculture sector. In 
Chapter III, review of the literature on the subjects in question will 
be presented. Section A of the chapter focuses on the model of adoption 
of new technological innovations in agriculture. The empirical 
application of this model is also discussed. In Section B, the theory 
of decision making under risk and uncertainty is introduced, along with 
empirical studies in agriculture. 
Chapter IV treats the empirical estimation methods. Study area, 
data and variables and their descriptions are presented. 
Chapter V considers empirical results and discussion of the 
adoption behavior model in Section A, and of the production risk in its 
second section. 
Finally, Chapter VI presents the summary of the results, 
conclusions, and implications for further research. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
Sampling procedures and variables used are elaborated further in 
Section C of Chapter IV. Admittedly, the time component of the data is 
extremely limited, so is cross-section farm-level data in general. 
These are the only data available that have ever been documented on 
particular individual farms covering more than a year. 
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II. A SETTING IN INDONESIAN AGRICULTURE 
Observation of the Indonesian economy in a wider perspective in 
terms of activities and time has its own merit. However, circumstances 
that emerged in the mid-sixties in the political system and its 
influence on Che general economy and on agriculture call for a brief 
review which is presented in this section. The deep involvement of the 
government at that time is undoubtedly responsible for shaping the 
course of the economic activities, and that involvement is still 
prevalent today. In many respects, the type and complexity of the 
problems today are becoming obvious. As in many developing countries, 
the government is a dominant force in the economy. 
A. Role of Agriculture 
As is typical in less developing countries, agriculture is still 
the leading sector of the economy. Even in the early eighties, the 
agriculture sector accounts for at least 60 percent of Indonesia's total 
labor force (and very much more than this if the work undertaken by 
wives and families of the peasant farmers is taken into account). 
Clearly, agriculture is a major source of income for the bulk of the 
population. Another contribution of agriculture is in the earnings of 
balance of payments (Table 2). From the table, the value of agriculture 
exports declined until 1976 and rose again in 1977 until 1979 but in 
1980 dropped back down forward. On the other hand, crude minerals' 
value increased until 1976 and dropped somewhat until 1979 but rose up 
again from then onward. In terms of contribution to gross domestic 
Table 2. Composition of merchandise trade 197.3-1982 (as percentage of total value) (Source: 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United Nations (Miscellaneous issues)) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Exports 
Agricultural products 38.8 20.9 15.5 21.3 23.6 22.4 23.8 18.4 10.9 8.4 
Crude minerals 44.5 64.2 71.3 67.6 64.9 65.8 61.2 67.6 75.3 80.3 
Manufacture goods 16.7 14.9 12.2 11.1 11.5 11.8 14.9 14.0 13.8 11.3 
Total exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Exports value 
(in billion US dollars) 3.2 7.4 7.1 8.6 10.9 11.6 15.6 21.9 22.3 22.3 
Imports 
Food and beverages 10.1 14.5 12.2 14.1 16.0 17.1 15.3 11.9 10.1 6.4 
Other consumer goods 4.7 3.8 2.8 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.2 
Fuels 1.3 4.0 4.7 7.4 11.4 8.4 10.7 15.7 12.8 4.0 
Other raw materials 42.6 42.2 43.4 34.4 33.2 34.6 38.7 36.1 38.2 32.3 
Transport equipment 13.7 12.1 13.0 10.8 10.7 13.7 9.5 11.6 12.4 11.4 
Other capital goods 27.6 23.3 24.0 29.2 24.8 21.9 22.1 21.4 23.2 26.4 
Total Imports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Imports value 
(in billion US dollars) 2.3 3.9 4.8 5.7 6.2 6.7 7.2 10.8 13.2 16.9 
product (GDP), the share of agriculture in the economy has declined 
since the mid-sixties (Table 3). In constant prices, agriculture (food 
and cash crops, forestry, and fishery) accounted for 54 percent of GDP 
in 1960, dropped down to 44 percent in 1971, and just over 31 percent in 
1980. This trend was more obvious from current market prices where 
agriculture's share of GDP in 1980 was less than 26 percent. These 
figures can lend themselves to showing the structure of agricultural 
economy. 
Based on the Agricultural Census undertaken in 1973, it was 
documented that there were 14,373,542 agricultural enterprise units 
which can be assumed as farm households, and recent Population Census of 
1980 data revealed that there were 17,468,560 farm households which made 
up 57.7 percent of total Indonesian households. Number of farmers has 
consistently increased but the majority of them were categorized as 
landless farmers. This situation resulted from peasant small holdings 
which over generations become progressively smaller and smaller as each 
generation's holding is divided up among the heirs (Table 4). 
Consequently, there are two distinctive types of easily 
recognizable farming systems, namely, small holding private farms (or 
peasant farms) and cash crop estates. The first type generally produces 
basic food crops and most of them are on basic subsistence levels as 
opposed to the second which typically produces non-food crops being 
exported into the international market. In spite of this, owner-
operated smallholder farms also dominate in the estate crop subsector 
where half of its production came from smallholder farms. Most 
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Table 3. Structure of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), selected years, 
1960-80 (as percentage of GDP) 
1960 1967 1971 1980* 
Current Prices 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
Farm food crops 
Farm nonfood crops 
Estate crops 
Livestock products 
Forestry 
Fishing 
Total Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Utilities 
Construction 
Commerce 
Transportation 
Financial services 
Public administration and defense 
Other services 
Total GDP j 
(In billions of rupiahs) 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross investment 
34.3 35.5 26.2 14.5 
7.2 5.4 5.3 3.1 
3.3 2.2 2.9 1.5 
4.8 3.9 3.4 2.3 
2.3 0.7 3.9 2.5 
1.9 6.4 3.2 1.8 
53.8 54.1 44.9 25.7 
3.7 2.7 8.0 26.7 
8.5 7.3 8.4 8.8 
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
2.0 1.7 3.5 5.7 
14.3 17.6 16.1 14.0 
3.7 2.2 4.4 3.9 
1.0 0.5 1.2 2.4 
4.5 4.8 5.8 7.2 
8.2 8.8 7.2 5.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0^ 
(0.39) (848) (3,672) (43,765) 
79.7 92.7 77.1 57.2 
11.5 7.4 9.3 12.7 
7.9 8.0 
00 
21.7 
^Preliminary. 
^Including ownership of dwellings. 
^Figures do not add to total because of rounding 
^For value of the rupiah; from 1978 to 1983 was Rp 625/US dollar, 
and from 1983 to present is Rp 970/US dollar. 
Excluding state enterprises. 
Table 3. (continued) 
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1960 1967 1971 1980' 
Net exports ^ -0, .8 -8 .1 -2 .2 8 .4 
Net factor payments -0, .8 -1 .1 -1 .8 -5 .0 
Constant Prices^ 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing n. •a. 51, .8 44, .0 31 .4 
Miniiij n< . a. 3, .8 9. 9 9 .5 
Manufacturing n. a. 8. 3 8, .8 14 .3 
Utilities n. .a. 0, .4 0, .4 0 .7 
Construction n. a. 1. 6 3, 0 5 .7 
Transportation^and communications n. t a. 3. ,6 3. ,8 5 .4 
Other services n. , a. 30. 5 30. .1 33, .0 
Total GDP ^ n. a. 100. ,0 100. ,0 100, .0^ 
(In billions of rupiahs) n. a. (0.45) (5,545) (10,954) 
Private consumption 
Government consumption® 
n. a. 85. ,3 72. 1 75. 7 
n. a. 8. 0 9. 4 15. 2 
Gross investment n. a. 7. 4 15. 6 26. ,2 
Net exports n. a. -0. 7 2. 9 -17. ,1 
Payment of wages, profits, and interest to foreign individuals and 
f irms. 
®1967 data in 1960 prices; 1971 and 1980 data in 1973 prices. 
^Not available. 
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Table 4. Number of households according to hectareage land operated 
(Source: B.P.S. (1982)) 
Land hectareage 
and status 
1973 Agricultural Census 1980 Population Census 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Less than 0.5 ha 
Owned operated 
Owned and rented 
Rented 
6,560,758 
4,907,495 
1,356,843 
296,420 
45.7 
34.2 
9.4 
2 . 1  
11,027,653 
7,914,305 
1,018,048 
2,095,300 
63.3 
45.3 
5.8 
12.0  
More than 0.5 ha 
Owned operated 
Owned and rented 
Rented 
7,812,784 
5,839,027 
1,813,831 
159,926 
54.3 
40.6 
12.6  
1 . 1  
6,440,907 
4,935,162 
999,254 
506,491 
36.9 
28.3 
5,7 
2.9 
Total 14,373,542 100.0 17,468,560 100.0 
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agricultural estates, however, were owned and operated by government 
enterprises, but some were in private hands. One other type of farming 
is shifting cultivation but is small in terms of hectareage and number 
of farmers involved. Another system that is becoming more 
distinguishable in recent years due to capital influx from abroad is 
natural resource exploration (beyond oil and gas) such as deep water 
fishery and forest product exploitation. Needless to say, the latter 
system does not involve many farmers. The above picture is becoming 
more gloomy due to unbalanced concentration of population. Sixty 
percent of the Indonesian population reside in Jawa, 19 percent in 
Sumatera, seven percent in Sulawesi, five percent in Kalimantan, and the 
rest in other parts of the country. Approximately 11 million hectares 
of smallholdings were devoted to the production of food crops but they 
average less than one hectare in size—barely half a hectare in Jawa. 
Consulting further the official 1980 census data, the number of landless 
farm households increased approaching three to four millions in 1980. 
On Jawa alone, official estimates in 1980 placed 30 percent of farms 
households in the landless category, and other estimates ran to more 
than 50 percent. As shown in Table 5, peasant farmers (less than 0.5 ha 
holding) are about 73 percent in Jawa and 63 percent nationally. 
B. Government Agricultural Policy 
Right from the beginning of the New Order government established in 
the mid-sixties, it was recognized that the agricultural sector was very 
vital to the economy. This importance is reflected in a series of five-
year economic development plannings (REPELITA) mapped out by BAPPENAS 
Table 5. Number of peasant farm households compared with total farm households (from 1980 
Population Census) (Source: Departemen Pertanlan, 1983) 
Islands Below 0.25 ha (1) 
0.25 to 0,50 ha 
(2) 
[(l)+(2)] 
(3) 
Above 0.50 ha 
(4) 
l(3)+(4)] 
(5) 
[ ( 3 )7 (5 )1  
(6) 
Jawa 4 ,433 ,057  3 ,098,265 7,531,322 2,830,057 10,361,379 72.68% 
Sumacera 837,891 933,408 1,831,299 1,738,057 3,569,524 51.30% 
Kalimantan 128,724 191,446 320,170 491 .474 811 644 39.44% 
Sulawesi 247,837 366,062 613,899 709,469 1,323,368 46.38% 
Bali 66,614 104,288 170,902 146,816 317,696 53.79% 
NTB and NTT 165,892 235,346 401,238 382,458 783,696 51.19% 
Maluku and 
Irian Jaya 84 ,339 74,484 158,823 142,408 301,231 52.72% 
Indonesia 5,964,354 5 ,063,299 11,027,653 6,440,907 17,468,560 63.12% 
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and projected into the 1990s. Looking at the specific theme of each 
plan; the first of the series, REPELITA I (1969-1974) was to emphasize 
the development of basic agriculture; REPELITA II (1974-1979), balancing 
agricultural production; REPELITA III (1979-1984) concentration on 
industries supporting agriculture; REPELITA IV (1984-1989) developing 
basic industry; REPELITA V (1989-1994) launching defense and security 
industries; and REPELITA VI (1994-1999) stressing on balanced and self-
sustaining production in all sectors. Nonetheless, these plans should 
not be conceived to imply that the agricultural sector is an isolated 
activity from the rest of the economy. In fact, many of :he attempts to 
stimulate development in agriculture by improving the physical, 
technical, and institutional supports for production rely upon the 
progress being achieved in other sectors. 
Land development schemes have taken the form of public works to 
expand and improve irrigation systems and to the opening up of new lands 
on the Outer Islands (islands other than Jawa). Another systematic 
complementary way of developing the land outside of Jawa for 
agriculture, so it was and still is perceived, has been the 
transmigration program of moving and settling people from Jawa to the 
Outer Islands. Moreover, there are some other technical programs 
ranging from the provision and development of modern agricultural inputs 
to extension services leading to wide-spread adoption of "green-
revolution" technology, particularly in the cultivation of food crops, 
such as rice, as has been outlined previously. These technical programs 
are: first, a local representative of the BRI responsible for managing 
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the bulk of the BIMAS program which involved credit from this rural 
banking facility; second, a farm cooperative responsible for 
distributing seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and equipment needed for the 
members of the programs^; third, BULOG as one of the most powerful 
economic institutions in the country responsible for procuring enough 
rice for the government to keep its price to a target level set by a 
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special coordinating committee ; fourth, an agricultural extension 
assigned to organized groupings of farmers consisting of extension field 
workers, farm leaders, and farmers in order Co enhance ideas exchanged 
among them; fifth, an agricultural research which is vital to the 
extension effort and carried out at research institutes and centers 
around the country. 
To the extent of financial commitment, development spending has 
taken an increasingly large share of the national budget. Under 
REPELITA I and REPELITA II, government investment went toward developing 
a basic infrastructure of transportation, communication, and power 
generation and toward strengthening agricultural production by expansion 
of irrigation projects and the provision of fertilizer as explained 
before (Table 6). Furthermore, from the table it can be observed that 
under REPELITA III, the emphasis has shifted slightly to investment in 
industry and education, healch, housing, and water facilities. 
C. Importance of Paddy Production 
Paddy or rice is a major staple food of the Indonesian population. 
Consideration of the Indonesian diet emphasizes the dominance of rice 
consumption in the republic. The poorest 30 percent of the population 
Table 6. Development expenditures, selected periods, fiscal years (FY) 1969-82 (as percentage of 
total development expenditures) 
Repelita III, FÏ 1979-83* 
Sector Repelita Repelita II* 
FY 1969-73 FY 1974-78 FY 1979 FY 1980 FY 1981^ FY 1982^ 
Agriculture 
General 
Fertilizer 
Total agriculture 
17.0 
2.7 
19.7 
12.6 
6.7 
19.3 
9.5 
3.2 
12.7 
11.2 
4.5 
15.7 
9.7 
5.0 
14.7 
14.5c 
n.a. 
14.5 
Industry and Mining 
lîlectrlc Power 
Transportation, 
Communication, and 
Tourism 
Manpower and 
Transmigration 
Regional Development 
Education 
Health 
Housing and Water 
7.0 
8 . 8  
2 1 . 1  
n.a. 
17.0 
6 . 1  
2 .8  
n.a. 
8.0  
10.1 
17.8 
2 . 1  
11 .1  
8.3 
2 . 8  
2 . 1  
10.0 
8 . 2  
1 1 . 6  
4.0 
8.4 
9.0 
3.5 
2.9 
8.5 
7.1 
13.2 
5.5 
8 .1  
9.7 
3.7 
3.2 
8 . 2  
7.7 
12.7 
6.8 
9.6 
12.3 
4.0 
2.4 
15.2 
n.a. 
12.8 
7.0 
8 . 6  
15.1 
3.7 
3.3 
Government Services 
Investment through State 
Banks 
Other 
Total^ 
5.6 6.4 
9.1 9.0 
2.8 3.0 
100.0 100.0 
^Repelita means Five-Year Development Plan. 
''oraft budget. 
"^Not available. 
'^Figures do not add to total because of rounding. 
1 1 . 8  1 1 . 8  
11.6 6.6 
6.3 6.8 
100.0 100.0 
11.5 10.1 
3.1 3.1 
7.0 6.6 
100.0 100.0 
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spend 37 percent of their budget on rice as recorded by the 1976 SUSENAS 
survey (Socio Economic Survey). Timmer (1975) also observed that not 
only did rice expenditure use up to 31 percent of living expenses in 
Jakarta, but was also rice used as the primary wage good of the economy. 
The direct consequence is that it is one of cost push inflation factors. 
Beyond that, rice seems to have a psychological role in determining 
anticipated inflation which in turn is considered as a price leader by 
Indonesian economists (Dapice, 1980; Mears, 1981). 
Consulting from Table 7, apparent consumption per capita in column 
6 has increased steadily. Although production has also increased making 
Indonesia the world's fifth largest rice producer, ironically at the 
same time it has been the world's biggest rice importer accounting for 
up to 30 percent of total world imports. Much of Indonesia's revenue, 
mostly from petroleum export, earned during the eighties has dissipated 
in the need to import substantial amounts of rice leveling at 2.5 
million metric ton or more per year from countries such as Thailand, 
Taiwan, and the U.S.A. The situation has been made worse by the steady 
improvement in Indonesia living standards, which translates into an 
increase in rice consumption by 4 percent per year in addition to the 2 
percent per year average growth in population. 
Therefore, there are apparently two seemingly antagonistic 
objectives being pursued simultaneously by the government, namely, 
economic stabilization on one hand and self-sufficiency in food and 
increased production on the other. The presumption was that rice price 
is not only a part of the economic stabilization, but also a means to 
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Table 7. Average annual per capita available and apparent consumption of 
milled rice in Indonesia, 1954-1983 (in millions of metric ton) 
(Sources: Production (converted from paddy at 68%) and 
population data from the Central Bureau of Statistics; import 
and stock changes from Bulog. Hears (1984)) 
Effect of Self- Apparent 
Calendar _ ^ Bulog's sufficiency consumption 
Production Imports , n cIn , / • / year stock surplus (+) kg/per capita/ 
changes or deficit (-) per year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
7.84 
7.51 
7.60 
7.63 
7.98 
8.29 
0.26 
0.13 
0.82 
0.55 
0.92 
0.89 
-0.09 
+0.40 
—0.06 
+0.06 
—0.06 
+0.02 
-0.17 
-0.53 
—0.86 
-0 .61 
-0.98 
-0.91 
88 
87 
89 
85 
90 
91 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
10.17 
9.58 
10.28 
9.16 
9.61 
10.24 
10.75 
10.40 
11.67 
12.25 
0.89 
1 .06  
1.02  
1.04 
1 . 0 1  
0.20  
0.31 
0.35 
0.63 
0 .60  
+0.08 
+0.03 
+0.02 
-0 .12 
0.00 
+0.10  
-0 .10  
+0.03 
-0.35 
+0.25 
-0.97 
-1.09 
-1.04 
-0.96 
-1.01 
-0.30 
-0 .21 
-0.38 
-0.28 
-0.83 
109 
101 
106 
92 
96 
92 
94 
91 
98 
104 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
13.14 
13.72 
13.18 
14.61 
15.28 
15.18 
15.84 
15.88 
17.52 
17.87 
0.96 
0.50 
0.75 
1.64 
1 . 0 6  
0.67 
1.29 
1.99 
1.83 
1.91 
-0.27 
0.00 
+0.33 
-0.41 
-0.27 
+0.22 
+0.08 
+0.03 
-0.67 
+0.29 
-0.69 
-0.49 
-1 .08  
-1.23 
-0.79 
-0.89 
-1.37 
-2 .02  
- 1 . 1 6  
-2 .20  
107 
107 
106 
114 
113 
110 
116 
118 
120 
126 
^Allows for changes in Bulog*s stocks but not those in the private 
sector, as country-wide or other surveys of private sector stocks have 
not been made. Also assumes 10% losses during harvesting and for seed 
plus 1% loss in marketing. This is an increase in losses from earlier 
calculations. 
Table 7. (continued) 
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Calendar 
year Production Imports 
Effect of 
Bulog's 
stock 
changes 
Self-
sufficiency 
surplus (+) 
or deficit (-) 
Apparent 
consumption 
kg/per capita/ 
per year 
1980 
1981 
1982: 
1983 
20.16 
22.29 
23.19 
23.97 
2.00 
0.48 
0.30 
1 . 1 6  
-0.88 
-0.55 
+0.46 
+0.49 
- 1 . 1 2  
+0.07 
-0.76 
-1.65 
130 
132 
140 
146 
Preliminary. 
achieve consumer price stabilization. To achieve these objectives, two 
options are available, that is, production incentives and consumption 
disincentives using either pricing policy or import levies or quotas on 
one hand and to increase physical production through input subsidies, 
government investment in irrigation, land reclamation, and basic 
agricultural education on the other. Either way, both measures 
indispensably require substantial amounts of funds which means an 
excessive financial burden for the government to bear. Apparently, the 
second approach has always been the popular instrument for the last 20 
years. The consequence is that food policy which was practically 
assumed as rice policy has always been in favor of consumers (Mubyarto, 
1970). This assertion has also been shown sti.ll in existence even in 
the early eighties by the work of Afiff et al. (1980), Dapice (1980), 
Hears (1981), Teken and Suwardi (1982) who used applied welfare economic 
analysis. This situation prompted the interesting question: "Which 
alternative would have been financially less burdensome to the 
government and to the society?" This has been addressed by two studies 
(Rasahan, 1983; Sastrohoetomo, 1984). Rasahan found that due to the 
deep government involvement in rice policy, Indonesian rice consumer 
price has been subsidized in relation to world price on average by 20 
percent in the last decade. This amounts to theoretically implying that 
there exists an equitably tax imposed on domestic rice production. The 
latter study suggested if any form of subsidies would have been 
eliminated letting rice and fertilizer prices fluctuate based on the 
market mechanism, the benefits would have outweighed the cost generated 
under the situation. 
The sole responsible institution to materialize and regulate the 
food policy in general and rice policy in particular is BULOG, which 
does so by being authorized to keep the price at target level by 
releasing its stock during shortage season and absorbing excess supply 
during harvest season nation-wide. Originally, BULOG was mainly 
concerned with rice procurement but recently its role has been expanded 
to include other basic food necessities such as sugar, com, kerosene 
oil, cooking oil, soybean, and salted fish procurement. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
^In the area where cooperatives had not yet been established, 
private traders were allowed to handle these inputs. 
2 This committee meets the president on a regular basis to discuss 
market performance of food products. 
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter provides an overview of existing literature on the 
subjects related to the approaches of this research. In Section A, 
models and empirical studies of adoption of new innovations are 
considered. The section discusses some attempts to explain what 
variables could influence farmers in adopting new agricultural 
innovations. Section B treats the theory of decision making under risk 
and uncertainty. It first summarizes risk modeling and then describes 
some empirical strategies for measuring risk or eliciting expectations. 
The literature on the risk subject is quite diverse, ranging from 
normative to positive studies, from descriptive to prescriptive studies, 
and from subjective to objective studies. These distinctions will not 
be attempted in this review. 
A. Adoption of New Agricultural Innovations 
Since the 1960s, we have witnessed the introduction of new 
technologies, especially in wheat and rice farms in developing 
countries. These technologies which are interchangeably called "seed-
fertilizer" or "green-revolution" technologies are unquestionably 
responsible for a tremendous increase in aggregate agricultural 
production in those areas. Yet, several studies have concluded that the 
ensuing benefits have not been equitably shared among producers and that 
the programs have only partially successful. 
Anden-Lacsina and Barker (1978) claim that despite the advance 
generated by the development of rice varieties with more resistance to 
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insects and diseases and with improved quality (taste and appearance) 
helping to extend the area where the HYVs are grown, the new rice 
varieties had spread to only about a quarter of the rice-growing area in 
Asia by the early 1970s. Measured by observed rates of adoption, the 
picture is also similar. 
Having been able to identify constraints to rapid adoption 
innovations such as the lack of credit, limited access to information, 
aversion to risk, inadequate farm size, inadequate incentives associated 
with farm tenure arrangements, inefficient human capital, absence of 
equipment to relieve labor shortages, chaotic supply of complementary 
inputs (such as seed, chemicals, and water), and inappropriate 
transportation infrastructure (Feder et al., 1985), many development 
projects have attempted to remove some of these constraints by 
introducing facilities to provide credit, information, the orderly 
supply of necessary and complementary inputs, infrastructure 
investments, and marketing networks. The removal of these constraints 
was expected to result not only in the adoption of improved practices 
but also in a change in crop composition, which was then expected to 
increase average farm incomes even further. Nevertheless, expectations 
have been only partially realized. 
Subsequent studies which attempted to explain the pattern of 
adoption behavior have been reported in the literature both 
theoretically and empirically. While not all the literature on the 
topics can be reviewed here, some of the works will be mentioned. (For 
a very extensive survey that is recently reported, see Feder et al. 
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(1985)). 
Most of the theoretical studies of adoption behavior of individual 
farmers use static analysis that relates the degree of adoption to the 
factors affecting it. For instance, the problem may be characterized as 
a farmer who has to choose between two technologies: the traditional 
technology and a modern technology such as the use of HYVs and the 
inputs associated with them (fertilizer, irrigation, and pesticides) 
with or without some form of fixed capital goods. Models following this 
approach investigate how much is allocated to modern technology and what 
the input-land ratios of modern inputs are under different circumstances 
[Hiebert (1974), Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970), Feder (1980), 
Just and Zilberman (1983), Pyle and Turnovsky (1971), Roumasset (1976), 
Bell (1972), Zilberman and Just (1984)]. 
A dynamic model is constructed from the static model using 
theoretical or heuristic arguments regarding the behavior over time of 
the farmer's perception of production-function and price-distribution 
parameters. For instance, Hiebert argues that the farmer learns his 
perceived distribution of technical parameters shifts over time from a 
lower payoff to a higher payoff. This induces farmers to increase their 
use of new technology. Likewise, in models that incorporate a credit 
constraint, one can assume that, over time, cash availability to farmers 
is increased by the increased profits from partial adoption. Belonging 
to this category are the works by O'Mara (1971), Lindner et al. (1979), 
Lindner (1980), Stoneman (1981), Lindner and Fischer (1981). 
Based on the key explanatory factors affecting adoption, the 
empirical literature can be summarized as follows: 
1. Farm size: This is one of the first factors on which the 
empirical adoption literature is focused. However, it varies according 
to the characteristics of technology and institutional setting. 
Particularly, the relationship of farm size to adoption depends on such 
factors as fixed adoption costs, risk preferences, human capital, credit 
constraints, labor requirements, tenure arrangements and so on. The 
importance of this variable has been demonstrated by the studies of 
Binswanger (1978), Dobbs and Foster (1972), Gafsi and Roe (1979), Weil 
(1970). Many other empirical studies also suggest that the use of HYVs 
and some modern variable inputs initially tends to lag behind on smaller 
farms. For example, see the studies by Parthasarathy and Prasad (1978) , 
Perrin and Winkelmann (1976), and Jamison and Lau (1982). With respect 
to the intensity of fertilizer and pesticide use per unit of land, a 
more confusing pattern of behavior prevails. While many studies 
indicate no significant difference in chemical input use per acre 
between farms of different size [see Lipton (1978), Parthasarathy and 
Prasad (1978), Burke (1979), Singh (1979), and Kalirajan (1981)], others 
indicate a positive relationship between the amount of fertilizer 
applied per hectare of fertilized land and farm size as shown by Perrin 
and Winkelmann (1976), Clawson (1978), and in a number of other studies 
cited by Singh (1979). On the other hand, some empirical studies found 
negative relationships between intensity of use of modern inputs and 
farm size as reported by van der Veen (1975) and Srinivasan (1972). 
2. Risk and uncertainty: In most cases, innovations induce a 
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subjective risk (that yield is more uncertain with an unfamiliar 
technique) and quite often objective risks also (due to weather 
variation, susceptibility to pests and diseases of new seeds, 
uncertainty regarding timely availability of important inputs). For 
instance, Dalrymple (1978) acknowledges that HYVs* techniques require a 
well-irrigated supply of water and thus the attainment of the full 
potential of the HYVs without undue risk requires an assured water 
supply. Similarly, Schutjer and van der Veen (1977), Schluter (1974), 
Wolgin (1975), and Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) conclude from their 
survey that the adoption of new agricultural technology may require the 
adopter to accept a greater degree of risk and uncertainty. However, 
empirical studies have very rarely treated this factor, because it is 
difficult to measure. One example of such an attempt is 0'Mara's (1980) 
study through direct interviews elicitating the farmer's subjective 
yield distributions and Binswanger's et al. (1980) study through 
gambling experiments. Another example is Herath et al. (1982) who 
compare three alternative decision models to explain farmers' actual 
behavior. From a different angle, a Gafsi and Roe (1979) study supposes 
that farmers' technology choices are based on their objective 
probabilities and hence on their exposure to information regarding new 
technology. A possible hypothesis that will be a subject to be tested 
is that more exposure to appropriate information through various 
communication channels (such as radio, television, newspapers, extension 
workers, group leaders) reduces subjective uncertainty. 
While these studies are motivated by the conceptual work of Rogers 
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(1957, 1962) on stages of experimentation, few of them (e.g., O'Mara, 
1980) apply the more sophisticated Bayesian models of learning such as 
the one proposed by Lindner (1980). 
3. Human capital: This notion was inspired by Schultz (1964) who 
argues that frequent introduction of new-technologies results in 
disequilibrium suboptimal use of inputs and technologies even though, in 
traditional agriculture, resource allocation is efficient. Welch (1978) 
extended and applied this concept suggesting that the contribution by 
the human factor to the returns from agricultural production can be 
attributed to two abilities, that is, worker ability and allocative 
ability. He adds that both abilities improve as experience and health 
improve. Formal schooling is hypothesized to play a much more important 
role in determining allocative ability than worker ability. This 
hypothesis has been supported by several studies on dynamic environment 
as shown by Welch (1970), Petzel (1976), Petzel (1978), Huffman (1977), 
Rosenzweig (1978), Jamison and Lau (1982), and Wozniak (1984). However, 
in less developed countries the results are mixed. Ram (1976), Sidhu 
(1976), and Pudasani (1983) have also demonstrated the effect of 
education but Mangahas (1970) concludes that schooling (formal 
education) has little effect on the probability of Philippines' farmers 
adopting a number of modem agricultural practices. This conclusion is 
also demonstrated by Kalirajan and Shand (1985) in India who suggested 
rather the importance of non-formal education. 
4. Availability of information: This is related to the human 
capital factor and is thought to be necessary to make innovative 
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decisions. This information might come in a form of exposure to 
extension service, from mass media and so on. This has been shown by 
the works of Gafsi and Roe (1979), Lockheed et al. (1980), Kalirajan and 
Shand (1985). Feder and Slade (1984) have also modeled a decision 
involving new technology by incorporating the decision to acquire 
information. 
5. Labor availability: New agriculture technologies are not 
similar in their respect to labor. Some are relatively labor-saving and 
others are labor-using. Moreover, new technologies may increase the 
seasonal demand of labor so that adoption may be less attractive for 
those with limited family labor or those operating in areas with less 
access to labor markets. This factor has been shown to affect farmers' 
decisions about adoption of new agricultural practices or inputs by the 
studies of Hicks and Johnson (1974), Harris (1972), Helleiner (1975), 
and Nordman (1969). 
6. Credit constraints: Some of the theoretical studies mentioned 
earlier argue that the need to undertake fixed investments may prevent 
small farms from adopting innovations quickly. Capital in the form of 
either accumulated savings or access to capital markets is required to 
finance many new agricultural techniques. Thus, differential access to 
capital is often cited as a factor in differential rates of adoption as 
reported by Lowdermilk (1972), Lipton (1976), and Bhalla (1979). On the 
other hand, others have argued that lack of credit alone does not 
inhibit adoption of innovations that are scale neutral [Schutjer and van 
der Veen (1977), and von Pischke (1978)]. Binswanger and Sillers (1983) 
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conclude that this constraint is in important ways related to risks of 
farming itself, risk aversion, to problems of imperfect information 
about borrower, and to the absence of good insurance markets for crop-
related risks. 
7. Tenure arrangement: A number of empirical and descriptive 
studies have considered the effect of these factors and the proportion 
of farms rented on the adoption of HYV technology. However, empirical 
findings are conflicting. For example, Parthasarathy and Prasad (1978) 
concluded that tenants had a lower tendency to adopt HYVs than owners. 
On the other hand, nitrogen fertilizer use was the same for tenants and 
owners. 
8. Input supply constraints: It is very obvious that HYV seeds 
will not be adopted unless both seeds and some fertilizer are readily 
available. In almost all cases, the high-yield potential of the seed 
can only be realized if at least some fertilizers are applied. 
Moreover, other inputs are also complementary to some degrees. 
Consequently, this raises the issue of complementary innovations. That 
is, some innovations (which may or may not have been introduced 
simultaneously) are complementary to a certain degree. Dalrymple (1978) 
and Burke (1979) suggested that HYV fertilizer package is more 
profitable and less risky if means of developing an assured and 
regulated water supply are also provided. 
9. Aggregate adoption over time: This notion has been established 
in the early empirical studies of dynamics of diffusion in agriculture 
[see Seal and Bohlen (1957) and Rogers (1957)]. The first econometric 
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study of aggregate adoption over time was conducted by Griliches (1957), 
introducing economic variables to explain the diffusion of hybrid corn 
in the United States utilizing a logistic function of time for 132 corn-
grower districts. Using Griliches's approach, Martinez (1972) obtains 
similar results for adoption of hybrid corn in Argentina. Jarvis (1981) 
estimates and predicts the diffusion of improved pastures in Uruguay 
using the nonlinear regression techniques for a modified logistic curve 
that includes beef and fertilizer prices as explanatory variables. In 
this category also belongs the work by Kislev and Shchari-Bachrach 
(1973). 
B. Theory of Decision-Making imder Risk and Uncertainty 
Although agricultural economics has a long and fruitful history in 
the study of risk attitudes and providing for the improvement of 
decision making under risk, not until in the seventies was decision 
analysis under uncertainty regarded as an important topic. Jensen 
(1977) cites Heady's observation in 1949 that risks and dynamics of the 
firm was a neglected area of farm management study. Several other 
studies prior to the seventies had also acknowledged the linkage between 
farming risks, credit rations, and the consequences for resource 
adjustment and firm growth suggested by Johnson (1947) and Schultz 
(1949). Moreover, Heady's (1952) work on the principles of 
diversification of farm activities was also significant. Then, the 
seventies experienced further development in decision analysis under 
risks as documented by Halter and Dean (1971) and Anderson et al. (1977) 
in agriculture, followed by Roumasset et al. (1979) in agricultural 
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development, and Valdes et al. (1979) in small farmer technology. Its 
revival is looming up again in the mid-eighties as documented in Barry 
(1984). Apparently, risk management analysis has regained its momentum 
in the more complex economic environment as prevailing today. Several 
models of risk have been advanced in the literature. 
1. Risk models 
Young (1984) classified risk models into three classes of decision 
rules, namely: (a) decision rules requiring no probability information, 
(b) safety-first rules, and (c) expected utility maximization. 
a. Decision rules without probability information Four 
decision rules belong to this category (Halter and Dean, 1971): (i) 
minimax loss or maximin gain, (ii) minimax regret, (iii) Hurwicz a-
index, and (iv) LaPlace principle of insufficient reason. 
Criterion (i) considers only an action's worst possible outcome, 
either maximum loss or minimum gain, and then chooses the action whose 
worst outcome is the least harmful. The second rule selects the action 
with the smallest maximum regret where the regret for each combination 
of actions and states is the difference between the respective outcomes 
and the highest possible outcomes for that states. The Hurwicz a-index 
rule is formally stated as follows: 
Max [Ij = a (Mj ) + (1 -a)(m^)] (1) 
where a is given by the decision maker subject to 0 < a < 1, ÎL and m^ 
is the maximum and the minimum gain of action, respectively. The fourth 
rule culls the action with the highest expected outcome, based on equal 
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probabilities of all outcomes. 
The major objection to these models is that they are too 
restrictive connoting either (1) the decision maker has absolutely no 
subjective feelings or objective information about the probability 
distribution of outcomes, or (2) the decision maker has subjective 
probability information but neglects it. 
b. Safety-first rules These rules are commonly employed in risk 
analysis as a lexicographic utility form, that is, they follow the 
sequential ordering of multiple goals where the highest priority goal 
must be achieved at a threshold level before considering the second 
goal, and so on. This can be translated as attaining a higher priority 
goal serving as a constraint on a goal with consecutively lower 
priorities. Typically, it is specified as chance of loss taking the 
form as : 
[PC? < d)] < a (2) 
where ir is stochastic income for a particular action and d is a 
threshold income level to be satisfied with probability a. To see how 
close this rule and variance as measure of risk is depicted in Figure 2. 
By applying chance of loss definition, we unequivocally will order 
distribution la more risky than 2a, and lb more risky than 2b, because 
is greater than 02 in both figures. To the contrary, the variance 
definition will order 2a more risky than la, and lb and 2b equally 
2 2 2 
risky, because 0^ is smaller than in Figure 2, Panel a and equals 
9 
G2 in Panel b. 
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Panel a 
a, > Oj 
Dist. la 
Panel b 
G, >02. 
Dist. 2b 
Dist. Ib 
Figure 2. Chance of loss and variance measures of risk 
In the literature, three types of safety-first rules have been 
advanced (Pyle and Turnovsky, 1970). The first rule (SFl), put forth by 
Shackle (1952) and Telser (1955-1956), supposes that an agent maximizes 
expected return (?) subject to the constraint that the probability of a 
return less than or equal to a specific level (ir-min) does not exceed a 
stipulated probability (P). This can be defined as: 
Max ? s.t. [(P ( TT < ir-min) ] < P . (3) 
r — — 
The decision maker first decides a threshold level of income and 
the probability with which incomes must surpass this level. These are 
the key indicators under the rule and both characterizes the decision 
maker's attitude toward risk. For instance, the threshold income could 
be an income covering living expenses, debt repayment, and operating 
expenses. Then, the criterion proceeds by letting the decision maker 
considers various set of actions that fulfill the constraint, and 
finally, select among the actions based on the highest expected value. 
Figure 3 illustrates the procedure by taking curve AF as representing 
the lower confidence limits of income for a set of actions. Since plans 
A and F are. below ir-min, they are not going to be considered. Among the 
qualifying plans, C is the most preferred since it has the highest 
expected return. 
The second safety-first rule (SF2) developed by Kataoka (1963) 
chooses a plan that maximizes income at the lower confidence limit (L) 
subject to the constraint that the probability of income being less than 
or equal to the lower limit does not surpass a specified value P. This 
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Figure 3. Lower confidence limits and safety-first 
is expressed as: 
Max L s.t. [P(iT<L)]<P. 
r — 
(4) 
Based on this rule, the optimal choice is plan C because it gives the 
highest return for confidence limit P, while still exceeding w-min. When 
the distribution depends on only two parameters such as the normal 
(Kunreuther and Wright, 1974), this rule can be expressed alternatively 
(Pyle and Tumovsky, 1970) as: 
Max [E + F 1 (P*) S] (5) 
-1  
where F denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution 
function F, and E and S are mean and standard deviation of return, 
respectively. This form is equivalent to an earlier rule proposed for 
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stochastic linear programming by von Moeseke (Roumasset, 1976). 
The third safety-first rule (SF3) introduced by Roy (1952) chooses 
the plan with the smallest probability of yielding a return below some 
specified level. Formally, that is 
Min [P^ ( < ir-min) ] (6) 
Operationally, this rule is often represented in terms of its mean (E) 
and standard deviation (S) as 
Min [(-rr-min - E)/S] (7) 
either by appeal to the Tchebychev inequality or by restriction to two-
parameter distribution in general (Pyle and Turnovsky, 1970) or the 
normal distribution in particular (Chipman, 1973). Then, according to 
this rule, the optimum plan occurs where ir-min is the greatest number of 
standard deviations away from the expected value. From Figure 3, this 
criterion is met by plan C. 
These models have been popular among economists concerned with 
peasant agriculture partially due to the fact that they lend themselves 
to the possibility of incorporating subjective interpretation of 
probability to satisfy farmer subsistence levels. 
c. Expected utility rule The mathematical form of expected 
utility which is also called Bernoulli's principle can be traced back to 
Cramer in 1728 and Bernoulli in 1738 who sought to explain the so-called 
St. Petersburg paradox.^ 
Unsatisfied with using monetary values in explaining many types of 
economic or financial behavior due to its inability to distinguish 
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between decision maker's attitude toward additional wealth, for example, 
theoreticians developed a more general approach based on utility theory 
so that attitude under consideration of risk can further be explored. 
This theory facilitates a single-valued index of ranking alternative 
choices according to the preferences or attitudes of the decision maker. 
Suppose an individual is confronted with sets of alternative 
choices , A^, .. , A^ with its conformable worth in monetary value is 
in the i-th state of nature, and further assume the individual can 
attach probabilities (either objective or subjective) to the various 
possible outcomes in a given state of each alternative choice [?^(S^)]. 
The choices are ranked based on assigned utility value on each monetary 
outcome generated from a subjective and arbitrary scaled utility 
function. Further, the utility for each possible outcome of an 
alternative choice is weighted by its probability and summed. This 
expected utility now becomes a preference index for the alternative 
choices. Finally, alternative choices are ranked based on their level 
of expected utility with the highest value being the most preferred. In 
a more formal form, the objective function is shown as 
Max {E[U(x)] = Z U(X ) P(S^)} for j = 1, 2, ..., n . (8) 
However, the axiomatic foundation of the theory had not been established 
until Ramsey's (1926) work which then was revived and extended by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) or Luce and Raiffa (1957). The axioms 
conceptualize how people behave towards risk and uncertainty. According 
to them, people are rational and consistent in choosing among risky 
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alternatives. Given that is true, the theorem concludes that an optimal 
risky choice is based on the maximization of expected utility. The 
following is a summary of sets of axioms (see Anderson et al., 1977; 
Dillon, 1979; Hey, 1979; Robison et al., 1984): 
(i) Ordering. For any two alternative choices, and , the 
individual either prefers to A^, prefers A^ to Aj^, or is indifferent 
between them. 
(ii) Transitivity. If A^ is preferred to A^, and is preferred to 
Ag, then A^ must be preferred to A^. 
(iii) Substitutability. If A^ is preferred to A^, and A^ is some 
other choice, then a risky choice PA^ + (l-PlA^ is preferred to another 
risky choice PA^ + (l-EOA^, where P is the probability of occurrence. 
(iv) Certainty equivalent. If A^ is preferred to A^, and A^ is 
preferred to A^, then some probability P exists that makes the 
individual indifferent to having A^ for certain or receiving A^ with 
probability P and Ag with probability (1-P). Thus, A^ is the certainty 
equivalent of PA^ + (1-P)A2. 
If these axioms are satisfied, a utility function can be derived 
solidifying the individual's preferences (Borch, 1968; Hey, 1979). 
Hence, the decision maker's utility functions captures the preference 
ordering over a set of outcomes based on his degree of belief and his 
degree of preference. This utility function is typically specified in 
terms of wealth, denoted by W and is assumed to be monotonically 
increasing, i.e., dU/dW is greater than zero, indicating a positive 
marginal utility for wealth. The decision maker's attitude toward risk 
44 
is then inferred from the relationship of his wealth and his utility. 
An individual with a concave utility function is said to be a risk 
averter, meaning that he prefers a choice with a perfectly certain 
return to another choice with an equal, but uncertain, expected return 
(Panel a. Figure 4). It follows immediately that certainty equivalent 
of a choice is always less than its expected monetary value by a 
positive risk premium (?) which remunerates the risk averter in utility 
terms for undertaking the risky choice. Risk indifference or risk 
neutral individual is exhibited by a linear utility function suggesting 
that the individual is indifferent to a certain return and an equivalent 
uncertain expected return. This signifies that certainty equivalent of 
risky prospect equals its expected monetary value (Panel b, Figure 4). 
In this case, then, the risk premium is zero. 
Panel c of Figure 4 portrays a risk-preferring individual having a 
convex utility function which implies that he chooses an uncertain 
expected return rather than an equivalent certain return. In this case, 
the certainty equivalent is always greater than its expected monetary 
value which gives negative risk premium. 
However, the classification above by no means is an exhaustive 
grouping. An individual could have a utility function that has some 
concave segments and some convex segments as has been pointed out by 
Friedman and Savage (1948, 1952). This is depicted in Panel a of Figure 
5 where the figure starts as concave in the first stage, turning to be 
convex in the next stage and winding up concave again. This purports 
that at lower levels of wealth with this sigmoid-type utility function 
Panel a Panel b Panel c 
U 
•H 
U(W) = kW 
EU(W) = 
kW 
U(W) 
ce 
Wealth (W) 
l'igure 4« Utility functions with diminishing, constant, and increasing marginal utility 
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Figure 5. Multi-infiecuion points utility function 
is initially risk averse up to level of wealth and turns to be a risk 
lover in range. Then, starting at the wealth level of the 
individual becomes a risk-averter again. Still, there is another form 
of utility function suggested by Markowitz (1952) which has three 
inflection points purporting the individual first behaves as risk-
preferring, then risk-averter, followed by risk-loving again before 
becoming eventually risk-averter (Panel b. Figure 5). In spite of 
theoretical appeals offered by these two possibilities, it seems a 
single inflection point over the range of wealth is regarded as the 
closest representation of individual attitude toward risk as 
predominantly shown in the current economic literature and it is the 
degree of risk aversion that may differ among individuals. 
Having established the relationship between utility functions and 
risk attitudes, an individual behavior toward risk can be deduced from 
the second derivative of this utility function with respect to wealth. 
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namely that negative, zero, or positive second derivative will indicate 
risk aversion, risk indifference, or risk preference of the individual, 
respectively. The problem, however, is the magnitude of second 
derivative cannot be used for interpersonal comparisons of risk aversion 
due to the fact that an individual's utility function is only unique up 
to a linear transformation. Thus, it can be arbitrarily transformed by 
multiplying the utility function by a positive number. To facilitate 
interpersonal comparisons, three measures have been proposed in the 
literature: 
(1) Absolute risk aversion (A) is defined as: 
A(W) = - U"(W)/U'(W) (9) 
a unit-free measure of the local concavity of the utility function 
2 2 [Primes denote derivative, e.g., U' = dU(W)/dW and U" = d U(W)/dW , 
etc.], where W is current wealth. 
(2) Relative risk aversion (R) is expressed as: 
R(W) = - W[U"(W)/U'(W)] = WA . (10) 
(3) Partial risk aversion (P) is formalized as: 
P(W) = - X[U"(W+X)/U'(W+X)] = XA ( 
where X is an outcome in the prospect under consideration. 
A and R indices are proposed by Pratt (1964), and independently by 
Arrow (1964), while S was suggested independently by Menezes and Hanson 
(1970) calling it partial risk aversion, and by Zeckhauser and Keller 
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(1970) who named it size-of-risk aversion. These measures can be used 
to test the hypothesis concerning responses of risk aversion to changes 
in wealth or the size of the outcome. 
2. Measuring risk attitudes 
In studying risk attitudes empirically, several approaches have 
been offered in the literature classified into five categories: 
a. Direct elicitation of utility functions (DEU) This 
procedure relies on direct contact with individuals to formulate their 
risk attitudes utilizing single-valued utility index, lexicograph, 
utility, or broader concept of multiple goals. Three variates belong to 
this group, namely, the von Neumann-Morgenstern method, the modified von 
Neumann-Morgenstern method, and the Ramsey method, all employing the 
certainty equivalent axioms of the expected utility model in repeated 
applications of hypothetical gambles (Anderson, 1979). The problem with 
this procedure is that it can be bias from different interviewers, 
preferences for specific probabilities, confounding from extraneous 
variables, negative preferences toward gambling, absence of realism in 
the game setting, lack of time and experience of the participants to 
become familiar with the hypothetical choices, and compounding of errors 
in the elicitation process (Roumasset, 1976; Binswanger, 1980; Robison, 
1982). Lin and Chang (1978) also pointed out that an inappropriate 
specification of the utility function can also adversely influence 
implications concerning risk attitudes. 
These shortcomings have helped to stimulate the refinings, 
extending and generalizing the DEU methods to appropriately typify risk 
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attitudes (Halter and Mason, 1978). However, the DEU method is very 
costly for carrying out economic analysis. In less developing 
countries, some empirical studies of risk attitudes that implement the 
DEU have been documented in the works by O'Mara (1971) in Mexico, 
Roumasset (1976) in Philippines, Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) in 
Mexico, Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) in Brazil, Arcia (1980) in Colombia, 
Binswanger (1980) in India, Hamal and Anderson (1982) in Nepal, and 
Herath et al. (1982) in Sri Lanka, among others. 
b. Risk efficiency approach This approach provides a partial 
ordering of alternative choices based on its ability to segment the 
decision alternative into two mutually exclusive sets, namely, an 
efficient set containing the preferred choice of every individual whose 
preferences conform to the restrictions associated with the criterion, 
and an inefficient set comprising the unpreferred alternatives. The 
advantage of this approach is that direct preference measurements need 
not be made and if enough can be eliminated, a final choice can be 
formulated by direct comparison of the outcome distribution of those 
that remain. Four groups of risk efficiency models are summarized 
below: 
(i) First degree stochastic dominance (FSD). This rule is the 
simplest and most universally applicable efficiency criterion. It 
states that given two alternative outcomes with their distributions 
defined by cumulative distribution function (CDF), F(y), and G(y), F(y) 
is preferred to G(y) if 
F(y) < G(y) (12) 
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for all possible values of y and if the inequality is strict for some 
value of y. Graphically, this condition translates as the CDF of 
dominant distribution must always lie below that of the dominated 
distribution. In Figure 6, for example, F(y) dominates G(y) by FSD 
rule, but neither F(y) nor G(y) can be ordered with respect to H(y), 
FSD holds for all individuals who prefer more to less. This rule was 
proposed by Quirk and Saposnik (1962), Fishburn (1964), Hadar and 
Russell (1969), and Hanoch and Levy (1969). This approach has been 
implemented by Valdes and Franklin (1979) for evaluating the performance 
1 .  
a 
G(y) 
H(y) 
y 
Figure 6. First and second degree stochastic dominance 
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of new ranch technologies ia Colombia and by Grisley and Kellogg (1983) 
to determine if farmers' crop production plan agreed with their 
expectations of the net income variable in Thailand. 
(ii) Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD). This rule is more 
discriminating than FSD. It says that F(y) is preferred to G(y) if 
/ F(y)dy _< / G(y)dy (13) 
for all possible values of y and if the inequality is strict for some 
value of y. Grapnically, this condition means that the accumulated area 
under dominant distribution is always less than or equal to that of 
under the dominated distribution. In Figure 6, for instance, F(y) 
dominates either G(y) or H(y) so F(y) is the SSD efficient set for these 
alternatives. However, when only G(y) and H(y) are compared, neither 
dominates the other by SSD since the accumulated area under G(y) is less 
than the area under H(y) for low values of y, while the opposite 
condition occurs at high values of y. SSD holds for all individuals 
whose utility functions have positive, non-increasing slopes at all 
outcome levels. The rule was discovered independently by Fishburn 
(1964), Hammond (1968), Hadar and Russell (1969), and Hanoch and Levy 
(1969). 
Among empirical studies that implemented this rule are Valdes and 
Franklin (1979), and Grisley and Kellogg (1983). 
(iii) Mean-variance (E-V) efficiency. This rule requires that the 
individual is risk averse and the outcome distributions are normal or 
the individual's utility function is quadratic. Thus, E-V efficiency 
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criterion can be stated in terms of only two moments, means and 
variances. Outcome distribution F with mean and variance 
'F 
dominates distribution G with mean and variance V , if 
(14) 
and if one of these two inequalities is strict. This procedure was put 
forth by Markowitz (1959) and is widely used for its analytical and 
computational convenience by using quadratic programming. 
Quadratic risk programming has been employed in many studies to 
evaluate optimum farm organizations under conditions of risky choice 
such as Freund (1956), Halter and Dean (1971), Thomas et al. (1972). 
Applications in less developing countries are the works by Khatikarn 
(1981) in Thailand, Mohayidin (1981) in Malaysia, and Singh and 
Zilberman (1984) in India, among others. 
(iv) Mean-absolute (E-A) deviation efficiency (MOTAD). This 
criterion is an approximation to E-V efficiency rule modeled in linear 
programming framework. It also assumes that the individuals are risk 
averter. Outcome distribution F with mean E^ and mean-absolute 
deviation , dominates distribution G with mean Eg and mean-absolute 
deviation A^, if 
and if one of the two inequalities is strict, where the mean-absolute 
deviation. A, is defined as 
Ep > Eg and Ap < Ag (15) 
(16) 
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and n is the number of observed outcome levels, is the i-th observed 
outcome level with its expected value E^. This rule was developed by 
Hazell (1971). This rule has been applied in numerous studies such as 
Schluter (1974), Simmons and Pomareda (1975), Sanders and Dias de 
Hollanda (1979), Kutcher and Scandizzo (1981), O'Brien (1981), and 
Musser et al. (1984). 
c. Risk interval approach Due to the limitations possessed by 
the DEU, King and Robison (1981a,b) indicate that the DEU method is not 
accurate enough to measure a uniquely defined utility function. Then an 
interval measure of risk attitudes is proposed accounting for possible 
errors in the measurement process. This is related to the second 
approach in the sense that it uses stochastic dominance principle in a 
more general case that is with respect to not only strategies but also a 
function inspired from the work by Meyer (1977a,b). It is a more 
discriminating efficiency criterion that allows for greater flexibility 
in representing preferences and it also does not require an assumption 
of normality. The method is based on identifying a confidence interval 
for the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion that is estimated 
by asking individuals to order pair-wise comparisons of probability 
density functions. 
This rule has since been applied in many studies such as King and 
Robison (1982), King and Oamek (1983), Pederson (1984), and Zacharias 
and Grube (1984). 
d. Experimental methods This approach involves the use of 
synthetic experiences through gambling or gaming experiment in which the 
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attitude towards risk is ascertained using a partial risk aversion 
measure. Each participant was offered a series of choices from sets of 
alternative risks. Upon identifying his preferred alternative, the 
participant was asked to toss a coin whose outcome then determined 
whether the participant receive the high or low return for the 
designated alternative. Since the alternatives offering higher expected 
return were designed to have a larger spread, the participant's revealed 
preference may be viewed as a reflection of his preferences between risk 
and expected gain (Binswanger, 1980; Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). 
This method has also been implemented by similar studies such as 
Grisley (1980) in Thailand, Sillers (1980) in Philippines, and Walker 
(1980) in El Salvador. 
e. Observed economic behavior (OEB) This method focuses on the 
relationship between the actual behavior individuals and the behavior 
predicted from empirically specified models. For instance, the 
determination of effects of a farmer's risk attitude on fertilizer 
levels when crop yield is a random variable. Following approaches by 
Anderson et al. (1977) and Young et al. (1979), expected utility 
maximization objective results to a first order condition, 
E(MVP.) = MFC. + R I (17) 
1 1 a r 
where E(MVP^) denotes expected marginal value product (MVP) of input i, 
MFC^ is nonstochastic marginal cost (MFC) of input 1, and 
encapsulates a risk adjustment based on the farmer's risk aversion 
coefficient (R^^, and the marginal contribution to risk of additional 
55 
input use (I ). If is assumed to be positive, risk aversion (R^ > 0) 
implies a positive risk adjustment, that is, a risk averse farmer will 
stop short of equating E(MVP) to MFC. 
Rearranging Equation [16], a theoretical approach for measuring R^ 
empirically is given by 
R = [E(MVP,) -MFCJ/I . (18) 
a 1 1 r 
Nonetheless, estimating I^ is difficult without making restrictive 
assumptions about stochastic events. 
The benefits of using the OEB method are that it can generate 
quantitative measures of risk aversion, it can handle large amounts of 
sample data, it is less costly than interviewing many objects, and it 
avoids measuring risk attitudes from hypothetical gaming situations. 
However, the major drawback is that it is subject to several inference 
problems. The OEB method attributes the entire difference between 
actual firm performance and performance predicted by an assumed 
objective to the decision maker's risk attitude even though in reality 
many other factors besides risk determined observed behavior. 
Empirical studies adopting this approach are exemplified by Behrman 
(1968) in Thailand, Just (1974) in U.S.A., Wolgin (1975) in Kenya, Wiens 
(1976) in China, Moscardi and de Janvry (1977) in Mexico, Anderson and 
Griffiths (1981) in Australia, Lins et al. (1981) in U.S.A., and 
Rosegrant and Roumasset (1983) in Philippines. A modification of this 
methodology is employed in this research. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
^Cramer proposed this theory in 1738 (letter to Bernoulli's cousin 
cited in Bernoulli, 1954). 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION METHODS 
This chapter discusses the models and the analytical methodology 
that will be used as empirical implementation of the study. It explains 
the specification, estimation and the source and the type of data used. 
Section A focuses on justification of the chosen specification and 
estimation procedure for farm-level input demands. Section B briefly 
develops the theoretical foundations of production risk in order to 
adequately represent the nature of the probability distribution of 
output and its important economic implications. The final section 
presents a brief description, source, and the type of data used in the 
analysis. 
A. Farm-level Input Demands Adjusted for Seed Selectivity Bias 
Analysis of input demand from micro data on Indonesian rice farms 
is quite scarce. One study that is specifically concerned with 
fertilizer demand in Asian rice economy including Indonesia is done by 
David (1976). In her model, the relative price of fertilizer to rice 
was one of the arguments in the equation which supposedly reflects the 
market force influencing farmer economic behavior. The coefficient for 
the price ratio has the correct sign but is not significant, however. 
Moreover. if seed selection is taken into account from the fact that 
farmers do not use the same type of seed, empirical research is hardly 
prevalent. Even though there may have been some attempts to consider 
this seed variety, most of them assume that seed selection is an 
independent variable rather than a decision variable. Therefore, those 
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studies neglect the possibility that farmers can respond to price 
changes not only by adjusting their variable input use but also by 
switching to different seed varieties. This is theoretically 
inappropriate. Two most recent studies using the second approach in the 
context of rice production are by Sumodiningrat (1982) and Pitt (1983). 
Sumodiningrat's study applies a transcendental logarithmic (translog) 
cost function covering a broad range of inputs, variable and fixed. 
Pitt's study employs a translog profit function. These two studies are 
in line with the induced-innovation hypothesis in part of farm producers 
proposed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) arguing that changes in the 
relative prices of new inputs will induce farmers to search for 
technical alternatives that save the increasingly scarce factors of 
production where high-yielding varieties are essentially an input 
designed to facilitate the substitution of fertilizer (or other inputs) 
for land. 
One consequence of the inability to consider this switching 
process, namely, seed selection from a traditional to an improved 
variety is a tendency to underestimate the parameters derived from 
nonswitching regime as suggested by Pitt (1983). This study will not 
employ profit maximizing objective but instead implement a cost 
minimizing rule due to the fact that profit maximization might not be a 
suitable hypothesis in the Indonesian case due to the subsistence 
characteristic of farms. Therefore, the cost function approach is much 
more useful than the profit function approach from the viewpoint of 
generating systems of factor demand equations consistent with cost 
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minimization. It relates some a priori restrictions imposed by profit 
function and is easier to estimate. Nevertheless, both approaches use 
duality theorems between each function and the production function. 
Input demand elasticities are derived by using Shephard's lemma [see 
Shephard (1970), Jorgenson and Lau (1974), Diewert (1974), Silberberg 
(1979), and Beattie and Taylor (1985)]. 
Operationally, we assume that farmers have to select between two 
types of rice seed, high-yielding (HYV) or modern (MV) varieties and 
local (LV) or traditional (TV) varieties with the consideration of 
minimizing farm production cost for a given output level. For each 
combination of fixed and variable input prices, there is a variable cost 
(and optimal input use) for the two seeds. A farmer will choose to 
plant MV seeds if the reservation variable cost incurred by doing so is 
less than the variable cost by growing traditional variety seed. 
The model considered here contains two regimes described by a set 
of simultaneous equations as follows: 
C . = P .  Y  + Z . 6  + e .  ( 1 9 )  
mi 1 m 1 m mi 
h  \ + ' t l  <20) 
- «=ti - ^ 
where is a vector of variable input prices; is a vector of fixed 
input and output level; and represent variable costs under the 
MV and TV regime, respectively, 6^, and X are vectors of 
2 2 parameters; and e . _ N(0, a ), and e _ N(0, cr"). Equations (19) and 
mi m L1 t 
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(20) are variable cost functions. Equation (21) is the decision 
criterion determining whether or not the farmer to plant MV seeds, and 
I is an unobserved variable. However, a dummy variable, is observed 
having the value of 1 if the farmers grows MV, and 0 otherwise, that is 
1 if I.* > 0 
(22)  
otherwise ^ 0  
By further assuming that a farmer grows either MV or TV, we observe 
associated costs incurred taking values 
C. = C . , iff I. = 1 
1 mi X 
Ci = Cti ' iff =1 - 0 
(23) 
The population regression function for equation (19) then is written as 
E(C„i|Pj. Zj) - Pj V + ^ 1 'mi (24) 
which can be estimated without bias from a random sample of the 
population of rice farmers. The regression function for the incomplete 
sample (MV farmers only) is written as 
E(C^i|P^, , sample selection rule) = 
P. Y . + Z. Ô . + E(e .I sample selection rule) . (25) 
X mi X mx mi ' 
If the conditional expectation of on the right-hand side of equation 
(25) equals zero, a regression on the incomplete sample will provide 
unbiased estimates of Y . and 5 . (Heckman, 1976). However, it is verv 
mi Tni *' 
unlikely that both 
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E(e^^|l^ = 1) = 0 and " 0) = 0 . (26) 
This can only occur in a very special situation (Lee, 1976). In 
general, and cannot be consistently estimated by ordinary least 
squares using observed expenditures. 
The parameters of the model are estimated by specifying equations 
(19) and (20) in a translog form as 
LnC = aQ + .2^ k^l + 1 k^l jil ^ij^^^i 
+ iSl ^iy LnP. LnY + j (LnY)^ + b.,^LnP. LnZ^ (27) 
+ i I Ï dki Lnz^ LaZi + : LnZ^ LnY 
where again C is variable cost, is a vector of variable input prices, 
is a vector of fixed input and Y is output levelThis cost 
function must satisfy the following restrictions: 
1. Symmetry : (a) a^^ = ^ji' ^iy ~ ^ vi' (c) d^^ = d^^ (27 a) 
m r 
2. Homogeneity: (a) a^^ = ^ b^^ = 1, and 
m m m r r r 
j5l =ij • i 'iy • i 'ik * k \l • k "ik • k '^ky 
By employing Shephard's lemma, a specification for factor shares (S^) 
can be obtained as follows : 
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LnC n r 
\ = -TÔT = \ + jil ^ + kil \k \ (28) 
where S^ is the ratio of variable expenditures for the i-th input to 
farm production expenses. Therefore, elasticity demand for inputs are 
estimated from the estimation of parameters in equation (28). 
Cost function (25) is estimated by the two-stage method described 
by Heckman (1976) and Lee (1976). Substituting the cost functions (19) 
and (20) into the selection criteria (21), 
I.* = e. + P. 9, + Z. 6. - E * . (29) 
1 0 1 1 1 2 1 
Equation (29) is estimated as a typical probit equation allowing the 
possibility of computing the probability that any farmer has missing 
data on C . or C . (Pitt, 1983). The estimates demonstrate how prices 
mi ti 
and fixed factors affect the probability of adopting MV. Following 
further the two-stage method, if the joint density of and 
is multivariate normal, then the conditional expectation on the right 
hand side of (25) is 
f(^j) 
where F is the cumulative distribution of standard normal random 
variable and f is its density function, both evaluated at (j>^. F(^^) is 
the probability that is observed. In principle, then the two-stage 
procedure uses {-f (<j)^)/F(<j)^)} and {f ((|)^)/[ 1-F(<j)^)]} as regressors 
representing seed selection variable in the MV and TV cost function, 
respectively, to purge them of bias. <j)^ are estimated by 0^ + + 
K_@2, obtained from the estimated probit reduced-form equation (29).^ 
B. Production under Risk 
In the previous chapter, the importance of risk and uncertainty in 
affecting adoption behavior of the farmer has been described. This 
section focuses on the specific issue of incorporating the risk element 
in the production function. 
Apart from the implicit consequence of the estimation procedure, 
hypothesis testing and drawing conclusions from the duality of the 
neoclassical production function discussed in Section A, another 
restrictive limitation embodied by many models is the failure to 
recognize the fact that output, and hence profit, might be stochastic. 
Consequently, it might be more realistic to assume that the producer is 
maximizing expected profit, or expected utility, which could for example 
be a function of the mean and variance of profit. Production risks 
arise from the variability of yields and technology or as Magnusson 
(1969) states, from the uncertain performance of production factors. 
Three major categories of risk and uncertainty in this respect are: (i) 
technological risk, (ii) weather risk, and (iii) price risk. All three 
are important in the traditional agriculture to low income nations 
(Mellor, 1969). 
The concept of stochasticity in production is not a new topic in 
the economic literature [see Marschak and Andrews (1944), Day (1965), 
Fuller (1965), Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze (1966), Anderson (1973), Pope 
and Just (1977), Just and Pope (1978, 1979a, 1979b), Antle (1983), Blair 
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and Lusky (1975)]. This research is primarily concerned with the 
implication of the inclusion of risk measured by moments of output 
distributions as a basis for portfolio choice. In particular, the 
effects of these distribution moments on farm input decision theory will 
be investigated. 
Just and Pope (1979a,b) have shown that the usual specifications of 
production functions with appending of additive or multiplicative random 
error terms have severe restrictions with respect to risk when risk is 
measured as the variance of output distribution. Naturally, some inputs 
may have decreasing effect on production risk such as pesticides and 
possibly certified seeds. However, these specifications do not allow 
for a possibility of decreasing risk since they are generally designed 
to measure mean productivity and typically ignore the possibility that 
higher moments may also be functions of input use. This has been 
empirically shown to be true by Day (1965), Anderson (1973), Roumasset 
(1976), Just and Pope (1979a,b), Nikiphoroff (1981), Antle and Goodger 
(1984). This assertion can be demonstrated as follows. Let 
y = m(X, a )e^ (31) 
where y is output, X = (X^, , .., X^) is a vector of inputs, a is a 
conformable parameter vector and e is a random error. Though this form 
is simple, it has little theoretical justification and can be shown to 
impose a number of arbitrary restrictions on the stochastic structure of 
the production process. Letting E(.) denote the mathematical 
expectation operator, the mean of output 
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= E(y) = m(X,a ) E(e^) (32) 
and the variance is 
^2 = E[y - E(y)]2 = m(X, a)^ E[e= - E(e^)]^ (33) 
and in general, the i-th moment about is 
= m(X, a)^ E[l- E(e^)]^ . (34) 
Equation (32) implies that the mean and the higher moments of the 
probability distribution of output are functions of inputs through the 
function m(X, a). The set of restrictions, or maintained hypothesis, 
implied by this model can be expressed in terms of the elasticities of 
moments with respect to inputs. From equation (34), for 0, 
i > 2 .  
In other words, the elasticity of the i-th moment with respect to the j-
th input, is proportional to the mean production elasticity 
The second frequently used specification is the additive error model 
y = m(X, o) + e . (36) 
Typically, e is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
across all observations and distribution of e is assumed not to depend 
on X, Under this specification, only the mean of the output 
distribution is assumed to be a function of inputs, all others moments 
independent of X. Thus, model (36) implies that = 0 for all i 2. 
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Just and Pope (1978) have suggested a more flexible stochastic 
specification than model (31) and (36) by using the Heteroskedastic 
model proposed by Harvey (1976). This is done by decomposing random 
error e in equation (36) with heteroskedastic structure as 
where u is an independently and identically distributed error term. 
This will allow for a relation between uncertainty and inputs not solely 
determined through the relationship of input and expected output. 
Moreover, h(X, g) is possibly linearly homogeneous allowing sufficient 
and h^^ denotes the first and second derivative of h with respect to i) 
are not predetermined a priori and so inputs with decreasing risk effect 
can be detected. 
This model has an intuitive appeal in the empirical analysis of 
production economics. Nevertheless, it has one weakness that has been 
pointed out by Antie (1981), Nikiphoroff (1981), and Antle (1983). This 
model imposes restrictions on the second and higher moments just as the 
models (31) and (36) impose on all moments. Namely, with equation (37), 
e = h(X, S)u. 
For i > 2 and E(u) f 0 the parameters of the i-th moment are directly 
related to the parameters of the second moment, particularly 
e = h(X, 6)u (37) 
E(E^) = h(X, 6)^ E(u^) = . (38)  
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'"Al.. «h(XB)/h(X.S).l _ 1)2 (39) 
'^ij «X /X «Xj/Xj 2 "2j 
Therefore, the elasticity of each higher nonzero moment with respect to 
an input is directly proportional to the elasticity of the second moment 
with respect to that input. He then proposed an alternative linear 
moment model as follows: 
y = X + e (40) 
= E(y) = X 6^ . (41) 
Defining = E(u^) , i >_ 2, as the i-th moment of y about its mean 
Then let the i-th moment function be 
= X , E(v^) =0, ± > 2 (42) 
so that = X S^ for all i. The model represented by equations (41) 
and (42) contains a different parameter vector for each moment 
function and thus does not impose restrictions on the either within 
or across moments. 
In spite of the drawback possessed by the Just and Pope model about 
the consequence on higher moments, it will be used in empirical 
estimation of production function specified later. 
This can still be justified when we assume that output follows a 
two-parameter distribution such as the normal distribution because most 
empirical production studies assume normality anyway. Moreover, Antle's 
model certainly necessitates a more complicated estimation procedure. 
Operationally assuming a traditional production function in Cobb-Douglas 
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(C-D) form, 
K n , G J 
Yz = G ( n X. ^)e ^ (43) 
1 U k=i k 
where is output and > 0 is the k-th input, is the stochastic 
2 
random error such that E(e^) = 0, and Var (e^) = ^ >0. Then the 
marginal effect of input on production variability can be shown as 
follows: 
K *k 2 e 
Var (y) = [a ( it X, )] Var (e ) (44) 
" k=l ^ 
avar (y) = ^°0^k=l 4^)]^ „ ^  . e 
Var (e ) . (45) 
k 
Equations (43) and (45) can be estimated using OLS after linearizing 
them by logarithmic operators. A more flexible form of production 
function proposed by Just and Pope (J-P), is specified as: 
K a. K g, 
= °o ( * 3%:^  + *o( " Xk ) "i ' (46) 
1 U k=i k " k=l k 1 
Then by the same token, the marginal effect of input on production 
variability can be derived as follows: 
* 6% 2 
Var (y.) = [B. ( it X, )] Var (u.) (47) 
k=l ^ 
and 
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SVsrCy ) K g 
^ "O \ V.r (U;). (48) 
Equation (46) is estimated involving three-stage procedure in order to 
yield asymptotically efficient estimates as outlined in Pope and Just 
(1977). 
Having estimated these equations, the next issue is to compare the 
optimal input use under the corresponding production functions. For the 
production risk model with linear mean-variance utility of profit and no 
price uncertainty, factor demand equations can be derived as follows 
[see Anderson et al. (1977), Dillon (1977), Just and Pope (1979a). and 
Hallam et al. (1982)]. 
For equations (46) through (48), then equation (49) becomes 
By rearranging (50), factor demand equations would be 
c.  C3U 
k k 
where w^ is the price of input k, (j) is risk aversion coefficient (that 
is, ^ > 0 represents risk-aversion, (j) = 0 risk-neutrality, and (j) < 0 
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risk preference, respectively) and e^ is the disturbance term such that 
E(e^) = 0. The complete system of factor demand equation would then be 
written as: 
^1 ®01 ®11^11 ®21^21 ^  ®1 
^2 ®02 ®12^12 ®22^22 ®2 
(52) 
where 
where 
a = 
\ ®0j ®1K^1K ®2K^2K 
k k 
, a, from C-D production function 
1 from J-P production function 
^ °KX,2 
b = 
cx^ [OQ )]" Var (e ) from C-D production function 
{ ^ ®K 2 
®k ^^0 ^k=l ^  ^ ^ Var (u) from J-P production function 
C. Data Set 
To implement those two models considered in previous sections, this 
study utilizes the data collected by Survey Agro Ekonomi (Agro Economic 
Survey) from its section located in Bogor, Jawa Barat, Indonesia. 
These data are part of the Rural Dynamic Study in paddy production area 
of the Cimanuk River Basin, Jawa Barat. The project was originally 
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planned to be continually conducted over years in order to observe farm 
individual response to economic and social stimulus existing over time 
in rural community by monitoring current data on labor requirements and 
employment opportunities, other inputs used in each crop, production 
costs and prices by crop. Other aspects that were being observed 
include livestock and machinery ownership and use, land tenure 
arrangements, consumption pattern, farm and non-farm income sources. 
However, upon completing two full crop years recording on farm 
management activities beginning in 1977, the project was unanticipatedly 
terminated due to lack of funds and changes in administration by the end 
of 1978. Fortunately, the survey reinstated again in 1983 to the same 
location and the same farmers. 
In 1977, the survey was conducted twice, that is, at the beginning 
and the end of the year. The first survey was associated with farming 
practice covering the wet (rainy) season of 1975/1976 and the dry season 
of 1976. The second survey covered data specifically on household 
activities in wet season of 1976/1977. In 1978, the visit to the survey 
area was undergone to cover data on farm management activities at dry 
season of 1977. The resurvey of 1983 to the same area and same farmers 
was conducted with a different emphasis on labor requirements and 
supply, land and asset holding, land tenure arrangements. Not 
surprisingly, during the five-year period there are tremendous changes 
prevailing in those aspects. At any rate, some data from farmers could 
be secured for this study. 
The location of the survey is characterized by dominant rice farms, 
implying having a good water supply and almost similar agroclimate 
environment. Sample farmers were drawn from six desas by multi stage 
stratified random sampling from the upper level kecamatans in such a way 
that those desas should come from six different kecamatans. And these 
kecamatans were picked randomly from five kabupatens (the higher level 
administration unit below province). Pesa selection was based on four 
criteria such as: (1) percentage of sawah (rice field) accessible to 
irrigation water all year round, (2) accessibility to transportation 
(automotive), (3) proximity to township, and (4) latitude stratum. 
From each desa, 60 farmers were selected as respondents 
representing all farmers in the desa community (Table 8). They were 
drawn from four strata based on hectareage under their own operated 
land. The strata are (1) below 0.25 ha, (2) 0.25 to 0.50 ha, (3) 0.50 
to 1 ha, and (4) above 1.00 ha. The attempt was to obtain 15 farmers 
from each stratum. For analyzing farm-level input demands adjusted to 
seed selection bias, the model is applied against 1977 and 1983 data 
sets separately based on season and year. But the production under risk 
model is tested against the same data with conformable individual farmer 
during the three-year and six-season survey. Ideally, the model would 
better be estimated from a combination of large cross-section and long 
time-series of microlevel data on inputs, outputs, and prices. With 
such a data set, information would be available to estimate not only 
cross-section production functions, but also to measure directly 
disturbances affecting price and output as perceived by the farmers. In 
addition, other information on environmental inputs such as soil organic 
matter, clay content of soil in farmers* fields, and stochastic inputs 
such as solar radiation, stress days and other agroclimatic variable in 
nature would also be desirable. Unfortunately, such a data set is 
unavailable at this time. So are data on series of yield response 
experiments on farmers' fields. At any rate, our aim in this study is 
primarily to ascertain whether both positive and negative marginal risks 
are likely to exist and to analyze whether this model is better in 
explaining the input allocation by farmers. We have to assume then that 
over time the levels of inputs in a given farm are not likely to vary 
sufficiently to cause a considerable jump in time coefficient. 
The variables used are reported and gathered during the six seasons 
from each farm. They are classified as: (1) observations on gross 
paddy yield (kg); (2) total expenditure for harvesting yield (kg); (3) 
net paddy yield (kg); (4) paddy price during harvest season (Rp/kg); (5) 
value of net paddy yield (Rp); (6) expenditure for buying rice-food 
(Rp); (7) expenditure for non-rice-food (Rp); (8) total household 
expenditure (Rp); (9) hectareage of land operated by farmer household 
(ha); (10) numbers of land fractions; (11) amounts of seed applied (kg) 
and its value (Rp); (12) amounts and values of fertilizer applied (N, P, 
and manure) in kg and Rp, respectively; (13) value of pesticide (Rp); 
(14) total value of production inputs (Rp); (15) seed type dummy, 1 for 
MV (or HYV) and 0 for TV (or LV); (16) man, woman, and animal labor 
input used in production process either from family or hired; and (17) 
age of the head of household (years). 
Other additional variables which were documented in the last four 
Table 8. Number of rice farms and percentage of Irrigated sawah in the area selected for the survey 
by residency 
Residency 
Wet season 
1976 1977 1983 
Dry season Percentage 
of irrigated 
1976 1977 1983 sawah in the desa 
3 b 
I. Wargabinangun , Gegesik , 
Cirebon 60 60 52 60 60 52 90 
2. Lanjan, Lohbener, 
Indramayu 60 59 53 60 60 53 40 
3. Gunungwangi, Argapura, 
Majalengka 60 60 50 60 60 50 96 
4. Malausma, Bantarujeg, 
Majalengka 60 60 55 60 59 55 33 
5. Sukaambit, Situraja, 
Sumedang 60 60 49 60 60 49 71 
6. Ciwangi, Blubur Limbangan, 
Garut 60 61 53 60 59 53 96 
Total 360 360 312 360 358 312 
a Desa. 
Kecamatan. 
'Kabupaten. 
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seasons but not in the first two are: (1) main occupation, (2) dummy 
for member of government agricultural program BIMAS, (3) tenure, status 
or tenure arrangements, and (4) non-food expenditure (Rp). 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
^Fixed inputs are considered in the model because if factor inputs 
are conditional on the level of output and the remaining inputs, then 
there exists a short-run or variable cost function which is also dual to 
the production function. 
2 The asymptotic standard errors of parameters of this model are 
estimated following Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980). 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The aim of this chapter is to set out the results of the separate 
independent estimation procedures developed in the two sections of the 
previous chapter against the data set of 1976, 1977, and 1983 on rice 
farming activities in both rainy and dry seasons. Further, interpre­
tation and discussion of the individual estimates is also attempted. 
Corresponding to the presentation in Chapter IV, the first section 
of the chapter elaborates the farm-level input demand by applying the 
sequence of the following estimation approaches: first, probit 
procedure to analyze factors determining seed selection and to generate 
an index of the seed selectivity variable; second, systems of cost share 
functions under the absence of seed selectivity adjustment regime; and 
third, systems of cost share functions under seed selectivity 
adjustment. In the second section, the actual estimation of production 
under risk case will be explained in more detail. Three production 
specifications, that is, Cobb-Douglas type. Crude model,^ and 
Heteroskedastic Model^ are estimated and their results are also 
compared. Furthermore, elasticities of output variability with respect 
to factors of production implied by each model are also evaluated. 
Lastly, input-use equations implied by the Cobb-Douglas and the 
Heteroskedastic models are investigated. 
A. Farm-level Input Demands 
Having adopted the translog cost function as in equation (27) of 
Chapter IV along with the necessary underlying restrictions as for any 
typical demand function [equations (27a) and (27b)], we obtain some 
78 
exogenous variables and some endogenous variables as appeared in Table 
9. Then the estimation is proceeded by taking the relationship of 
endogenous variables on exogenous variables. These constructed 
variables have no direct economic interpretation but the influence of 
each of the basic economic variables that constituted the constructed 
variables as in equation (27) and Table 9 can be derived from the 
estimation function. 
Some descriptive statistics from farmers' samples are summarized in 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for rainy (dry) season data. From the tables 
it appears that most of quantity variables do not change much between 
five—year range on data sets in the same season except the net paddy 
yield means. Of course, there exists quite a change in most price 
variables supposedly due to an increase in price level from 1977 to 
1983. On further analysis, these two-year data sets are treated 
separately as exemplified in probit estimation results of Table 10. The 
reason is due to the inability to control for other important changes in 
conditions between the two periods and to the simplification the the 
estimation. Also, in this particular section, the data set of 1976 are 
not included because imputed labor wages, for human and animal, are 
unreliable. 
Since the seed—selection model is derived as the difference in 
total costs of planting modern and traditional varieties, the 
restrictions imposed on the total cost function will automatically be 
carried over to the seed-selection model estimated by the two-stage 
probit procedure. The estimation results are set out in Table 10. 
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Table 9. Description of the variables used in the empirical estimation 
Name Description 
Endogenous Variables 
LnC* {Total expense - Animal labor wage - Insecticide or 
pesticide expense - (Output*Insecticide or pesticide 
expense)} 
I Seed type, MV=1 and TV=0 
Exogenous Variables 
LnY 
LnPMafa 
LnPMhla 
SPMAl 
SPMA2 
SPMB 
LYPM, sa 
LYPM. 
nfa 
LYPM' hla 
LHMIP 
SPKMA 
Net paddy yield 
Seed price - Animal wage 
Nitrogen price - Animal wage 
Human labor wage - Animal wage 
{(Seed price*Nitrogen price) - (Seed price*Animal wage) 
- (Nitrogen price*Animal wage) + (Animal wage)^ } 
{(Seed price*Human wage) - (Seed price*Animal wage) 
- (Human wage*Animal wage) + (Animal wage)^ } 
{(Nitrogen price*Human wage) - (Nitrogen price*Animal wage) 
- (Human wage*Animal wage) + (Animal wage)^ } 
LnY*LPMs3 
LnY*LPMnl^  
LnY*LPMhia 
Landholding - Insecticide or pesticide expense 
{(Seed price*Landholding) - (Seed price*Insecticide 
expense) - (Animal wage*Landholding) + (Animal Wage* 
Insecticide expense)} 
L^n designates natural logarithms. 
Table 9. (continued) 
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Name Description 
SPKMB {(Nitrogen price*Landholding) - (Nitrogen price*Insecticide 
expense) - (Animal wage*Landholding) + (Animal wage* 
Insecticide expense)} 
SPKMC {(Human wage*Landholding) - (Human wage*Insecticide 
expense) - (Animal wage*Landholding) + (Animal 
wage*Insecticide expense)} 
LYLHMIP LnY*LHMIP 
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Table 10. Probit reduced - form coefficient estimates of seed selection 
equations, 1977 and 1983 
Endogenous Year - 1977 Year - 1983 
Variables^  
lb 2C 1^  2C 
Intercept -6.0612 -2.5108** 4.5001 0.8325 
D(.)d 
-7.5907 -1.5647 -12.9200 -1.4547 
LnY -0.6934 -1.5050 -0.5482 -0.6164 
D(.) 0.9830 1.4119 1.5072 0.8903 
l/2(LnY)2 0.0567 0.9083 -0.0092 -0.1053 
D(.) -1.1057 -1.1742 0.0334 0.1745 
LnPMsa 5.5364 2.22293** 1.8159 0.4437 
D(.) -5.2699 -1.2776 1.9307 0.3055 
LaPHnfa -20.2800 -4.7983*** 6.5625 1.2158 
D(.) 16.7940 2.2094** -15.1360 -1.8298* 
LnPMhla 5.3271 1.6574* -6.9973 -1.4927 
D(.) -12.5980 —2.4041** 7.6253 1.2257 
l/2(LnPMga)2 17.7860 5.3744*** 6.1705 2.8313*** 
D(.) -17.6980 -5.1729*** -2.9788 -1.1296 
SPMAl -16.1580 -5.4421*** -5.0609 -2.2091** 
D(.) 15.6010 4.1621*** 2.7761 0.8491 
SPMA2 7.4380 2.9707*** -0.3103 -0.2078 
C^omplete description of the variables is presented in Table 9. 
C^oef ficients. 
A^symptotic t-ratios. 
D^(.) represents D*Variable right above it, where D=1 for rainy 
season and D=0 for dry season. 
Significant at og o^=1.695. 
**Significant at og Qg=1.960. 
Significant at otQ^Q^=2.576. 
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Table 10. (continued) 
Endogenous Year - 1977 Year - 1983 
Variables^  
2_b 1^  2^  
D(.) -8.5656 -2.6998*** 1.1091 0.5358 
l/2(LnPMafa)2 2.6594 1.4900 9.3415 1.0950* 
D(.) 6.5741 1.5800 -9.2168 -1.4022 
SPMB -4.7828 -2.0182** -2.7412 -1.1751 
D(.) 0.2180 0.0676 2.7776 0.9371 
l/2(LnPMhia)2 -0.8789 -0.4483 -0.6639 0.7610 
D(.) 0.8709 0.4185 0.7121 0-7386 
0.7568 2.3899** -0.4883 -1.2664 
D(.) -1.2106 -2.5286** 0.2405 0.4182 
0.3834 0.5573 -0.0276 -0.0403 
D(.) 0.0821 0.0827 0.7616 0.7956 
™Mhla -1.4043 -2.7742*** 0.2111 0.4081 
D(.) 1.3701 1.8889* -0.0541 -0.0717 
LHMIP -0.3228 -0.8723 0.4909 0.8268 
D(.) 0.2844 0.5280 -0.0620 -0.0825 
1/2(LHMIP)2 0.0658 -1.1104 0.0286 0.3055 
D(.) 0.1599 1.6929* 0.1033 0.8238 
SPKMA 0.5420 2.5833*** 0.0606 0.4751 
D(.) -0.4399 -1.6015 0.0595 -0.3418 
SPKMB -0.0970 -0.2698 0.1680 0.5769 
D(.) 0.1335 0.2977 -0.0527 -0.1455 
SPKMC -0.2971 -1.1844 0.1394 0.8401 
D(.) 0.1799 0.5625 -0.1201 -0.5044 
LYLHMIP 0.0159 0.6252 -0.0014 -0.0400 
D(.) 0.0194 0.4778 0.0067 0.1200 
Negative 
Loglikelihood Function 160 .65 230. 71 
Likelihood Ratio Test 407 .74 231. 92 
Degrees of Freedom 41 41 
Number of Observations 576 506 
Out of 42 coefficient estimates, 19 (4) are statistically significant 
for data set of 1977 (1983). Coefficients of first order price 
variables are mostly significant. So are its season interactions [D(.)] 
for data of 1977 which are different from those of data of 1983. These 
coefficient estimates cannot directly show the sign or magnitude of the 
change in the probability of growing MV rice varieties in response to 
changes in the exogenous variables. Therefore, we evaluate this 
sensitivity response in terms of the elasticities as presented in Table 
11. One thing that is worth pointing out though, is that these 
elasticities, like any elasticity coefficient, are very subject to the 
values where they are evaluated. In this regard, some simplification 
steps were inevitably made during its calculation. Apart from its direct 
interpretation, these elasticities will also be used an as adjustment 
factor in the sample of farmers when calculating total input demand 
elasticities later in this section. 
The results from Table 11 concerning nitrogen fertilizer price are 
conformable to a priori expectation for all data sets. For instance, 
it is expected that an increase in fertilizer price, all things 
remaining the same, will induce a decline in the probability of farmers 
to use MVs which are shown by coefficients of -2.11 (-0.08) for 1977 
rainy (dry) season data and -0.59 (-0.89) for 1983 rainy (dry) season 
data. On the other hand, the elasticities with respect to seed price, 
wage rate of human and animal labor have positive signs excluding the 
elasticities with respect to seed price on rainy season 1977 and the 
elasticities with respect to human labor wage on dry season 1977. The 
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Table 11. Estimated elasticities of the probability of choosing 
MVs evaluated at sample means 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Estimated Elasticities 
1977 1983 
Seed price: 
Landholding: 
Nitrogen price: RS 
DS 
Wage rates 
Human labor: RS 
DS 
Animal labor : RS 
DS 
Output level: RS 
DS 
DS 
Insecticide or 
Pesticide expense: 
RS 
DS 
-0.05 
1.26 
-2.11 
-0.08 
0.22 
-1.24 
2.71 
0.63 
-0.06 
-0.15 
-0.02 
0.31 
0.02 
-0.31 
0.55 
0.51 
-0.59 
-0.89 
0.23 
0.24 
0.69 
0.60 
-0.08 
-0.08 
-0.22 
-0.06 
0.22 
0.06 
R^S designates rainy season. 
D^S designates dry season. 
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table also shows that the elasticities with respect to the level of 
output and landholding are generally negative except that of landholding 
on dry season data of 1977. 
The interpretation of the individual elasticities is generally a 
relatively straightforward exercise. For example, for all data sets 
1977 of rainy and dry seasons, those elasticities illustrate that for a 
1 percent increase in nitrogen fertilizer price, all things being equal, 
there will be a 2.11 (0.08) percent decrease in the probability of 
growing MVs seed during rainy (dry) season. The magnitude of these 
elasticities are also as expected; that is, the change in response will 
be higher during the rainy season than the dry season. Likewise, for 
1983 data it appears that for a 1 percent increase in nitrogen price, 
all things remaining the same, there will be a 0.59 (0.89) percent 
decrease in the probability of choosing MV seeds during rainy (dry) 
season. The magnitude of the elasticity on rainy season data is smaller 
than that of dry season data. 
Turning to seed price effect, we would expect that an increase in 
seed price would cause a decrease in the probability of using MVs. 
However, this assertion is not supported by the estimated elasticities 
except for only 1977 rainy season data. This is indeed puzzling. It 
appears that seed price is not a major factor in determining its 
adoption. Indeed, the majority of farmers acquire production inputs, 
especially seed, from government provision channeled through the BIMAS 
program. These estimates might also be resulted from the fact 
that seed expense is only a small part of production budget (Appendix 
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Tables Al and A2). 
With respect to change in wage labor, the signs of the elasticities 
are generally positive which imply that an increase in human or animal 
wage rate will tend to raise the probability of planting î-!Vs by rice 
growers. These results appear to be showing that, given the common 
knowledge that modem varieties are more labor intensive than local 
varieties, even though wage rates rise, farmers could still grow modern 
varieties. This occurs because hired labor, which is subject to market 
condition, is only a small source of total labor during the rice 
production process. The effect of a 1 percent increase in output level 
have all negative signs implying that an increase in the output level 
will reduce the probability of using MV seeds by 0.06 (0.15) percent on 
rainy (dry) season data of 1977 and 0.08 percent on both rainy and dry 
season data of 1983. 
Turning to the effect of the size of land operated by rice farm 
growers, the signs are negative for rainy season of both data sets. For 
instance, an increase in land size by 1 percent, ceteris paribus, there 
will be a 0.02 (0.22) percent decline in the probability of planting MVs 
for 1977 (1983) data. However, during the dry season of 1977 (1983) it 
appears that for a 1 percent increase in land size operated by a farmer, 
all things remaining the same, there will be a 0.31 (-0.06) percent 
change in the probability of planting modern rice varieties. This seems 
to suggest that the larger the operated land is, the more likely that 
farmers will avoid planting modem varieties. This appears to 
contradict the general expectation that larger farmers the more inclined 
87 
to be receptive adopters. It might have something to do with the 
aversion to risk on the part of larger farmers. Risk aversion, 
unfortunately, cannot be simultaneously incorporated in this particular 
model, due to types and limitations of the data. 
Turning back to the total cost function itself, an attempt is made 
to utilize as much information as is available by estimating it through 
seemingly unrelated multivariate regression technique developed by 
Zellner. Specifically, knowing that input share function is derived by 
taking partial derivative of total cost function with respect to price 
of particular input, there is a very high probability that the 
disturbances from each of the included total cost and input share 
equations are to be correlated because errors in cost minimization which 
result in overstating on input share will symmetrically affect other 
input shares- Therefore, greater efficiency in estimation can be 
achieved by this technique. In addition, iteration of the Zellner's 
estimation procedure will converge results into maximum likelihood 
estimates. The results of this iteration of the Zellner's technique are 
presented in Tables 12 and 13. Note, however, that the estimates for 
the total cost function are not included due to the fact that by 
applying Shephard's lemma, everything there is to know about the total 
cost function is already captured in input share equations. 
Estimates on Table 12 are the results from 1977 data and estimates 
on Table 13 are the results from 1983 data. Incidentally, upper halves 
of Tables 12 and 13 show the estimates for TVs and bottom halves are the 
results for MV of 1977 and 1983, respectively. 
Turning first to the upper half of Table 12, it shows that only 2 
88 
Table 12. Estimated coefficients of input share equations for TVs and 
MVS without adjustment for seed selectivity bias, 1977 
Equations Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
Exogenous 
Variables* ib 2^  1^  2"= 1^  2<^  
TV Farmers Group 
Intercept 0.0658 1.8565* 0.1601 2.6089*** 0.7513 9.4107 
D(.)d 0.0480 0.9400 -0.0359 -0.4032 -0.0287 -0.2550 
LnPMga -0.0555 -1.4434 0.0314 0.7979 -0.0356 -1.0273 
D(.) 0.0954 2.1146** -0.0332 -0.6962 0.0042 0.1167 
LaPKnfa 0.0314 0.7979 0.0486 0.6735 -0.0387 -0.5807 
D(.) -0.0332 -0.6852 -0.0716 -0.8546 -0.0199 -0.2857 
LnPMhla -0.0356 -1.0273 -0.0387 -0.5807 0.0926 1.0723 
D(.) 0.0042 0.1167 -0.0199 -0.2857 0.0604 0.6770 
LnY -0.0055 -0.9942 0.0211 2.1212** -0.0139 -1.0861 
D(.) -0.0033 -0.4256 -0.0173 -1.2472 0.0132 0.7397 
LHMIP 0.0050 1.2548 -0.0078 -1.1114 0.0089 0.9743 
D(.) -0.0004 -0.0923 0.0181 2.1191** -0.0088 -0.7946 
C^omplete description of variables is presented in Table 9. 
C^oefficients. 
A^symptotic t-ratios. 
D^(.) represents D*Variable right above it, where D=1 for rainy 
season and D=0 for dry season. 
*Significant at og ^ 0=1.645. 
**Significant at 
***Significant at ag.01=2.576. 
Table 12. (continued) 
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Equations 
Exogenous 
Variables^  
Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
MV Farmers Group 
LnPM, sa 
D(.) 
LnPM. 
nfa 
D(.) 
Intercept 0.0354 1.4239 0.2153 
D(.)d 0.0331 0.8793 0.0219 
0.0424 3.2395***-0.0351 
-0.0072 -0.3768 -0.0003 
-0.0351 -2.1571** 0.0979 
-0.0003 -0.0112 -0.0782 
-0.0416 -2.1786** -0.0566 
D(.) 0.0418 1.4626 0.0359 
LnY 0.0004 0.1084 0.0151 
D(.) -0.0016 -0.3328 -0.0270 
LHMIP 0.0065 3.6844*** 0.0019 
D(.) -0.0055 -2.2730** -0.0125 
LnPM, hla 
3.0883*** 0.6721 
0.1991 -0.0064 
-2.1571** -0.0416 
-0.0112 0.0418 
1.8466* -0.0566 
-0.7721 0.0359 
-1.0344 0.1187 
0.3983 -0.0896 
1.3781 -0.0044 
-1.7942* 0.0118 
0.3526 -0.0044 
-1.6456* 0.0173 
8.6304*** 
-0.0556 
-2.1786** 
1.4626 
-1.0344 
0.3983 
1.8397* 
-0.9172 
-0.3607 
0.7069 
-0.7267 
2.0649** 
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Table 13. Estimated coefficients of input share equations for TVs and 
MVs without adjustment for seed selectivity bias, 1983 
Equations Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
Exogenous 
Variables^  1% 2= it 2= lb 2= 
TV Farmers Group 
Intercept 0.0575 4.1079*** 0.1731 4.3318*** 0.8597 14.0460*** 
D(.)d 
-0.0316 -1.5925 -0.1149 -2.0147** -0.0479 -0.5298 
LaPMsa 0.0057 1.0433 0.0150 2.1881** -0.0184 -4.7138*** 
D(.) 0.0016 0.2129 0.0055 0.6051 -0.0148 -2.9536*** 
LaPMnfa 0.0150 2.1881** 0.0884 5.2374*** -0.0596 -5.2803*** 
D(.) 0.0055 0.6051 0.0033 0.1549 -0.0622 -4.3074*** 
LnPMhla -0.0184 -4.7138*** -0.0596 -5.2803*** 0.0950 4.9907*** 
D(.) -0.0148 -2.9536*** -0.0622 —4.3074*** 0.0702 2.9528*** 
LnY -0.0008 -0.5079 0.0110 2.2362** -0.0127 -1.5855 
D(.) 0.0027 1.0604 0.0048 0.6400 0.0004 0.0293 
LHMIP -0.0005 -0.5509 -0.0077 -0.30801*** 0.0192 4.6359*** 
D(.) -0.0000 0.0324 -0.0004 -0.1090 -0.0085 -1.5848 
C^omplete description of variables is presented in Table 9. 
C^oefficients. 
A^symptotic t-ratios. 
D^(.) represents D*Variable right above it, where D=1 for rainy 
season and D=0 for dry season. 
*Significant at og 2Q=1.645. 
**Significant at aQ^ Q5=1.960. 
***Significant at 03.01=2-576. 
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Table 13. (coneinued) 
Equations 
Exogenous 
Variables^  
Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
lb 2C lb 2C lb 2= 
MV Farmers Group 
Intercept 0.0358 1.4661 0.0658 1.5390 0.8701 16.3320*** 
D(.)d -0.0230 -0.6052 0.1445 2.1952** -0.1352 -1.5877 
0.0810 10.4460*** 0.0102 1.0322 -0.0637 -5.7339*** 
D(.) -0.0209 -2.0903** 0.0046 0.3510 0.0059 0.3795 
LaPMnfa 0.0102 1.0322 0.0807 3.3937*** -0.1231 —6.4620*** 
D(.) 0.0046 0.3510 0.0225 0.6448 0.0218 0.7501 
LnPHhia -0.0637 -5.7339*** -0.1231 -6.4620*** 0.2047 6.8137*** 
D(.) 0.0059 0.3795 0.0218 0.7501 -0.0354 -0.8021 
LnY 0.0078 2.6238*** 0.0137 2.9747*** -0.0247 -3.6881*** 
D(.) 0.0004 0.0847 -0.0146 -1.9902** 0.0207 1.9209* 
LHMIP -0.0031 —2.9606*** -0.0045 -2.7745*** 0.0073 3.1296*** 
D(.) -0.0003 -0.2020 -0.0023 -0.9384 -0.0026 -0.7442 
out of 12 coefficients are statistically significant on seed share 
equations, and 3 in nitrogen and 1 in human labor share equations, 
respectively. On the bottom half of Table 12, we see that 5 out of 12 
coefficients are statistically significant on each seed and nitrogen 
share functions, and 4 in human labor share. For 1983, Table 13 
exhibits that 4 out of 12 coefficients are statistically significant on 
seed share equations, 8 in each nitrogen fertilizer and human labor 
share functions. The lower half of Table 13 reports that 5 out of 12 
coefficients are significant on seed share equations, 6 and 7 on 
nitrogen and human labor share equations, respectively. 
For the purpose of incorporating seed selection as an endogenous 
decision variable or in other words, to evaluate how important the 
selectivity variable is, the system of equations in Tables 12 and 13 are 
reestimated by including the selectivity variable as one of additional 
exogenous variables as previously outlined in equations (29) and (30) of 
Chapter IV. In a sense then, this is going to be the two-stage 
estimation results. The conformable tables to Tables 12 and 13 then are 
Tables 14 and 15. By observing these tables, out of 12 total input share 
equations for TVs and MV of 1977 and 1983 data, eight of them have 
statistically significant selectivity variables as seen on all seed share 
equations, on nitrogen share equations of MV of 1977 and 1983 data, and 
on human labor share of 1977 data. This is obviously an evidence of the 
existence of selection bias in estimating those input share equations 
from a subsample of farmers- On the other hand, for nitrogen share 
equations of TVs of 1977 and 1983 data, and human labor share equations 
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of TV 1977 and of 1983 data, seed selection bias appears to be 
statistically insignificant. 
Turning back to Tables 12 and 13, the coefficients again cannot 
show directly the sign and magnitude of the input elasticity of demand. 
These elasticities must be derived from mathematical combinations of the 
coefficients and the value of input share.^  These derived elasticities 
appear in Tables 16 to 19 for each data set. 
The most obvious feature observed in those tables is that most of 
the own-price elasticities of demand have correct negative signs on all 
data sets except on demand for seed and human labor on MV group of dry 
season 1983 which have positive signs. Also, the elasticity of animal 
labor wage on animal labor demand function in this data set is positive. 
The same thing also seems to be true in rainy season data 1983. 
Moreover, these elasticities also show a tendency to decline, when 
comparing data sets of 1977 and 1983 in the same season. This 
phenomenon might be resulted from the fact that over time, farmers also 
leam their perceived distribution of technical parameters and gather 
more and more information about adoption. This is illustrated by 
figures in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 where more farmers are using MVs 
from 30.16 (35.79) percent of the farmer samples in rainy (dry) season 
1977 to 55.08 (57.60) percent in rainy (dry) season 1983. 
For the data sets of 1977 and 1983, own-price elasticity of demand 
V 
for seed are -0.20 (-0.36) and -0.77 (-0.01) for TV (MV) group of rainy 
season data and —1.48 (-0.43) and -0.82 (0.20) for TV (MV) group of dry 
season data. It appears that the absolute elasticities of dry season 
94 
Table 14. Estimated coefficients of input share equations for TVs and 
MVS with adjustment for seed selectivity bias, 1977 
Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
lb 2^  1^  2^  
TV Farmers Group 
Equations 
Exogenous 
Variables* 
Intercept 
D(.)d 
LaPMga 
D(.) 
LoPMofa 
D(.) 
LaPMhla 
D(.) 
LnY 
D ( 0  
LHMIP 
D(.) 
SELECT® 
D(.) 
0.0558 
0.0638 
-0.0758 
0.1147 
-0.0132 
0.0154 
0.0284 
-0.0568 
-0.0091 
0.0001 
0.0116 
-0.0070 
0.1366 
-0.1202 
1.6255 
1.2751 
—2.0140** 
2.5981*** 
-0.3324 
0.3201 
0.7783 
-1.4955 
-1.6938* 
0.0145 
2.9109*** 
-1.4721 
5.7686*** 
-3.2554*** 
0.1585 
-0.0590 
-0.0132 
0.0154 
0.1021 
-0.1781 
-0.0558 
0.0044 
0.0203 
-0.0159 
-0.0074 
0.0169 
0.0140 
-0.1674 
2.5757** 
-0.6533 
-0.3324 
0.3201 
1.3337 
-1.9793** 
-0.7728 
0.0579 
2.0325** 
-1.1518 
-1.0054 
1.9167* 
0.3134 
-2.4688** 
0.7596 
-0.0454 
0.0284 
-0.0568 
-0.0558 
0.0044 
0.0554 
0.0988 
-0.0102 
0.0097 
0.0035 
-0.0031 
-0.1186 
0.2459 
9.5202*** 
-0.4048 
0.7783 
-1,4955 
-0.7728 
0.0579 
0.5967 
1.0355 
-0.7947 
0.5452 
0.3691 
-0.2707 
-2.0761** 
2.9907*** 
C^omplete description of variables is presented in Table 1. 
C^oefficients. 
A^symptotic t-ratios. 
represents D*Variable right above it, where D=1 for rainy 
season and D=0 for dry season. 
S^electivity variable: MV={f(<{)^ )/F(^ )^}; and TV={f(ti)/[l-F(4i)]}. 
*Significant at °0.10=1.645. 
**Significant at "0.05=1.960. 
***Significant at <^0.01=2.576. 
95 
Table 14. (continued) 
Equations 
Exogenous 
Variables® 
Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
Labor 
1% 2= lb 2= 1% 2C 
MV Farmers Group 
Intercept 0.0202 0.6910 0.1291 1.6779* 0.7451 8.7147** 
D(.)d 0.0515 1.1477 0.0314 0.1945 -0.0400 -0.2976 
Li^ sa 0.0502 3.2957*** -0.0319 -1.8611* -0.0430 -2.2262** 
D(.) -0.0156 -0.7556 -0.0024 -0.0684 0.0434 1.4281 
LoPMnfa -0.0319 -1.8611* 0.0813 1.5447 -0.0497 -0.9209 
D(.) -0.0024 —0.0684 -0.1481 -0.9231 0.0756 0.6885 
LaPMhla -0.0430 -2.2262** -0.0497 -0.9209 0.1122 1.7634* 
D(.) 0.0434 1.4281 0.0756 0.6885 -0.1089 -1.0616 
LnY 0.0017 0.4908 0.0188 1.7312 -0.0080 -0.6662 
D(.) -0.0030 -0.6281 -0.0312 -2.0957** 0.0158 0.9551 
LHMIP 0.0056 3.1308*** -0.0018 -0.3315 -0.0008 -0.1350 
D(.) -0.0047 -1.9151* -0.0089 -1.1694 0.0139 1.6497* 
SELECT® -0.0233 -1.7785* -0.0847 -2.3424** 0.0797 1.9993** 
D(.) 0.0274 1.5332 0.0657 1.0974 -0.0744 -1.3251 
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Table 15. Estimated coefficients of input share equations for TVs and 
MVs with adjustment for seed selectivity bias, 1983 
Equations Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
Exogenous 
Variables* lb 2C lb 2C lb 2C 
TV Farmers Group 
Intercept 
D(.)d 
0.0419 
-0.0242 
2.6464*** 
-1.0944 
0.1721 
-0.1430 
3.7511*** 
-2.2396*** 
0.9220 
-0.1404 
12.0290 
-1.3239 
0.0009 0.1617 0.0255 3.2583*** -0.0228 -5.2650*** 
D(.) 0.0063 0.7909 -0.0056 -0.5648 -0.0115 -2.1075** 
LaPMbfa 0.0255 3.2583*** 0.0727 3.7983*** -0.0585 -4.4555*** 
D(.) -0.0056 -0.5648 0.0186 0.7977 -0.0675 -4.1736*** 
LnPWhla -0.0228 -5.2650*** -0.0585 -4.4555*** 0.1053 4.8968*** 
D(.) -0.0115 -2.1075** -0.0675 -4.1736*** 0.0554 2.0807** 
LnY 0.0012 0.6498 0.0096 1.7549* -0.0168 -1.9335* 
D(.) 0.0006 0.2278 0.0062 0.7930 0.0042 0.3348 
LHMIP 0.0013 1.1433 -0.0084 -2.4572 0.0143 2.5764 
D(.) -0.0005 -0.2659 0.0052 1.0468 0.0002 0.0276 
SELECT® 0.0158 2.2190** -0.0068 -0.3246 -0.0428 -1.3048 
D(.) -0.0042 —0.3467 0.0510 1.4830 0.0767 1.3711 
C^omplete description of variables is on Table 9. 
C^oefficients. 
A^symptotic t-ratios. 
"^ DC.) designates D* variable right above it, where D=1 for rainy 
season and D=0 for dry season. 
S^electivity variable; MV={f((})j:)/F((i)j^ )}; and TV={f((l)^ )/[l-F((i)j)]}. 
*Significant at ag,iQ=1.645. 
**Signlficant at «^ ^^ =^1.960. 
***Significant at otQ^Q]^=2.576_ 
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Table 15. (continued) 
Equations Share of seed Share of nitrogen Share of human 
labor 
Exogenous 
Variables* 1^  2^  1° 2^  1° 2^  
MV Farmers Group 
Intercept 
D(.)d 
0.0287 
-0.0090 
1.0916 
-0.2220 
0.1094 
0.1239 
2.4036** 
1.7575* 
0.8597 
-0.0932 
15.652*** 
-1.0486 
LnPHga 0.0696 7.3025*** 0.0038 0.3131 -0.0693 -5.9605*** 
D(.) -0.0204 -1.7088* 0.0134 0.8414 -0.0016 -0.1003 
LPMnfa 0.0038 0.3131 0.0944 3.6924*** -0.1225 —6 «3468*** 
D(.) 0.0134 0.8414 0.0059 0.1597 0.0274 0.9173 
LnPMi^ la -0.0693 -5.9605*** -0.1225 —6.3468*** 0.2009 6.7088*** 
D(.) -0.0016 -0.1003 0.0274 0.9173 -0.0432 -0.9765 
LnY 0.0086 2.9033*** 0.0157 3.3383*** -0.0247 —3.6663*** 
D(.) 0.0017 0.3547 -0.0165 -2.2220** 0.0232 2.1408** 
LHMIP 0.0008 0.4933 -0.0004 -0.1556 0.0073 2.1425** 
D( . )  0.0012 0.0428 -0.0043 -1.0941 0.0051 0.9000 
SELECT® 0.0382 2.7636*** 0.0479 2.3169** -0.0009 -0.0325 
D ( . )  0.0068 0.3408 -0.0304 -0.9842 0.0668 1.6119 
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Table 16. Estimated elasticities of input demands evaluated at sample 
means, rainy season 1977 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Demand for 
Seed Nitrogen Human Labor Animal Labor 
Seed price TV -0.20 0.02 -0.53 -0.07 
MV -0.36 -0.52 0.06 0.06 
Nitrogen price TV 0.23 -0.86 -0.02 
MV 0.13 -0.66 0.19 
0.59 
0.19 
Wage rates 
Human labor TV 
MV 
0.56 
0.66 
0.52 
0.63 
-0.14 
-0.30 
0.51 
0.65 
Animal labor TV 1.38 0.95 
MV 0.01 2.45 
-4.65 
-0.56 
-1.04 
-2.84 
Output level TV 
MV 
-2.00 
-4.16 
-1.82 
-4.19 
-1.83 
-4.17 
-1.92 
-2 .18 
Landholding TV 
MV 
6.81 
6.91 
6.77 
6.86 
6.73 
6.92 
6.58 
6.67 
Insecticide or 
Pesticide 
expense TV 
MV 
6.64 
6.88 
6 . 6 8  
6.94 
6.73 
6.88 
6.88 
7.12 
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Table 17. Estimated elasticities of input demands evaluated at sample 
means, dry season 1977 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Demand for 
Seed Nitrogen Human Labor Animal Labor 
Seed price TV 
MV 
-1.48 
-0.43 
0.42 
-0.32 
-0.26 
-0.39 
0.72 
0.48 
Nitrogen price TV 
Mv 
0.37 
0.17 
-0.56 
-0.37 
0.08 
0.09 
0.07 
0.27 
Wage rates 
Human labor TV 
MV 
0.57 
0.53 
0.57 
0.50 
-0.22 
-0.20 
0.60 
0.56 
Animal labor TV 
MV 
1.95 
1.22 
-1.30 
-0.19 
-0.56 
-0.68 
-0.97 
-1.24 
Output level TV 
MV 
-1.86 
-2.38 
-1.71 
-2.12 
-1.82 
-1.83 
-1.86 
-2.78 
Landholding TV 
MV 
6.05 
6.74 
5.97 
6.67 
5.98 
6 . 6 6  
5.81 
6.52 
Insecticide or 
Pesticide 
expense TV 
MV 
5.95 
6.59 
6.03 
6 . 6 6  
6 .02  
6.67 
6.20 
6.80 
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Table 18. Estimated elasticities of input demands evaluated at sample 
means, rainy season 1983 
Exogenous Demand for 
Variables Seed Nitrogen Human Labor Animal Labor 
Seed price TV -0.77 0.57 -0.83 0.18 
MV -0.01 0.29 -0.83 2.07 
Nitrogen price TV 0.21 -0.23 -0.68 0.21 
MV 0.25 -0.17 -0.51 0.01 
Wage rates 
Human labor TV 0.71 0.59 -0.03 0.74 
MV 0.65 0.59 -0.04 0.74 
Animal labor TV 0.15 0.22 -0.11 1.23 
MV -0.25 -0.25 -0.13 -0.15 
Output level TV -2.30 -2.24 -2.36 -2.44 
MV -3.16 -3.30 -3.30 -3.35 
Landholding TV 6.81 6.28 6.82 6.77 
MV 8.18 8.19 8.24 8.34 
Insecticide or 
Pesticide 
expense TV 6.81 7.33 6.79 6.84 
MV 8.29 8.28 8.23 8.14 
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Table 19. Estimated elasticities of input demands evaluated at sample 
means, dry season 1983 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Demand for 
Seed Nitrogen Human Labor Animal Labor 
Seed price TV -0.82 0.39 -0.39 -0.48 
MV 0.20 0.21 -0.82 0.01 
Nitrogen price TV 0.25 -0.26 
MV 0.23 -0.35 
-0.25 
-0.56 
-0.14 
0.31 
Wage rates 
Human labor TV 
MV 
0.75 
0.63 
0.69 
0.55 
-0.11 
0.00 
0.75 
0.70 
Animal labor TV -0.03 
MV -0.62 
-1.16 
0.82 
-0.43 
-0.39 
0.76 
-0.64 
Output level TV 
MV 
-2.14 
-2.65 
-2.05 
-2.68 
-2.13 
-2.79 
-2.05 
-2.68 
Landholding TV 
MV 
6.43 
7.58 
5.93 
7.60 
6.47 
7.63 
6.14 
7.70 
Insecticide or 
Pesticide 
expense TV 
MV 
6.46 
7.67 
6.98 
7.65 
6.42 
7.61 
6.75 
7.55 
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data are higher than that of the rainy season data which somewhat 
suggests that the farmers are more responsive to price change of seed 
during the dry season. Comparison of elasticities between groups, TV 
and MV farmers are quite mixed. In 1977 rainy season data the absolute 
elasticity of demand for seed by TV group is less than that of by MV 
group but for dry season data it is the reverse. So it appears that a 1 
percent increase in seed price, ceteris paribus, will cause a reduction 
in demand for seed by 0.20 (0.36) and 0.77 (0.01) percent during rainy 
season of 1977 (1983). And for dry season of 1977 and increase in seed 
price by 1 percent, other things remaining the same, will cause 1.48 
(0.43) percent reduction in demand for seed by T\' (MV) group. However, 
for dry season of 1983, an increase in seed price by 1 percent, keeping 
everything constant, there will be a decrease in demand for seed by TV 
group by -0.82 percent and an increase by MV group by 0.20 percent. 
Comparing to Sumodiningrat* s (1982) study, this result has a wider 
range assuming that positive elasticities such as 0.20 percent are ruled 
out. He found on his data set of rice farmers in Jawa-Bali in the 
period of 1979-80 that seed price elasticities of demand was -0.14 
(-0.58) for TV (MV) rice farmers group. 
Regarding the own-price elasticities of demand for nitrogen 
fertilizer, surprisingly enough, TV farmers group have a higher value in 
all data sets except in dry season of 1983. The values are -0.86 (-0.66) 
and -0.23 (-0.17) for rainy season data of 1977 and 1983 of TV (MV) 
group and -0.56 (-0.37) and -0.26 (-0.35) for dry season data of 1977 
and 1983 of TV (MV) group. This says, then, that in rainy season data of 
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1977 and 1983, a 1 percent increase in nitrogen fertilizer price, 
ceteris paribus, will tend to decrease demand for fertilizer by 0.86 
(0.66) percent and 0.23 (0.17) percent in TV (MV) group, given that 
everything else remains the same. It then suggests that traditional 
variety rice farmers are relatively more sensitive to change in 
fertilizer price than modern variety rice farmers. This might be true 
if we assume on one hand, that most MV farmers were members of BIMAS 
program and on the other hand, that most TV farmers were not. Hence, 
while MV farmers could attain their fertilizer need through the BIMAS 
package, TV farmers could only acquire the fertilizer from the local 
market. Based on Philippines data in 1975, Barker and Anden (1975) 
found that the fertilizer demand elasticity was about -0.50 and Pitt^ , 
in his study of the 1973 agricultural census data, found elasticity was 
-0.50 in Java rice farmers. Sumodiningrat's result was -0.47 (-0.42) 
for TV (MV) rice farmers group. 
With respect to the own-price elasticity of demand for human labor, 
TV farmers have no different elasticities with that of MV farmers group 
which is in the neighborhood of -0.30 to 0.00. In contrast with the 
demand for animal labor, the absolute own-price elasticities are higher 
in MV group for data of 1977. The opposite is true for data of 1983, 
where the own-price elasticities of labor of TV group is higher than 
that of MV group. Note that, the elasticities are positive for TV group 
and negative for MV group. These results are quite different with 
Sumodiningrat's results. He found that TV rice farmers had a higher 
animal labor elasticity of demand than MV group. One conjecture that 
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there seems to be true on 1977 data is that MV farmers do not rely much 
on animal labor for certain farm chores as opposed to TV farmers. 
Hence, any percentage change in animal wage rate will induce MV farmers 
to make more percentage change in demand for animal labor. 
Tables 16 to 19 also show that for any percentage increase in 
output level, ceteris paribus, there will be a decline in demand for all 
inputs in all data sets. It appears that the absolute value of 
elasticities are always higher in the MV group than the TV group. 
Furthermore, regarding the elasticities with respect to landholding, it 
also appears that the values for the MV group are always higher than the 
TV group. In Tables 16 to 19, it can also be observed the estimates 
of the cross-price elasticities among input, that is, a percentage change 
in demand for particular input due to a percentage change in other input 
prices and the degree of substitutability, is measured by the coefficient 
of elasticities of substitution ^  (Tables A3 and A4). The sign of 
cross-price elasticities is mixed, either within a particular data set 
or among particular data sets. However, four remarks can be summarized 
from the tables that: 1) signs of cross—price elasticities of demand for 
seed with respect to nitrogen fertilizer price or wage rate of human 
labor are always positive which appears to be suggesting that for any 
price increase in fertilizer price or wage rate, everything else is 
equal, there will be an increase in demand for seed, 2) cross-price 
elasticities of demand for nitrogen fertilizer with respect to wage rate 
of human labor are always positive, 3) cross-price elasticities of 
demand for human labor with respect to animal labor are always 
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negative, and 4) cross-price elasticities of demand for animal labor 
with respect to human labor are always positive. This is a bit 
puzzling. It appears to be indicating, on one hand, a direction of 
complementary rather than substitutability of human labor and animal 
labor. In this sense, it confirms the hypothesis that human labor and 
animal labor each performs specialized and diverse activities that 
cannot be interchanged. On the other hand, for an increase in wage rate 
of human labor there will be an increase in demand for animal labor. 
Another very important aspect of this study is the issue of 
adjusting seed selectivity bias on the elasticity estimates already 
summarized in Tables 16 and 19. Based on those results, total 
elasticities of demand for a particular input can be calculated for a 
typical farmer sample. 
The expected demand for an input by a representative farmer having 
mean endowments of fixed inputs and facing mean prices is (Pitt, 1983) 
E(Qj^ ) = E(Qi^ ll=l) Prob(I=l) + E(Qk|l=0) Prob(I=0) 
where E(Qj^ jl=l) and S(Qjj^ |l=0) are the demand for input Qj^  
under a MV and TV seed regime, respectively; and Prob(I=l) and 
Prob(I=0) are the probabilities of observing an MV and a TV farmer, 
respectively. Hence, the total price elasticity of demand (e) can be 
written as 
% E(Qk|l=l) Prob(I=l) E(Qk|l=0) Prob(I=0) 
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E(Qk|l=l) - E(Qk|l=0) 
+ 5 Ç Prob(I=l) 
where 6 is the elasticity of the probability of choosing I-IV seeds with 
respect to any exogenous variables (see Table 11) and and Ej. are input 
demand elasticities with respect to any exogenous variables as shown in 
Tables 16 to 19. The total price elasticities of demand for an input are 
illustrated in Tables 20 and 21^ . Columns 1 (3) of Tables 12 and 13 
indicate the total elasticities of rainy (dry) season data without 
selectivity bias adjustment and columns 2 (4) indicate the total 
elasticities of rainy (dry) season data with selectivity bias adjustment 
in the sense that these elasticities are adjusted for the change in the 
probability of choosing MV as a result of an input price increase. 
From observation of Tables 20 and 21, the inclusion of 
elasticities of the probability of planting MV due to a price increase 
has very mixed results. In some instances, it reinforces the 
elasticities calculated from the case without adjustment, such as own-
price elasticities of demand for seed and animal labor in dry season 
1977 and own-price elasticities of demand for human and animal labor in 
rainy season 1977. This also holds true in the own-price elasticity of 
demand for nitrogen fertilizer in rainy and dry season 1983. For other 
cases, the elasticities of the probability of choosing MV helps to 
mitigate the total elasticities of demand as illustrated by the own-
price elasticities of demand for nitrogen fertilizer of rainy season 
data 1977 and human labor in the data of 1983 during rainy and dry 
season. Moreover, the total elasticities of demand also show a tendency 
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Table 20. Total elasticities of demand for input, 1977 
Demand for: Elasticities of demand for input 
with respect to 
price or wage Rainy season Dry Season 
la 2^  1^  2^  
Seed: 
Seed -0.28 -0.28 -1.02 -1.07 
Fertilizer 0.18 0.18 0.28 0.29 
Human labor 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.61 
Animal labor 0.70 0.69 1.63 1.60 
Fertilizer: 
Seed -0.22 -0.22 0.08 0.04 
Fertilizer -0.77 -0.70 -0.47 -0.47 
Human labor 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.57 
Animal labor 1.62 1.53 -0.79 -0.80 
Human labor: 
Seed -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.41 
Fertilizer 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.09 
Human labor -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.11 
Animal labor -2.95 -3.08 -0.61 -0.66 
Animal labor: 
Seed -0.06 -0.05 0.67 0.40 
Fertilizer 0.57 1.12 0.11 0.13 
Human labor 0.52 0.46 0.59 0.86 
Animal labor -1.15 -1.87 -1.02 -1.16 
W^ithout seed selectivity bias adjustment, 
i^th seed selectivity bias adjustment. 
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Table 21. Total elasticities of demand for input, 1983 
Demand for: Elasticities of demand for input 
with respect to 
price or wage Rainy season Dry Season 
Seed: 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
-0.24 
0.24 
0.67 
-0.13 
-0.18 
0.11 
0.72 
0.02 
-0.16 
0.24 
0.67 
-0.41 
-0.07 
0.08 
0.71 
-0.31 
Fertilizer: 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
0.39 
-0.19 
0.59 
-0.09 
0.48 
-0.29 
0.63 
0.03 
0.28 
-0.31 
0.61 
0.04 
0.34 
-0.42 
0.63 
0.11 
Human labor: 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
-0.83 
-0.58 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.77 
-0.69 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.62 
-0.41 
-0.05 
-0.41 
-0.60 
-0.44 
-0.04 
-0.39 
Animal labor: 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
1.30 
0.09 
0.74 
0.41 
1.36 
0.03 
0.76 
0.48 
-0.22 
0.10 
0.72 
0.01 
-0.20 
0.06 
0.73 
0.03 
W^ithout seed selectivity bias adjustment. 
W^ith seed selectivity bias adjustment. 
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to wane over time at the same season. 
To sum up this section, two-stage probit procedure is applied to 
accommodate the possibility of incorporating seed selection as an 
endogenous variable decision which is hypothesized to be a function of 
exactly the same endogenous variables that affect the total cost 
function. It is found that the elasticities of the probability of 
planting MVs with respect to seed price is -0.05 (1.26) during rainy 
(dry) season 1977 and 0.55 (0.51) during rainy (dry) season 1983. With 
respect to nitrogen fertilizer price, then elasticities are -2.11 (-0.08) 
for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.59 (-0.89) for rainy (dry) season 
1983. For the operated land, the elasticities are 0.02 (0.22) from 1977 
(1983) rainy season data and 0.31 (-0.06) from 1977 (1983) dry season 
data. 
Own-price elasticities of input demands have the appropriate signs 
on each data set and for each farmer group. Cross-price elasticities of 
input demand have mixed signs. Total own-price elasticities of demand 
for seed with seed selectivity bias adjustment are -0.28 (-1.07) for 
rainy (.fry) season 1977 and -0.11 (-0.07) for rainy (dry) season 1983. 
In the case of no seed selectivity bias adjustment, the elasticities are 
-0.28 (-1.02) for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.24 (-0.16) for rainy 
(dry) season 1983. So, for 1983 data, there is correction downward with 
bias adjustment. Total elasticities of demand for nitrogen fertilizer 
are -0.70 (-0.47) for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.29 (-0.42) for 
rainy (dry) season 1983 under selectivity bias adjustment. In no 
selectivity bias adjustment case, the elasticities are -0.77 (-0.47) for 
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rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.19 (-0.31) for rainy (dry) season 1983. 
Hence, it appears that there is a downward correction for 1977 data and 
upward correction of 1983 data due to the adjustment. Incidentally, in 
his analysis of wet rice fanning in Java, 1971, Pitt (1983) found the 
total elasticity of demand with respect to fertilizer price was -1.155 
and -1.042 under seed switching adjustment and no adjustment, 
respectively. Meanwhile, Sumodiningrat's (1982) results for 1979-80 
period are -0.47 and -0.35, respectively. 
Finally, it also appears that total own-price elasticities of 
demand show a tendency to wane over time. 
B. Production under Risk 
Application of analytical framework set out in the last section of 
Chapter III and further refined in Section B of Chapter IV is performed 
here. The data sets are composed of observations that exist in three 
cross-section years, that is, in 1977, 1978, and 1983. The summary 
statistics are shown in Table 22. 
The first step in our estimation is by applying Cobb-Douglas 
production function through its loglinear transformation. The model is 
estimated by OLS and results of the estimation are summarized in Table 
23. All of the factors of production coefficients are statistically 
significant in both data sets, rainy and dry season, except animal labor 
and insecticide or pesticide expense. All coefficients have the 
expected positive signs with the exception of insecticide expense. We 
anticipate that for any percentage increase in a factor of production, 
ceteris paribus, there will be a percentage increase in yield. With 
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Table 22. Means of selected variables 
Variables Rainy Season Dry Season 
Net paddy yield (kg) 1326 .7 962 .90 
Seed (kg) 19 .67 16 .65 
Nitrogen fertilizer (kg) 104 .79 80 .88 
Phosphorous fertilizer (kg) 37 .93 28 .93 
Human labor (mandays) 366 .50 247 .03 
Animal labor (animaidays) 9 .94 3 .92 
Landholding (ha) 0. 48 0, .37 
Insecticide or pesticide expense (Rp) 567 .48 315. 82 
Number of observations 226x3=678 185x3=555 
respect to insecticide or pesticide expense of rainy season data, the 
sign is negative but is relatively very small and not statistically 
significant. The insignificance of animal labor and insecticide or 
pesticide expense in production function is probably dictated by the 
uncommon application of the factor in the sample farmers. Most of the 
farmers use human labor as source of labor be it either as coming from 
the family or hired from outside if he could afford to. Only a few 
farmers applied insecticide or pesticide. They usually are relatively 
large farmers (more than 0.50 ha landholding). 
The second alternative specification attempted in the analysis is 
by applying a 'crude' model analogous to Anderson's (1973).® The 
results of mean production are given in Table 24. The coefficient 
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Table 23. Estimated coefficients of Cobb Douglas production function, 
rainy and dry season 
Coefficients 
Factor of Production Rainy Season Dry Season 
Intercept 
Seed 
Nitrogen fertilizer 
Phosphorous fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
Landholding 
Insecticide or pesticide expense 
6.5547 
(21.3640)*** 
0.0751 
(2.0049)** 
0.0433 
(2.1424)** 
0.0569 
(5.5118)*** 
0.0824 
(2.0828)** 
0.0087 
(1.2817) 
0.6818 
(11.3700)*** 
-0.0073 
(-0.7218) 
4.5068 
(19.3490)*** 
0.4584 
(8.6724)*** 
0.0588 
(2.6049)*** 
0.0206 
(1.8211)* 
0.1788 
(5.5896)*** 
0.0088 
(0.8983) 
0.2580 
(5.9071)*** 
0.0103 
(0.7297) 
^ Numbers in parentheses are respective t-ratios. 
*Significant at - 1.645. 
** Significant at = 1.960. 
***Significant at ag = 2.576. 
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Table 24. Estimated coefficients of mean production for Crude model 
Mean production 
Factor of production Rainy Season Dry Season 
Intercept 
Seed 
Nitrogen fertilizer 
Phosphorous fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
Landholding 
5.2273 
(14.0600)*** 
0.2240 
(3.7090)*** 
0.2795 
(5.4800)*** 
0.0636 
(3.1970)*** 
0.0235 
(0.4870) 
0.0113 
(3.0520)*** 
0.4271 
(6.1350)*** 
4.4380 
(8.8490)*** 
0.0489 
(0.7680) 
0.3546 
(5.3170)*** 
0.0108 
(0.6470) 
0.2141 
(3.2480)*** 
0.0103 
(1.7510)* 
0.4678 
(5.5560)*** 
Insecticide or pesticide expense -0.0094 
(-1.5670) 
0.0011 
(0.1190) 
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estimate are quite similar to the results in Table 23. Most 
coefficients are statistically significant except human labor and 
insecticide expense in rainy season data and seed, phosphorous 
fertilizer, and insecticide expense in dry season data. Again in the 
model, the estimate of insecticide coefficient is negative for rainy 
season data. 
The last specification estimated is the Heteroskedastic model of 
Just and Pope type (1978, 1979a,b)^  as outlined in equations (46) 
through (48) of Chapter IV. The estimates of mean production are 
summarized in Table 25. Comparing with the results from the previous 
two alternatives, the estimates are quite different. For rainy season 
data, all estimates are statistically (and asymptotically) significant 
with the exception of nitrogen fertilizer coefficient. In dry season 
data, all coefficients are statistically significant with the exception 
of insecticide expense which also has a negative sign. By using this 
procedure, it is very surprising to see that elasticity of mean 
production with respect to nitrogen fertilizer is statistically not 
significant which is contrary to that shown by the first two models. 
This might have happened because the effect of nitrogen fertilizer on 
production might be confounded by other inputs, because inputs other 
than labor and land are obtained from the package of BIMAS in fixed 
proportions. To substantiate this assertion, simple correlation 
coefficients among inputs are computed in the Appendix Table A5. As we 
can see from the table, simple correlations of nitrogen fertilizer with 
seed, phosphorous fertilizer, and insecticide are all significant in 
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Table 25. Estimated coefficients of mean production for Hetero-
skedastic model 
Mean Production 
Factor of Rainy Season Dry Season 
Production 
First stage^  Final stage First stage Final stage 
Intercept 
Nitrogen 
fertilizer 
Phosphorous 
fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
Landholding 
1221.3 
(4.2171)*** 
(1.7694)* 
-0.0080 
(-1.6096) 
0.0409 
(6.8227)*** 
0.0711 
(2.4395)** 
0.0254 
(8.8131)*** 
0.8290 
(15.3090)*** 
832.70 633.44 
(816.9200)*** (3.7835)*** 
0.1301 0.1068 
(3.0915)*** (3.8476)*** 
0.0025 
(0.3279) 
0.0140 
(0.5057) 
Insecticide or 
pesticide expense 0.0091 
(1.7982)* 
0,0434 0.0139 
(6.3006)*** (2.2415)** 
0.0899 0.1761 
(3.8735)*** (4.5114)*** 
0.0143 0.0413 
(4.7252)*** (9.9878)*** 
0.7366 0.6759 
(27.7500)** (14.072)*** 
0.0112 -0.0212 
(2.4960)** (-4.1398***) 
693.86 
(182.98)*** 
0.1136 
(3.4654)*** 
0.0319 
(2.0684)** 
0.0212 
(3.6099)*** 
0.1276 
(6.0639)*** 
0.0267 
(6.1854)*** 
0.6809 
(24.6230)*** 
-0.0091 
(-1.4305) 
^Numbers in parentheses are respective asymptotic t-ratios. 
* Significant at Oq.IO ~ 1.645. 
** Significant at aggg = 1.960. 
***Significant at Og = 2.576. 
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both rainy and dry season data. 
Furthermore, Table 25 also shows that in the dry season data, the 
sign for insecticide expense is negative which is also contrary to the 
previous results. One possible explanation has something to do with the 
improper application of insecticide or pesticide in terms of technique 
or timing. 
Specific to the Cobb-Douglas production type, these estimates are 
also designating the elasticities of mean production with respect to the 
corresponding factor of production. By using our nonlinear or 
heteroskedastic estimation results, a 1 percent increase in each factor 
of production of seed, nitrogen fertilizer, phosphorous fertilizer, 
human labor, animal labor, landholding, and insecticide or pesticide 
expense, respectively, other things remaining constant, will cause a 
0.13, 0.00, 0.04, 0.09, 0.01, 0.74, and 0.01 percent increase in yield 
in rainy season data and 0.11, 0.03, 0.02, 0.13, 0.03, 0.68 percent 
increase and -0.01 percent decrease in yield for dry season data. 
The next important aspect that needs to be considered is the 
relationship between the level of inputs and the variance of production 
as can be deduced from the Crude model and the Heteroskedastic model. 
We hypothesize that the coefficients associated with human and animal 
labor, and insecticide and pesticide expense, to have a risk-reducing 
effect on the variance of the production. 
The amount of labor spent during the production process is 
considered to make production yield more stable to a certain level, 
especially if it is given at the right time. The same argument holds 
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for insecticide and pesticide expense. A rice grower is willing to 
spend additional money to buy insecticide or pesticide in the 
expectation that production yield level becomes more certain than it 
otherwise would have been. Again, this assumption will be true if the 
timing for application of insecticide and pesticide is right during the 
cultivation. 
For seed, nitrogen fertilizer, phosphorous fertilizer, and 
landhclding, the coefficients are expected to be positive indicating the 
risk-inducing effects. As pointed out in Chapter III, these inputs are 
thought to be making production yield more susceptible to environmental 
condition. 
Table 26 shows the coefficient estimates for the Crude model and 
Table 27 for the Heteroskedastic model. By observing Table 26, we see 
that 4 out of 8 coefficients are statistically significant for rainy 
season data and 3 out of 8 coefficients in dry season. 
Out of 8, three (one) have negative signs in rainy (dry) season 
data.\ In rainy season data they are nitrogen fertilizer, human labor, 
and animal labor and for dry season data it is seed quantity. These 
results are somewhat contrary to the expectation, namely that human 
labor, animal labor, and insecticide expense will behave as risk-
reducing factors as opposed to risk-inducing of the rest of factor 
productions. Despite the correct signs shown by human and animal labor 
input, insecticide expense fails to do so for rainy season data. In 
dry season data, the signs for human and animal labor, and insecticide 
expense are in conflict with the expectation. 
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Turning to Table 27 as for results on Heteroskedastic model, there 
are some similarities between these results and those of Table 26, even 
though the extent of statistical significance in individual effects is 
different. In addition. Table 27 shows that nitrogen fertilizer picks 
up the correct negative sign showing a risk-inducing factor in rainy 
season data but again fails to show risk-reducing effects of insecticide 
or pesticide expense in both data sets, and of human and animal labor in 
dry season data. 
Since the estimated functions of variance of production for Crude 
model is linear in parameters (Table 26), the coefficients can be 
interpreted as risk elasticities. Therefore, a 1 percent increase in 
the use of seed results in a 1.31 (-0.12) percent increase (decrease) in 
the variance of production in rainy (dry) season data, everything else 
is the same. Similar interpretation can be applied to all other 
estimates. 
With respect to Cobb-Douglas and Heteroskedastic models, these 
elasticities are calculated in Tables 28 and 29, respectively.® The 
estimated elasticities of Cobb-Douglas and Heteroskedastic model are 
very close to one another but they are derived from different mean 
production functions. The signs of elasticities in Cobb-Douglas 
functions are already determined in the mean production functions 
unintentionally while the signs of elasticities in Heteroskedastic 
model are free from the results of the mean production functions due to 
the fact that the mean and the variance functions are allowed to be 
independent of one another. In other words, we could still have an 
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Table 26. Estimated coefficients of variance of production for Crude 
model 
Factor of Production 
Variance of production 
Rainy Season Dry Season 
Intercept 
Seed 
Nitrogen fertilizer 
Phosphorous fertilizer 
Human labor 
Animal labor 
Landholding 
Insecticide or pesticide 
expense 
10.6103 
(5.8460)*** 
1.3111 
(4.4470)*** 
-0.1237 
(-0.4970) 
0.1595 
(1.6420) 
-0.2262 
(-0.9590) 
-0.0280 
(-1.5430) 
0.9006 
(2.6500)** 
0.0640 
(2.1940)** 
10.0038 
(5.5290)*** 
-0.1238 
(-0.5390) 
0.5179 
(2.1520)** 
0.0733 
(1.2160) 
(0.9300) 
0.0307 
(1.4470) 
1.1506 
(3.7890)*** 
0.0315 
(0.9510) 
^Numbers in parentheses are respective asymptotic t-ratios. 
* Significant at «o.lO ~ 1.645. 
** Significant at og Qg = 1.960. 
***Significant at og = 2.576. 
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Table 27. Estimated coefficients of variance of production for 
Heteroskedastic model 
Variance of Production^  
Factor of Production Rainy Season Dry Season 
Intercept 13.376 7.6310 
(14.2370)*** (12.207)*** 
Seed 0.0558 0.4045 
(0.9726) (5.7021)*** 
Nitrogen fertilizer 0.0167 0.0662 
(0.5403) (2.1870)** 
Phosphorous fertilizer 0.0017 0.0272 
(0.1062) (1.7940) 
Human labor -0.1423 0.0817 
(-2.3497)** (1.9041) 
Animal labor -0.0137 0.0186 
(-1.3168) (1.4157) 
Landholding 0.9396 0.2108 
(10.2340)*** (3.5975)*** 
Insecticide or pesticide expense 0.0341 0.0115 
(2.1890)** (0.6046) 
N^umbers in parentheses are respective asymptotic t-ratios. 
* Significant at OQ = 1.645. 
** Significant at «0.05 ~ 1.960. 
***Significant at = 2.576. 
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Table 28. Estimated elasticities of output variability with respect to 
factor of production implied by Cobb-Douglas model evaluated 
at means 
Elasticities 
Factor of Production Rainy Season Dry Season 
Seed 0.15 0.92 
Nitrogen fertilizer 0.09 0.12 
Phosphorous fertilizer 0.11 0.04 
Human labor 0.16 0.36 
Animal labor 0.02 0.02 
Landholding 1.36 0.52 
Insecticide or pesticide expense 0.01 0.02 
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Table 29. Estimated elasticities of output variability with respect to 
factor of production implied by Heteroskedastic model 
evaluated at means 
Elasticities 
Factor of Production Rainy Season Dry Season 
Seed 0.11 0.81 
Nitrogen fertilizer 0.03 0.13 
Phosphorous fertilizer 0.00 0.05 
Human labor -0.28 0.16 
Animal labor -0.03 0.37 
Landholding 1.88 0.42 
Insecticide or pesticide expense 0.07 0.02 
input having positive marginal product but negative marginal risk. This 
is one of the advantages of using Heteroskedastic model as outlined in 
Chapter IV. 
Turning to the results from Table 29 of Heteroskedastic model, a 1 
percent increase in the use of seed results in a 0.11 (0.81) increase in 
the variance of the production in rainy (dry) season data, everything 
held constant. And 1 percent increase in the use of nitrogen 
fertilizer, ceteris paribus, results in 0.03 (0.13) percent increase in 
the variance of production of rainy (dry) season data. The same thing 
can be applied to other remaining estimated elasticities. 
One last issue that we are going to take up before closing this 
section is about the implication of estimated production models on the 
Table 30. Estimated coefficients of implied Input-use equations for Cobb-
Douglas and Heteroskedastic models, rainy season^ 
Parameters/ Cobb-Douglas Model 
Statistics 
Risk-responsive Risk-neutral 
Nitrogen^  Labor Nitrogen Labor 
®01 18.295 
(3.4862)*** 
269.360 
(16.4620)*** 
31.297 
(6.9940)*** 
300.99 
(14.3670)*** 
011 1.4900 
(17.6960)*** 
-0.1375 
(-2.4876) 
1.1525 
(29.435)*** 
0.5610 
(11.5560)*** 
®21 0.2071 X 10"^  
(4.5023) 
-0.1768 X 10"5 
(-17.265)*** 
0.67 0.53 0.66 0.23 
F 461.900 259.892 866.425 133.552 
®0nly two major inputs, that is, nitrogen and labor, are considered. 
^Numbers in parentheses are respective t-ratios. 
*Significant at «q.IO ~ 1.645. 
**Signlficant at Oq Q5 = = 1.960. 
***Signlfleant at «Q = 2.576. 
Table 30. (continued) 
Parameters/ 
Statistics 
Heteroskedastic Model 
Risk-responsive Risk-neutral 
Nitrogen Labor Nitrogen Labor 
'Oi 
li 
21 
2 
30.935 
(5.8588)*** 
20.1130 
(13.3040)*** 
0.6184 X lO'lZ 
(0.1293) 
0.66 
432.274 
238.47 
(13.669)*** 
0.2570 
(6.4689)*** 
0.3049 X lO'lO 
(15.397)*** 
0.49 
220.350 
31.297 
(6.9940)*** 
19.938 
(29.4350)*** 
0.66 
866.425 
300.99 
(14.367)*** 
0.5132 
(11.5567)*** 
0.23 
133.552 
Table 31. Estimated coefficients of implied input-use equations for Cobb-
Douglas and Heteroskedastic models, dry season^ 
Parameters/ 
Statistics 
Cobb-Douglas Model 
Risk-responsive Risk-neutral 
Nitrogen Labor Nitrogen Labor 
'01 
li 
21 
2 
14.758 
(3.0637)*** 
0.9654 
(14.977)*** 
0.7974 X 10"? 
(3.1474)*** 
0.64 
327.720 
114.840 
(10.863)*** 
0.5908 
(11.6580)*** 
-0.1431 X 10"^ 
(-4.7550)*** 
0.61 
293.220 
22.828 
(5.5312)*** 
0.7875 
(25.1050)*** 
0.63 
630.280 
102.460 
(9.7182)*** 
0.7752 
(23.0770)*** 
0.59 
532.556 
^Only two major inputs, that is, nitrogen and labor, are considered. 
^Numbers in parentheses are respective t-ratios. 
*Significant at «q.IO ~ 
**Signifleant at ciq = 1.960. 
***Signifleant at Cq.OI ~ 2.576. 
Table 31. (continued) 
Parameters/ 
Statistics 
Heteroskedastic Model 
Risk-responsive Risk-neutral 
Nitrogen Labor Nitrogen Labor 
'01 
)li 
21 
2 
14.056 
(2.9400)*** 
1.8636 
(14.1540)*** 
0.1155 X 10 
(3.4875)*** 
0.64 
330.781 
110.290 
(10.352)*** 
0.8643 
(10.7460)*** 
-0.3339 X 10"^ 
(-3.3721) 
0.60 
279.468 
22.828 
(5.5312)*** 
1.4495 
(25.1050)*** 
0.63 
630.280 
102.46 
(9.7182)*** 
1.0858 
(23.0770)*** 
0.59 
532.556 
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input use estimations as laid out in equations (49) through (52) of 
Chapter IV. The estimated coefficients are presented in Tables 30 and 
31 for rainy (dry) season data. We analyze the input-use equations 
implied by Cobb-Douglas and Heteroskedastic models. In each of the 
models, two variates are considered, that is, risk-responsive case and 
risk—neutral case, where risk-neutral is risk-responsive variate with 
risk coefficient equals zero. Only two major inputs are considered 
because the same interpretation could be applied to other inputs. 
Most of the coefficients in the input-use equations are 
statistically significant. Also, almost in all cases, the coefficients 
of are statistically different from 1 as implied by the models. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of 02^ are also statistically significantly 
different from zero excluding that of nitrogen demand on risk-responsive 
Heteroskedastic model. Recalling from equations (49) through (52) in 
Chapter IV, by the implication assuming that the models are ture, this 
coefficient measures the risk aversion parameter for particular input. 
We found that the coefficient ranges from 0.62x10"^^ to 0.21x10"^ for 
nitrogen fertilizer and from -0.l7xl0~^  to 0.30x10"^*^ for human labor on 
rainy season data and for dry season data, the respective range is from 
0.12x10"^ to 0.80x10"^ for nitrogen and from -0.14x10"^ to -0.33x10"^  
for human labor. Hence, as far as nitrogen fertilizer is concerned, the 
farmers are risk-averter (the coefficient is positive). This is 
probably one of the reasons why some farmers did not apply some new 
inputs as recommended by extension personnel. This, in turn, will 
contribute to the widening yield gap between experimental stations and 
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farmers' plots. However, the results from this analysis have to be 
taken with caution. Three notes must be in order: (1) the implicit 
assumption that the amount of input use is solely a function of two 
"aggregate" variables may not be realistic, (2) the clear departure from 
the assumption that Qq^  = 0 and G^i ~ 1 Chat must be imposed as in 
equation (51) of Chapter IV, and (3) the possibility of conflicting 
interpretation of the risk aversion coefficients derived for each input. 
Hence, these input-use equations have to be interpreted carefully. 
In terms of human labor input, the signs of the coefficients are in 
the range of negative to positive for rainy season data and always 
negative for dry season data. Therefore, it would be safe to conclude 
that risk coefficient for human labor is indetermined, but it appears to 
be in the negative direction. It then suggests that farmers are also 
risk-averter toward labor. 
To close this section, we summarize the main results of the 
analysis. We perform three alternative production specifications of 
estimating mean production function and implication of the estimation on 
the variance of production. The specifications are Cobb-Douglas, Crude 
model, and Heteroskedastic model. The mean production estimates of each 
model gives very different results. In spite of the possibility that 
they may result in the same positive marginal products of inputs as we 
expected, the implication of each model on the effect of input on the 
variability of output may be quite different. 
Based on our Heteroskedastic model, the model that could separate 
the effect of inputs on mean production and variance of production, the 
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elasticities of output with respect to inputs seed, nitrogen fertilizer, 
phosphorous fertilizer, human labor, animal labor, landholding, and 
insecticide or pesticide expense for rainy season data are 0.13, 0.00, 
0.04, 0.09, 0.01, 0.74, and 0.01, respectively. Furthermore, by using 
Heteroskedastic model, in rainy season data, human labor and animal labor 
and insecticide or pesticide inputs behave as risk-reducing factors 
while other factors of production perform risk-inducing effects, such 
as seed, nitrogen fertilizer, phosphorous fertilizer, landholding, and 
insecticide or pesticide. In dry season data, all factors of production 
are shown to have risk-inducing effects. 
The elasticities of variance of output with respect to inputs in 
rainy season data are 0.11, 0.03, 0.00, -0.28, -0.03, 1.88, and 0.07 for 
seed, nitrogen, phosphorous, human labor, animal labor, landholding, and 
insecticide expense, respectively. For dry season data, the respective 
elasticities are 0.81, 0.13, 0.05, 0.16, 0.37, 0.42, and 0.02. With the 
exception of landholding and insecticide inputs, the elasticities in dry 
season data are always higher in absolute values than in rainy season 
data. It appears that the existence of sufficient moisture during the 
cultivations in the rainy season helps to mitigate the variance of 
output caused by inputs. 
Our risk aversion coefficients, given the estimates of production 
functions are true, are ranging from 0.62x10"^^ to 0.21x10"^ for 
nitrogen fertilizer and from -0.14x10"^ to 0.30x10"^ *^  for human labor. 
So, it is probably suggesting that the sample farmers are risk-averter on 
nitrogen fertilizer and on labor. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V 
T^he relationship between the change in probability and a change in 
one of the exogenous variables in probit model is derived as follows: 
X5 2 
P = Prob(Yi=l) = F(XS) = / e~" /^ du 
where u N^(0,l), so 
ÔP 
g— S^ fCXB) 
•^ k 
so the elasticity is ( 6P|P)/( = 8j^f(X8) Xy^/P where f(XS) is the 
value of the normal density function evaluated at point X6. 
2 The own-price and cross-price elasticities (e^ j) of demand 
are calculated through. 
Hi 
Hi = Si - 1 + — 
c, ,  = s , .  + 
'IJ "J s. 
where S and a are share values of an input and a coefficient from the 
estimation. 
^See Sumodiningrat (1982). 
^Elasticities of substitution Is derived from-the relationship as 
follows: 
a)own-elasticity of substitution 
1 a^ i 
""-^-ST^SIST 
^Total elasticities of demand for variable inputs with respect to 
output and fixed inputs are not included. 
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T^he Crude model is constructed from independent exponential 
function specifications for mean of production, y, and for variance of 
production, Var(y), namely: 
In y^  = ao + Z ay. InE^^i + 
In Var(y)i = + Z °^^ ki *i 
where X is mean inputs, and y is mean output averaged in each 
observation over time. Var(y) for each farm was computed as the 
average over time of the squared deviations between output and the 
transformed (antiln) predictions of mean output. 
I^nitially, it was intended to apply Heteroskedastic error-
component model as advanced by Anderson and Griffiths (1981) and 
Griffiths and Anderson (1982), but due to the inaccessibility to a 
flexible generalized nonlinear least squares software program, the 
original Just and Pope type is employed, namely; 
yi = f(Xi, a) + g(X^ , 6)ui 
where E(u )^ = 0, Var(u^ ) = 1. One more important assumption that has to 
be imposed is Var{g(Xi, g )u£} = o2, so ordinary nonlinear least squares 
is still valid. The estimation itself consisted of three steps: 
STEP 1: A nonlinear regression of y^  on f(Xj^, a) obtaining a . 
STEP 2; An OLS regression of In u^*2 = In {y^  - f(X^ , a)}2 on In X^  
obtaining 6. 
STEP 3: A nonlinear regression of y^* = y^ g~^ ^^ (X^ , 6) on f*(X^, 
= f(X£, â)g~^^^(X^, 6) obtaining a. 
®i)For Cobb-Douglas function, 
y = (a,* 
Var(y) = (a^ tt x^ °'^ )2var(e^  
6Var(y) ^i 
5Xi risk elasticity) 
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For Heteroskedastic model, 
y = Xi  ^+ BQ TX. lu 
Var(y) = ( SQTtX^ ^ )^^ Var(u) 
ôVar(y) ^i 
— ——7—^ = 2B^ (the risk elasticity). 
ôXi Var(y)  ^
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This final chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section 
treats the overall approach and empirical results of the study. In the 
second section, a number of conclusions will be drawn from the empirical 
results summarized in the first section. The final section is devoted 
to the suggestion for further research along the lines followed in this 
study. 
A. Summary 
At the very beginning of this dissertation (Chapter I), we set out 
our theme as to try to gain some insights into the farm-level production 
decision making. For instance, a rice grower is aware of the potential 
increase in his yield if he adopts and applies new technological 
practices provided by experimental stations but he does not do so. Why? 
In this study we follow two alternative paths that could narrow 
down the scope of the study through the identification and formulation 
of the problem. The first is to construct a model of seed selection 
adoption process through economic force dictated by the perceived 
potential cost or penalties that have to be borne by the farmers in his 
actual state of action, either by planting TVs or MVs (Chapter IV, 
Section A) in line with the induced-innovation hypothesis in part of 
farm producers. The second is to investigate whether the application of 
inputs bears some effect on production risk perceived by peasant farmers 
where risk is measured by the variance of output (Section B of Chapter 
IV). 
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In the first section of Chapter III, theoretical and empirical 
works on agricultural technological adoption is reviewed. The present 
stage of theoretical approaches in the area can be grouped as static or 
dynamic analyses. Meanwhile, based on the key explanatory factors 
affecting adoption of new technology, the empirical literature on the 
subject can be categorized through: (1) farm size, (2) risk and 
uncertainty, (3) human capital, (4) availability of information, (5) 
labor availability, (6) credit constraint, (7) tenure arrangement, (8) 
input supply constraint, and (9) aggregate adoption over time. 
To the extent of the significance of risk and uncertainty in 
agriculture beyond the context of adoption of new technology. Section B 
of Chapter III provides an overall review. In the existing literature, 
there are three risk models being advanced as follows: (1) decision 
rules requiring no probability information, (2) safety-first rules, and 
(3) expected utility maximization rules. While in measuring risk 
attitudes empirically, literature can be classified into five groups, 
namely: (1) direct elicitation of utility function, (2) risk efficiency 
approach, (3) risk interval approach, (4) experimental methods, and (5) 
observed economic behavior. 
Our empirical results (Chapter V) contains coefficient estimates 
of measured economic variables. The two-stage probit procedure is 
applied (Section A) on the seed selection model for the data set to 
accommodate the possibility of embodying seed selection as an endogenous 
decision variable. It is hypothesized to be a function of exactly the 
same exogenous variables that influence the total cost function. The 
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estimated elasticities of probability of planting MVs with respect to 
seed price are -0.05 (1.26) during rainy (dry) season 1977 and 0.55 
(0.51) during rainy (dry) season 1983. In passing, within the range of 
about five years between 1977 to 1983, there were more and more farmers 
applying new seed varieties in the sample farmers from 30.16 (35.79) 
percent of rainy (dry) season in 1977 to 55.08 (57.60) percent of rainy 
(dry) season in 1983. 
In regard to nitrogen fertilizer prices, the elasticities are -2.11 
(-0.08) for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.59 (-0.89) for rainy (dry) 
season 1983. 
From the total cost function estimation, we found that almost all 
own-price elasticities of input demands have the appropriate signs on 
each data set for each farmer group (TV or MV) with the exception of the 
elasticities of demand of seed in MV group of dry season 1983 and of 
animal labor in TV group of rainy and dry season 1983. But cross-price 
elasticities of input demand have mixed signs. In one data set, they 
can be substitutes and in another they can be complements. However, 
there are some elasticities having signs unchanged in different data 
sets and farmer groups such as the cost-price elasticities of demand for 
seed with respect to nitrogen price and human labor wage, and the cross-
price elasticities of demand for nitrogen fertilizer with respect to 
human labor wage, and finally the cross-price elasticities of demand for 
animal labor in regard to human labor wage being always positive. Also, 
the cross-price elasticities of demand for human labor with respect to 
wage of animal labor are always negative (reflecting complementary). 
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The results of incorporating seed selectivity variable as derived 
from the two-stage probit procedure demonstrate that eight out of twelve 
total input share equations for TV and MV group of 1977 and 1983 data 
have statistically significant selectivity variable as seen on all seed 
share equation, on nitrogen share equations of MV of 1977 and 1983 data, 
and on human labor share of 1977 data. This is obviously evidence of 
the existence of selection bias in estimating those input share 
equations from respective subsample of farmers. On the other hand, for 
nitrogen share equations of TVs of 1977 and 1983 data, and human labor 
share equations of TV 1977 and of 1983 data, seed selection bias appears 
to be statistically insignificant. 
With this selection bias in mind, we compare the total own-price 
elasticities of demand for input under the existence and the absence of 
selection bias. Total own-price elasticities of demand for seed with 
seed selectivity bias adjustment are -0.28 (-1.07) for rainy (dry) 
season 1977 and -0.18 (-0.07) for rainy (dry) season 1983. In the case 
of the absence of seed selectivity bias adjustment, the elasticities are 
-0.28 (-1.02) for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.24 (-0.16) for rainy 
(dry) season 1983. Total elasticities of demand for nitrogen fertilizer 
are -0.70 (-0.47) for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.29 (-0.42) for 
rainy (dry) season 1983 under selectivity bias adjustment, and in the 
absence of bias adjustment the elasticities are -0.77 (-0.47) for rainy 
(dry) season 1977 and -0.19 (-0.31) for rainy (dry) season 1983. In 
regard to human labor demand, the total elasticities are —0.22 (-0.11) 
for rainy (dry) season 1977 and -0.01 (-0.04) for rainy (dry) season 
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1.983 under selectivity bias adjustment regime, and under no selectivity 
bias adjustment, the elasticities are -0.21 (-0.21) in rainy (dry) season 
1977 and -0.04 (-0.05) in rainy (dry) season 1983. Moreover, in regard 
to animal labor, the total elasticities under bias adjustment regime are 
-1.87 (-1.16) rainy (dry) season 1977 and 0.48 (0.03) in rainy (dry) 
season 1983. Under no bias adjustment, the respective total own-price 
elasticities are -1.15 (-1.02) in rainy (dry) season 1977 and 0.41 
(0.01) in rainy (dry) season 1983. Lastly, it appears that total own-
price elasticities of demand show a tendency to wane over time based on 
the two samples. 
Turning to production under risk analysis, on our Heteroskedastic 
model we found that for rainy season data, all estimates of mean 
production function are statistically (asymptotically) significant with 
the exception of nitrogen fertilizer coefficient, and in dry season data 
all coefficients except insecticide are statistically significant. The 
mean production elasticities are 0.13, 0.00, 0.04, 0.09, 0.01. 0.74, and 
0.01 for rainy season data with respect to factors of production seed, 
nitrogen fertilizer, phosphorous fertilizer, human labor, animal labor, 
landholding and insecticide. In dry season data, the respective 
elasticities are 0.11, 0.03, 0.03, 0.13, 0.03, 0.68, and -0.01. 
Furthermore, from the variance of production estimation, we found that 4 
(6) out of 8 (8) coefficients are statistically significant in rainy 
(dry) season data. Amount of labor, from human or animal, has the 
correct negative signs, but insecticide does not, as shown in rainy 
season data. Other factors of production have positive sign indicating 
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risk-inducing characteristics such as seed, nitrogen, and phosphorous 
fertilizer, and landholding. With respect to dry season data, all 
coefficients show positive signs reflecting as risk-inducing factors 
including amount of labor, human and animal, and insecticide contrary to 
the expectation. In terms of the elasticities, the estimated 
elasticities of output variability with respect to factors of production 
implied by Heteroskedastic model are 0.11, 0.03, 0.00, -0.28, -0.03, 
1.88 and 0.07 of seed, nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizer, human labor, 
landholding, and insecticide for rainy season data. In dry season data, 
the respective elasticities are 0.81, 0.13, 0.05, 0.16, 0.37, 0.42, and 
0.02. In addition, our risk aversion coefficients, given the estimates 
of production function are true, are ranging from -0.62xl0"12 
-0.21x10"^  for nitrogen fertilizer and from -0.14x10"^ to 0.30x10"^ ® for 
human labor. So, it is probably suggesting that the sample farmers are 
risk-averter toward nitrogen fertilizer input and human labor input. 
B. Conclus ions 
The elasticities of the probability of selecting MVs and of input 
demands with respect to exogenous variables are not stable by comparing 
the two-year data sets. With respect to seed price, the probabilities 
of selecting MVs are increased with increases in the seed prices except 
for rainy season 1977. Meanwhile, the probabilities of selecting MVs 
are decreased with increases in nitrogen fertilizer prices. It appears 
on o^ ie hand that even though seed prices are increased, more farmers are 
using MVs probably due to the learning process over time. On the other 
hand, when nitrogen fertilizer prices increase, less farmers are willing 
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to grow MVs. In regard to animal labor wage, the elasticities are 
positive indicating that an increase in animal wage tends to increase 
the probabilities of choosing MVs. For human labor wage of rainy season 
data, the same conclusion is true that it appears an increase in human 
labor wage tends to increase the probability of choosing MVs. For 
output level, the opposite is true in all data sets, that is, an increase 
in level of output results in a decrease in the probability of choosing 
MVs. The inclusion of seed selectivity bias adjustment has no a priori 
direction impact on existing forces at focus. It can be either 
reinforcing as lessening the total effect in question. Therefore, 
ignoring its existence through use of subsample of farmers may result in 
serious selection bias. This has been demonstrated by 8 out of 12 total 
input share equations that have statistically significant selectivity 
variables. 
Total own-price elasticities of input demand are by and large 
inelastic with exception of elasticities of seed in dry season 1977 and 
animal labor in rainy and dry seasons 1977. Other than total own-price 
elasticities of demand for animal labor, we found that most total own-
price elasticities are becoming smaller by contrasting 1977 to 1983 
results at the same season. 
From the Heteroskedastic model, we found that the most significant 
elasticity of production is of landholding. In rainy season data, the 
elasticity of production of nitrogen fertilizer is not significant, and 
in dry season data, the elasticity of production of insecticide or 
pesticide is negative although it is insignificant. 
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In regard to variance of production, the Heteroskedastic model 
concludes that in the rainy season data seed, nitrogen and phosphorous 
fertilizer, landholding, and insecticide inputs are risk-creating 
factors and labor (human and animal) inputs are risk-reducing factors. 
However, in the dry season all factors of production are shown to be 
risk-inducing factors. Furthermore, we found that with respect to 
nitrogen fertilizer and human labor inputs, farmers are risk-averter. 
This may be one of the factors that will cause the yield gap between 
experimental station and farmers' plot. 
The results of the estimations in this research may not be of 
direct use by farmers, but they certainly could provide the basis not 
only for guidance in general policy formulation, but more specifically 
for indicating the direction and magnitude by which relevant 
instrumental variables need to be manipulated or introduced to achieve 
some desired objectives. In addition, they could also furnish 
reasonable information as to how peasant farmers might respond to 
agricultural development programs such as continued development of better 
new varieties. The qualitative and quantitative information of this 
type might be valuable to policy makers and extension personnel. 
Without a better understanding of farmer structure, price response, and 
economic motivation and production behavior, the planners and policy 
makers cannot fully appraise the potential of agricultural programs on 
production, farm income, and farmer welfare. Neither can the 
establishment of agro-industries and the expansion of industrial 
production of new factors of production be effectively evaluated. This 
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becomes relevant upon considering the Government of Indonesia's efforts 
on the dissemination of better new rice varieties and the construction 
of fertilizer plants to meet the domestic demand in recent years. 
C. Implications for Further Research 
The empirical results of this study should be interpreted with some 
caution considering the following limitations. One is the meagerness 
and the quality of data. The second is the simplification and implicit 
restrictions entailed in the models. For example, in cost function 
estimation, we have to assume that prices are exogenous and somehow can 
be observed from input markets and everybody paying the same price. But 
in the real world, at least in the study area, the markets are not well 
established and the opportunity cost are not easy to evaluate. Some 
farmers might obtain their fertilizer from the provision of the 
government and their labor through specific customary arrangement. In 
addition, the model does not include farmer characteristics such as 
education, number of family members, financial strength, level of 
credit, tenure arrangement, irrigation, and aggregate adoption over 
time. 
In production under risk case, data on agroclimatological 
characteristics such as soil type, soil fertility, precipitation, and 
temperatures, to name a few, are not available and hence not included. 
Unquestionably, this information shmilH he considered in fn-rrVio-r 
research. Therefore, this should encourage future studies to consider 
those explanatory variables. 
Not only by considering the addition of some explanatory variables 
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mentioned above, further research could also hypothesize different 
models. In seed selection, for example, along the lines of the induced-
innovation hypothesis we could extend that the seed selection criteria 
are governed by perceived utility associated with different choices. It 
also would be interesting to see the relationship of this seed selection 
variable with farmer characteristics. Others might consider the 
possibility of applying multiple categorical decision variables. 
In production under risk case, as more data become available, we 
could construct a model of combining cross-section and time-series of an 
individual farmer. Also, we could consider relaxing the assumption that 
only yield is random, that is, we could assume that prices are also 
random. Of course, these suggestions might entail some costs in terms 
of time and money, but it may be worth a challenge. 
143 
BEFEBENCES CITED 
Afiff, S., W. P. Falcon, and C. P. Timmer. "Elements of a Food and 
Nutrition Policy in Indonesia." In The Indonesian Economy. Edited 
by G. F. Papanek. New York: Praeger, 1980. 
Anden-Lacsina, T. and R. Barker. "The Adoption of Modem Varieties." In 
Interpretative Analysis of Selected Papers from Changes in Rice 
Farming in Selected Areas of Asia. Los Banos, Philippines; 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), 1978. 
Anderson, J. R. "Sparse Data, Climatic Variability, and Yield 
Uncertainty in Response Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 55(l):77-83, 1973. 
Anderson, J. R. "Perspective on Models of Uncertain Decisions." In 
Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development. Edited by J. A. 
Roumasset, J.-M. Boussard, and I. Singh. Laguna, Philippines: 
Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research iu 
Agriculture (SEARCA) and Agricultural Development Council (ADC), 
1979. 
Anderson, J. R., J. L. Dillon, and J. B. Handaker. Agricultural Decision 
Analysis. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1977. 
Anderson, J. R. and W. E. Griffiths. "Production Risk and Input Use: 
Pastoral Zone of Eastern Australia." Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 25(2):149-159, 1981. 
Anderson, J. R. and W. E. Griffiths. "Production Risk and Efficient 
Allocation of Resources." Australian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 26(3):226-232, 1982. 
Antle, J. M. "Theory and Measurement of Output Distribution". Working 
Paper No. 81-3:1-21. Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of California. Davis, California, 1981. 
Antle, J. M. "Testing the Stochastic Structure of Production: A 
Flexible Moment-Based Approach." Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, 1983. 
Antle, J. M. and W. J. Goodger. "Measuring Stochastic Technology: The 
Case of Tulare Milk Production." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 66(3):342-350, 1984. 
Arcia, G.J. "Risk, Institutional Change and Technology Adoption for Low 
Income Farmers: An Analysis of New Bean Alternatives for the 
Southern Huila Region of Colombia, South America." Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, 1980. 
144 
Arrow, K. J. "The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-
Bearing." Review of Economic Studies 31(2);91-96, 1964. 
Barker, R. "Adoption and Production Impact of New Rice Technology: The 
Yield Constraints Problem." In Farm-level Constraints to High Rice 
Yields in Asia: 1974-1977. Laguna, Philippines; IRRI, 1979. 
Barry, P. J., ed. Risk Management in Agriculture. Ames, Iowa; Iowa 
State University Press, 1984. 
Beal, G. M. and J. M. Bohlen. "The Diffusion Process." Iowa State 
Agricultural Experiment Station Special Report No. 18, 1957. 
Beattie, B. R. and C. R. Taylor. The Economics of Production. New York; 
Wiley & Sons, 1985. 
Behrman, J. R. Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968. 
Bell, C. "The Acquisition of Agricultural Technology; Its Determinants 
and Effects." Journal of Development Studies 9(1); 123-159, 1972. 
Bernoulli. D. "Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis." Commentarii 
Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae 5:175-192, 1738. 
Translated by L. Sommer as "Expositions of a New Theory on the 
Measurement of Risk." Econometrica 22(1): 23-36, 1954. 
Bhalla, S. S. "Farm and Technical Change in Indian Agriculture." In 
Agrarian Structure and Productivity in Developing Countries. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
Binswanger, H. P. "The Economics of Tractors in South Asia: An 
Analytical Review." Agricultural Development Council and the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, 
New York: ADC, 1978. 
Binswanger, H. P. "Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in 
Rural India." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62(3):395-
407, 1980. 
Binswanger, H. P. and D. A. Sillers. "Risk Aversion and Credit 
Constraints in Farmers' Decision-Making; A Reinterpretation." 
Journal of Development Studies 20(1);5—21, 1983. 
Binswanger, H. P., J. Dayantha, T. Balaranaia, and D. A. Sillers. "The 
Impact of Risk Aversion in Agricultural Decisions in Semi-Arid 
India." Development Economics Department, Washington, D.C.; The 
World Bank, 1980. 
145 
Blair, R. G. and R. Lusky. "A Note on the Influence of Uncertainty on 
Estimating of Production Function Models." Journal of Econometrics 
3(4):39l-394, 1975. 
Borch, K. Economics of Uncertainty. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1968. 
B.P.S. (Biro Pusat Statistik = Central Bureau of Statistics). 
"Indonesian Food Balance Sheet, 1968." Statistik Indonesia, 
Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1970 & 
1971. 
B.P.S. Population of Indonesia; Results of the Sub-Sample of 1980 
Population Census. Jakarta, Indonesia: B.P.S., 1982. 
Burke, R. V. "Green Revolution Technologies and Farm Class in Mexico." 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 28(1):135-154, 1979. 
Chipman, J. S. "The Ordering of Portfolios in Terms of Mean and 
Variance." Review of Economic Studies 40(2):167-190, 1973. 
Clawson, D. L. "Intravillage Wealth and Peasant Agricultural 
Innovation." Journal of Development Areas 12(3):323-326, 1978. 
Dalrymple, D. G. Development and Spread of HYV of Wheat and Rice in 
LDCs. Foreign Agricultural Report No. 95. Washington, D.C.: USDA, 
1978. 
Dapice, D. 0, "An Overview of the Indonesian Economy." In The 
Indonesian Economy. Edited by G. F. Papanek. New York: Praeger, 
1980. 
David, C. C. "Fertilizer Demand in the Asian Rice Economy." Food 
Research Institute Studies 15(1);109-124, 1976. 
Day, R. H. "Probability Distributions of Field Crops." Journal of Farm 
Economics 47(3):713-741, 1965. 
Departemen Pertanian (Department of Agriculture). Vademekum Bina Usaha 
Petani Tanaman Pangan (Summary Statistics on Food Farm Management). 
Jakarta, Indonesia; Departemen Pertanian, 1983. 
Diewert, W. E. "Application of Duality Theory." In Frontiers of 
Quantitative Economics Volume II. Edited by M. D. Intrilligator and 
D. A. Kendrick. New York: North Holland, 1974. 
Dillon, J. L. The Analysis at Response in Crop and Livestock Production, 
Second Edition. New York; Fergamon Press, 1977. 
146 
Dillon, J. L. "Bernoullian Decision Theory: Outline and Problems-" In 
Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development. Edited by J. A. 
Roumasset, J.-M. Boussard, and I. Singh. Laguna, Philippines: 
SEARCA and ADC, 1979. 
Dillon, J. L. and P. L. Scandizzo. "Risk Attitudes of Subsistence 
Farmers in Northeast Brazil: A Sampling Approach." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 60(3):425-435, 1978. 
Dobbs, T. T. and P. Foster. "Incentives to Invest in New Agricultural 
Inputs in North India." Economic Development and Cultural Change 
21(1):101-117, 1972. 
Feder, G. "Farm Size, Risk Aversion and the Adoption of New Technology 
Under Uncertainty." Oxford Economic Papers 32(2):263~283, 1980. 
Feder, G. and R. Slade. "Adoption of New Technology." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 66(3):312-320, 1984. 
Feder, G., R. E. Just, and D. Zilberman. "Adoption of Agricultural 
Innovations in Developing Countries: A Survey." Economic 
Development of Cultural Change 33(2):256-298, 1985. 
Fishbum, P. C. Decision and Value Theory. New York: Wiley and Sons, 
1964. 
Freund, R. J. "The Introduction of Risk Into a Programming Model." 
Econometrica 24(2);253—263, 1956. 
Friedman, M. and L. J. Savage. "The Utility Analysis of Choices 
Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy 56(4):279-304, 
1948. 
Friedman, M. and L. J. Savage. "The Expected-Utility Hypothesis and the 
Measurability of Utility." Journal of Political Economy 60(6):463-
474, 1952. 
Fuller, W. A. "Stochastic Fertilizer Production Functions for Continuous 
Com." Journal of Farm Economics 47(1);1G5-I19, 1965. 
Gafsi, S. and T. Roe. "Adoption of Unlike High-Yielding Wheat Varieties 
in Tunisia." Economic Development and Cultural Change 28(1):119-
134, 1979. 
Gomez, K. A-, R. W. Herdt, R. Barker, and S. K. DeDatta. "A Methodology 
for Identifying Constraints to High Rice Yields on Farmers' Fields." 
In Farm-Level Constraints to High Rice Yields in Asia: 1974-77. 
Laguna, Philippines: IRRI, 1979. 
147 
Griffiths, W. E. and J. R. Anderson. "Using Time-Series and Cross-
Section Data to Estimate a Production Function with Positive and 
Negative Marginal Risks." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 77(379);529-536, 1982. 
Griliches, Z. "Hybride Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of 
Technological Change." Econometrica 25(4):501-522, 1957. 
Grisley, W. "Effect of Risk and Risk Aversion on Farm Decision-Making: 
Farmers in Northern Thailand." Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, 1980. 
Grisley, W. and E. D. Kellogg. "Farmers' Subjective Probabilities in 
Northern Thailand: An Elicitation Analysis." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 65(1);78-82, 1983. 
Hadar, J. and W. R. Russell. "Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects." 
American Economic Review 59(l):25-34, 1969. 
Hallam, J. A., R. E. Just, and R. D. Pope. "Positive Economic Analysis 
and Risk Considerations in Agricultural Production." In New 
Directions in Econometric Modeling and Forecasting in U.S. 
Agriculture. Edited by G. C. Rausser. New York: North-Holland, 
1982. 
Halter, A. N. and G. W. Dean. Decisions Under Uncertainty: With 
Research Applications. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Westem, 1971. 
Halter, A. N. and R. îdason. "Utility Measurement for Those Who Need to 
Know." Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 3(2):99-109, 
1978. 
Hamal, K. B. and J. R. Anderson. "A Note on Decreasing Absolute Risk 
Aversion Among Farmers in Nepal." Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 26(3):220-225, 1982. 
Hammond, J. S. "Towards Simplifying the Analysis of Decisions Under 
Uncertainty Where Preference is Nonlinear." Ph.D. dissertation. 
Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 1968. 
Hanock, G. and H. Levy. "The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving 
Risk." Review of Economic Studies 36(3):335-346, 1969. 
Harris, B. "Innovation Adoption in Indian Agriculture: The High-
Yielding Variety Program." Modem Asian Studies 6(l):71-98, 1972. 
Harvey, A. C. "Estimating Regression Models With Multiplicative 
Heteroscedasticity." Econometrica 44(3):461-465, 1976. 
143 
Hayami, Y. and V. W. Ruttan. Agricultural Development; An 
International Perspective. Revised and Expanded Edition. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 
Hazell, P. B. R. "A Linear Alternative to Quadratic and Semivariance 
Programming for Farm Planning under Uncertainty." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 53(l):53-62, 1971. 
Heady, E. 0. Economics jf Agricultural Production and Resource Use. New 
York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. 
Heckman, J. J. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of 
Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a 
Simple Estimator for Such Models." Annals of Economic and Social 
Measurement 5(4):475-492, 1976. 
Helleiner, G. K. 1975. "Smallholder Decision Making; Tropical African 
Evidence." In Agriculture in Development Theory. Edited by L. G. 
Reynolds. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
Herath, H. M. G., J. S. Handaker, and J. R. Anderson. "Choice of 
Varieties by Sri Lanka Rice Farmers: Comparing Alternative Decision 
Models." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(l):87-93, 
1982. 
Herdt, R. W. and C. Capule. Adoption, Spread, Production Impact of 
Modern Rice Varieties in Asia. Los Banos, Philippines: IRRI, 1983. 
Herdt, R. W. and T. Wickham. "Exploring the Gap Between Potential and 
Actual Rice Yields in the Philippines." Food Research Institute 
Studies 14(2):163-181, 1975. 
Hey, J. D. Uncertainty in Microeconomics. New York: New York 
University Press, 1979. 
Hicks, W. H. and S. R. Johnson. "Population Growth and the Adoption of 
New Technology in Taiwanese Agriculture." Working Paper in 
Economics No. 1974-EG. Columbia, Missouri: University of 
Missouri, 1974. 
Hiebert, D. "Risk, Learning, and the Adoption at Fertilizer Responsive 
Seed Varieties." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
56(4):764-768, 1974. 
Huffman, W. E. "Allocative Efficiency: The Role of Human Capital." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 91(l):59-80, 1977. 
Jamison, D. T. and L. J. Lau. Farmer Education and Farm Efficiency. 
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
149 
Jarvis, L. S. "Predicting the Diffusion of Improved Pasture in Uruguay." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63(3);495-502, 1981. 
Jensen, H. R. "Farm Management and Production Economics, 1946-70." In A 
Survey of Agricultural Economics Literature. Vol. 1. Edited by L. 
R. Martin. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1977. 
Johnson, E. G. Forward Prices for Agriculture. Chicago, Illinois: 
University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
Jorgenson, D. W. and L. J. Lau. "The Duality of Technology and Economic 
Behavior." Review of Economic Studies 41(2);181-200, 1974. 
Just, R. E. "An Investigation of the Importance of Risk in Farmers 
Decisions." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 56(1):14-25, 
1974. 
Just, R. E. and R. D. Pope. "Stochastic Specification of Production 
Functions and Economic Implications." Journal of Econometrics. 
7(l):67-86, 1978. 
Just, R. E. and R. D. Pope. "On the Relationship of Input Decision and 
Risk." In Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development. Edited 
by J. A. Roumasset, J.-M. Boussard, and I. Singh. Laguna, 
Philippines; SEARCA and ADC, 1979a. 
Just, R. E. and R. D. Pope. "Production Function Estimation and Related 
Risk Consideration." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
6(2):277-284, 1979b. 
Just, R. E. and D. Zilberman. "Stochastic Structure, Farm Size, and 
Technology Adoption in Developing Agriculture." Oxford Economic 
Papers 35(2):307-328. 1983. 
Kalirajan, D. "The Economic Efficiency of Farmers Growing High-Yielding, 
Irrigated Rice in India," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 63(3):566-570, 1981. 
Kalirajan, K. and R. T. Shand. "Types of Education and Agricultural 
Productivity: A Quantitative Analysis of Tamil Nadu Rice Farming." 
Journal of Development Studies 21(2):232-243, 1985. 
Kataoka, S. "A Stochastic Programming Model." Econometrica 31(1-2):181-
396, 1963. 
Khatikam, K. "Risk and Uncertainty of Farmers in the Central Plain of 
Thailand." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Kentucky, Lexington, 
Kentucky, 1981. 
150 
King, R. P. and G. E. Oamek. "Risk Management by Colorado Dryland Wheat 
Farmers and the Elimination of the Disaster Assistance Program." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65(2);247-255, 1983. 
King, R. P. and L. J. Robison. "An Interval Approach to Measuring 
Decision Maker Preferences." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 63(3):510—520, 1981a. 
King, R. P. and L. J. Robison. "Implementation of the Interval Approach 
to the Measurement of Decision Maker Preferences." Michigan State 
University Agricultural Experiment Station Research Report No. 418. 
Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1981b. 
Kislev, Y. and N. Shchari-Bachrach. "The Process of an Innovation 
Cycle." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(1):28—37, 
1973. 
Kramer, R. A. and R. D. Pope. "Participation in Farm Commodity Programs: 
A Stochastic Dominance Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 53(1);119-128, 1981. 
Kunreuther, A. and G. Wright. "Safety-First, Gambling and the 
Subsistence Farmer." Decision Sciences Department Discussion, Paper 
No. 59. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
1974. 
Kutcher, G. P. and P. L. Scandizzo. The Agricultural Economy of 
Northeast Brazil. Baltimore, Maryland; The World Bank, 1981. 
Lee, L.-F. "Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models by Two-Stage 
Method." Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Rochester, 
Rochester, New York, 1976. 
Lee, L.-F. G. S. Maddala, and R. P. Trost. "Asymptotic Covariance 
Matrices of Two-Stage Probit and Two-Stage Tobit Methods for 
Simultaneous Equations Models with Selectivity." Econometrica 
48(2):491-503, 1980. 
Lin, W. and H. Chang. "Specification of Bernoulli Utility Functions in 
Decision Analysis." Agricultural Economic Research 30(1):30-36, 
1978. 
Lindner, R. K. "Farm Size and the Time Lag to Adoption of a Scale 
Neutral Innovation." Mimeograph. University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 
Australia, 1980. 
Lindner, R. K. and A. J. Fischer. "Risk Aversion, Information Quality, 
and the Innovation Adoption Time Lag." Mimeograph. University of 
Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia, 1981. 
151 
Lindner, R. K., A. J. Fischer, and P. Pardey. "The Time to Adoption." 
Economic Letters 2(2);187-190, 1979. 
Lins, D., S. Gabriel, and S. Sonka. "An Analysis of the Risk Aversion of 
Farm Operators: An Asset Portfolio Approach." Western Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 6(1);15-30, 1981. 
Lipton, M. "Agricultural Finance and Rural Credit in Poor Countries," 
World Development 4:321, 1976. 
Lockheed, M. E., D. T. Jamison, and L. J. Lau. "Farmer Education and 
Farm Efficiency: A Survey." Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 29(1):37-75, 1980. 
Lowdermilk, M- "Diffusion of Dwarf Wheat Production Technology in 
Pakistan's Punjab." Ph.D. dissertation. Cornell University, 
Ithaca, New York, 1972. 
Luce, R. and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley & Sons, 
1957. 
Magnusson, G. "Production Under Risk: A Theoretical Study." Acta 
Universitis Upsaliensis, Studia Oeconomica Upsaliensia 2:1-286, 
1969. 
Mangahas, M. "An Economic Analysis of the Diffusion of New Rice 
Varieties in Central Luzon." Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1970. 
Markowitz, H. M. "The Utility of Wealth." Journal of Political Economy 
60(2);151-158, 1952. 
Markowitz, H. M. Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of 
Investments. New York: Cowles-Wiley, 1959. 
Marschak, J. and W. H. Andrews. "Random Simultaneous Equation and the 
Theory of Production." Econometrica 12(3-4): 143—205, 1944. 
Martinez, J. C. "The Economics of Technological Change: The Case of 
Hybrid Com In Argentina." Ph.D. dissertation. Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa, 1972. 
Mears, L. A. The New Rice Economy of Indonesia. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: 
Gadjahmada University Press, 1981. 
Mears, L. A. "Rice and Food Self-Sufficiency in Indonesia." Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 10(2):122-138, 1984. 
152 
Mellor, J, W. "Production Economics and the Modernization of Traditional 
Agricultures." Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
13(l):25-34, 1969. 
Menezes, C. I. and D. L. Hanson. "On the Theory of Risk Aversion." 
International Economic Review ll(3);481-487, 1970. 
Meyer, J. "Choice among Distributions." Journal of Economic Theory 
14(2)r326-336, 1977a. 
Meyer, J. "Second Degree Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a 
Function." International Economic Review 18(2):477-487, 1977b. 
Mohayidin, M. G. "Risk in Farm Decision-Making: A Case of Crop 
Selection in Two Malaysian Districts." Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Hawaii, Manoa, Hawaii, 1981. 
Moscardi, E. and A. de Janvry. "Attitudes Toward Risk Among Peasants." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59(4);710-716, 1977. 
Mubyarto. "Harga Seras dan Policy Produksi di Indonesia (Rice Price and 
Production Policy in Indonesia)," Agro Ekonomika 1(1): 112-120, 
1970. 
Musser, W. N., H. P. Mapp, Jr., and P. J. Barry. "Applications I: 
Risk Programming," In Risk Management in Agriculture. Edited by P. 
J. Barry. Ames, Iowa; Iowa State University Press, 1984. 
Nelson, R. R. and E. S. Phelps. "Investments in Humans, Technological 
Diffusion, and Economic Growth." American Economic Review 56:69-75, 
1966. 
Nikiphoroff, B. "Economic Analysis of Paraguayan Farms Under 
Uncertainty." Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Davis, 
California, 1981. 
Nordman, D. W. "Labor Inputs of Farmers: A Case Study of the Zaria 
Province of the North-Central State of Nigeria." Nigerian Journal 
of Economic and Social Studies 11(1):1-13, 1969. 
O'Brien, D. T. "Risk and the Selection of Alternative Need Management 
Technologies in Philippine Upland Rice Production." Ph.D. 
dissertation. Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, 1981. 
O'Mara, G. T. "A Decision—Theoretic View of The Microeconomics of 
Technique Diffusion in a Developing Country." Ph.D. dissertation. 
Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1971. 
153 
O'Mara, G. T. The Microeconomics of Technique Adoption by Small-Holding 
Mexican Farmers. Development Research Center. Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, 1980. 
Parthasarathy, G. and D. S. Prasad. Response to the Impact of the New 
Rice Technology by Farm Size and Tenure: Andhra Pradesh, India. 
Los Banos, Philippines: IRRI, 1978. 
Pederson, G. D. "Selection of Risk-Preferred Rent Strategies: An 
Implication of Simulation and Stochastic Dominance." North Central 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 6(1);17—27, 1984. 
Perrin, R. and D. Winkelmann. "Impediment to Technical Progress on Small 
Versus Large Farms." American Journal of Agricultural Economies 
58(5):888-894, 1976. 
Petzel, T. "Educations and the Dynamics of Supply." Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 1976. 
Petzel, T. "The Role of Education in the Dynamics of Supply." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 60(3):445-451, 1978. 
Pitt, M. M. "Farm-Level Fertilizer Demand in Java: A Meta-Production 
Function Approach." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
65(3):502-508, 1983. 
Pope, R. D. and R. E. Just. "On the Competitive Firm under Production 
Uncertainty." Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
21(2):111-H8, 1977. 
Pratt, J. W. "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large." 
Econometrica 32(1-2):122—136, 1964. 
Pudasani, S. P. "The Effects of Education in Agriculture: Evidence From 
Nepal." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65(3):509-515, 
1983. 
Pyle, D. H. and S. J. Turnovsky. "Safety First and Expected Utility 
Maximization in Mean Standard Deviation Portfolio Analysis." Review 
of Economics and Statistics 52(1):75-81, 1970. 
Pyle, D. H. and S. J. Turnovsky. "Risk Aversion in Chance Constrained 
Portfolio Selection." Management Science 18(3):218-225, 1971. 
Quirk, J. P. and R. Saposnik. "Admissibility and Measurable Utility 
Functions." Review of Economic Studies 29(2);140-146, 1962. 
Ram, R. "Education as a Quasi-Factor of Production: The Case of India's 
Agriculture." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago, Chicago, 
Illinois, 1976. 
154 
Ramsey, F. P. "Truth and Probability." 1926. In The Foundation of 
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite. 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1931. 
Rasahan, C. A. "Govei-nment Intervention in Food Grain Markets: An 
Econometrics Study of the Indonesian Rice Economy." Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1983. 
Robison, L. J., P. J. Barry, J. B. Kliebenstein, and G. F. Patrick. 
"Risk Attitudes: Concepts and Measurement Approaches." In Risk 
Management in Agriculture. Edited by P. J. Barry. Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State University Press, 1984. 
Robison, L. J. "An Appraisal of Expected Utility Hypothesis Tests." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64(2):367-375, 1982. 
Rogers, E. Diffusion of Innovation. Iowa State Agricultural 
Experiment Station Special Report No. 18. Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa, 1957. 
Rogers, E. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1962. 
Rosegrant, M. W. and J. A. Roumasset. "Stochastic Production Functions 
and Optimal Inputs." International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 1983. (Mimeographed.) 
Rosenzweig, M. R. "Schooling, Allocative Ability, and the Green 
Revolution." Paper presented at the Meetings of the Eastern 
Economic Association, Washington, D.C., 1978. 
Roumasset, J. A. Rice and Risk: Decision Making Among Low—Income 
Farmers. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976. 
Roumasset, J. A., J.-M. Boussard, and I. Singh, eds. Risk, Uncertainty 
and Agricultural Development. Laguna, Philippines: SEARCA and 
ADC, 1979. 
Roy, A. D. "Safety First and the Ho'.dinr of Assets." Econometrica 
20(3):431-439, 1952. 
Sanders, J. H. and A. D. de Hollanda. "Technology Design for Semiarid 
Northeast Brazil." In Economics and the Design of Small-Farmer 
Technology. Edited by A. Valdes, G. M. Scobie, and J. L. Dillon. 
Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1979. 
Sastrohoetomo, M. A. "Dampak Kebijaksanaan Harga Pupuk dan Beras 
Terhadap Pendapatan Masyarakat (Impact of Fertilizer and Rice Prices 
Policies on Society's Income)." Ph.D. dissertation. Institut 
Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Institute of Agriculture), Bogor, Indonesia, 
1984. 
155 
Schluter, M. G. G. The Interaction of Credit and Uncertainty in 
Determining Resource Allocation and Income on Small Farms, Surat 
District, India. Occasional Paper No. 68, Employment and Income 
Distribution Project. Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York, 1974. 
Schultz, T. W. Production and Welfare of Agriculture. New York: 
Macmillan, 1949. 
Schultz, T. W. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University, 1964. 
Schutjer, W. and M. van der Veen. Economic Constraints on Agricultural 
Technology Adoption in Developing Countries. Occasional Paper 
No. 5. Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1977. 
Shackle, G. L. Expectations in Economics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1952. 
Shephard, R. W. The Theory of Cost and Production Functions. 2nd ed. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970. 
Sidhu, S. "The Production Value of Education in Agricultural 
Development." Staff Paper No. P76-17. department of Agricultural 
and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, 
1976. 
Silberberg, E. The Structure of Economics; A Mathematical Analysis. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
Sillers, D. A. Measuring Risk Preferences of Rice Farmers in Nueva 
Ecija, Philippines: An Experimental Approach. New Haven, 
Connecticut; Yale University, 1980. 
Simmons, R. L. and C. Pomareda. "Equilibrium Quantity and Timing of 
Mexican Vegetable Exports." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 57(3);472-479, 1975. 
Singh, I. "Small Farmers and the Landless in South Asia." Staff 
working Paper No. 320. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979. 
Singh, C. and D. Zilberman. "Allocation of Fertilizer Among Crops under 
Risk—A Quadratic Programming Approach." Indian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 39(l):77-83, 1984. 
Srinivasan, T. N- "Farm Size and Productivity Implications of Choice 
Under Uncertainty." Sankhya: Indian Journal of Statistics 34, 
Series B, Part 4:415-419, 1972. 
156 
Stoneman, P. "Intra-Firm Diffusion, Bayesian Learning and 
Profitability." Economic Journal 91(362);375-388, 1981. 
Sumodiningrat, G. "Varietal Choice and Input Demand in Rice Production 
in Indonesia." Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota, 
St. Paul, Minnesota, 1982. 
Teken, I. B. and H. Suwardi. "Food Supply and Demand and Food Policy." 
In Growth and Equity in Indonesia Agricultural Development. Edited 
by Mubyarto. Jakarta: Yayasan Agro Ekonomika, 1982. 
Telser, L. "Safety-First and Hedging." Review of Economic Studies 
23(1):1-16, 1955-1956. 
Thomas, W. E., L. Blakeslee, L. Rogers, and N. Whittlesey. "Separable 
Programming for Considering Risk in Farm Planning." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 54(2);260-266, 1972. 
Timmer, C. P. "The Political Economy of Rice in Asia: Indonesia." Food 
Research Institute Studies 14(3):197-231, 1975. 
United Nations. Miscellaneous Issues of Yearbook of International Trade 
Statistics. Geneva: U.N. 
Valdes, A. and D. L. Franklin. "Evaluation of Design Parameters for 
Cattle Production in the Colombian Llanos." In Economics and the 
Design of Small-Farmer Technology. Edited by A. Valdes, G. M. 
Scobie, and J. L. Dillon. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 
1979. 
Valdes, A., G. M. Scobie, and J. L. Dillon, eds. Economics and the 
Design of Small-Farmer Technology. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1979. 
van der Veen, M. "Analysis of Interfarm Variation in Rice Yields: An 
Economic Study of HYV Rice Production in Cavite Province, 
Philippines." Ph.D. dissertation. Pennsylvania State University, 
University Park, Pennsylvania, 1975. 
von Neumann, J. and 0. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947. 
von Pischke, J. "When is Smallholder Credit Necessary?" Development 
Digest 16(3):6-14, 1978. 
Walker, T. S. "Decision Making by Farmers and the National Agricultural 
Research Program on the Adoption and Development of Maize Varieties 
in El Salvador." Ph.D. dissertation. Stanford University, 
Stanford, California, 1980. 
157 
Weil, P. M. "The Introduction of the Ox Plow in Central Gambia." In 
African Food Production Systems; Cases and Theory. Edited by P. F. 
McLaughlin. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1970. 
Welch, F. "Education in Production." Journal of Political Economy 
78(l):35-59, 1970. 
Welch, F. "The Role of Investment in Human Capital Agriculture." In 
Distortion of Agricultural Incentives. Edited by T. W. Schultz. 
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1978. 
Widodo, S., Nasrullah, and H. Nataatmadja. "Rice and Indonesia's 
Agriculture." In Farm-level Constraints to High Rice Yields in 
Asia; 1974-1977. Laguna, Philippines; IRRI, 1979. 
Wiens, T. "Peasant Risk Aversion and Allocative Behavior: A Quadratic 
Programming Experiment." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
58(4):629-635, 1976. 
Wolgin, J. M. "Resource Allocation and Risk—A Case Study of 
Smallholder Agriculture in Kenya," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 57(4):622-630, 1975. 
Wozniak, G. D. "The Adaptation of Interrelated Innovations: A Human 
Capital Approach." Review of Economics and Statistics 64(1):70-79, 
1984. 
Young, D. L. "Risk Concepts and Measures for Decision Analysis." In 
Risk Management in Agriculture. Edited by P. J. Barry. Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State University Press, 1984. 
Young, D. L., W. Lin, L. Robison, and R. Selley. "Risk Preferences of 
Agricultural Producers: Their Measurement and Use." In Risk 
Management in Agriculture: Behavioral, Managerial, and Policy 
Issues. Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station AE-4478. 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, 1979. 
Zacharias, T. P. and A. H. Grube. "An Economic Evaluation of Weed 
Control Methods Used in Combination with Crop Rotation: A 
Stochastic Dominance Approach." North Central Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 6(1):113-120, 1984. 
Zeckhauser, R., and E. Keeler. "Another Type of Risk Aversion." 
Econometrica 38(5);661-665, 1970. 
Zellner, A., J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze. "Specification and Estimation of 
Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models." Econometrica 34(4):784-
795, 1966. 
158 
Zilbernan, D. and R. E. Just. "Labor Supply Uncertainty and Technology 
Adoption." In Seasonal Agricultural Labor Markets in the United 
States. Edited by R. D. Emerson. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1984. 
159 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It would be impossible to acknowledge the numerous people that have 
contributed to making this research possible, from the data collection 
through the finalization of this dissertation. To all of you, I extend 
my sincere thanks for all you did in any way you could. 
In particular, I wish to convey my gratitude to Professor William 
H. Meyers, my advisor, who let me continue this research and furnished 
the additional funds for the computer work. He also helped me a great 
deal during the final stage of my program here and during the writing of 
this dissertation. I am also thankful to other members of my committee. 
Professors Lehman B. Fletcher, J. Arne Hallam, Roy D. Hickman, and 
Dennis R. Starleaf for their suggestions throughout the course of this 
research. I wish to thank Professor Peter H. Calkins for generously 
setting his time aside to substitute for Professor Starleaf at my oral 
defense exam. These remarkable individuals offered me many helpful and 
constructive suggestions that improved the quality of this research. 
To my former advisor. Professor Earl 0. Heady, who could not 
continue supervising this research due to unprecedented illness, I also 
would like to express my indebtedness and deep appreciation for the help 
and advise he generously gave me throughout the continuance of my 
graduate program here at Iowa State University. I wish hiu a continued 
recuperation. 
My graduate education would not be possible without the support 
from the Government of Indonesia through Badan Penelitian dan 
Pengenbangan Pertanian. In this regard, I thank Dr. Sjarifuddin 
160 
Baharsjah, then director of Pusat Agro Ekonomi (PAE), who paved my way to 
go this far and gave me the study leave and the encouragement. Also, I 
would like to acknowledge the prompt response and stimulation in the 
initiation of this study rendered by Dr. Faisal Kasryno, my current 
director at PAE. He also authorized me to utilize the data gathered by 
Survey Agro Ekonomi (SAE) for this research. Thanks are also due to Dr. 
Paul Stangel at International Fertilizer Development Center, Alabama, 
who kindly provided me a round-trip ticket to get the data of this 
research. To my colleagues at PAE, Drs. M. Husen Sawit MSc., Ir. Yusuf 
Saefuddin MS., Ir. Rozany Nurmanaf, and Ir. Memed Gunawan MS., I am 
thankful for supplying me additional information about the data. 
I am greatly benefited from the opportunity to have informal 
discussions with my fellow students at the Department of Economics, ISU, 
especially my classmates, Dr. David Hakes, Dr. Tesfaye Teklu, and Mr. 
Bashir A. Qasmi during the analysis of the data. I also owe a debt of 
gratitude to Mr. Jim A. Hoekstra at the computer center for his 
invaluable time and assistance in the earlier stage of the computer 
work. 
To my fellow Indonesians in Ames, I am indebted for friendship, 
hospitality, and dinners given by all of you during my stay here. I 
could always seek a refuge to escape from my academic boredom and secure 
your help and moral support whenever I felt down and homesick. 
This work is dedicated to the memory of my beloved mother, T. 
Tampubolon and father, J. W. Hutabarat. 
Last, but not least, I want to convey my profound appreciation to 
161 
my brothers and sisters in Indonesia for providing me the seemingly 
endless flow of moral support and confidence in me during my entire 
graduate career. This helped me to sustain my spirit, tenacity, and 
enthusiasm in order to survive in the academic system. 
162 
APPENDICES. TABLES 
163 
Table Al. Means of selected variables from farmers' sample used in the 
empirical estimation, rainy season 
MV Farmers TV Farmers 
Variables 1977 1983 1977 1983 
Seed quantity (kg) 27.32 26.87 11.89 13.92 
Nitrogen fertilizer 
(kg) 118.99 152.84 63.97 99.47 
Human labor (mandays) 23.66 67.33 26.76 41.47 
Animal labor 
(animaldays) 420.04 415.44 254.14 349.24 
Seed price (Rp/kg) 77.24 200.55 73.82 147.69 
Nitrogen price (Rp/kg) 70.10 85.08 71.59 89.86 
Human wage (Rp/hr) 69.58 87.42 70.94 92.72 
Animal wage (Rp/hr) 61.49 162.59 60.86 144.07 
Share of seed 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Share of nitrogen 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.15 
Share of human labor 0.66 0.73 0.61 0.75 
Share of animal labor 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.06 
Insecticide or 
pesticide expense 
(Rp) 543.53 2126.67 237.75 175.00 
LandhoId ing(ha) 0.63 0.58 0.31 0.36 
Net paddy yield (kg) 956.34 2215.00 728.03 1211.49 
Number of samples 92 141 213 115 
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Table A2. Means of selected variables from farmers* sample used in the 
empirical estimation, dry season 
MV Farmers TV Farmers 
Variables 1977 1983 1977 1983 
Seed quantity (kg) 15.57 17.85 11.02 12.96 
Nitrogen fertilizer (kg) 83.64 105.84 54.25 93.24 
Human labor (mandays) 23.85 48.78 19.21 36.31 
Animal labor 
(animaldays) 215.89 239.69 189.52 293.06 
Seed price (Rp/kg) 109.61 211.01 87.59 163.15 
Nitrogen price (Rp/kg) 70.25 87.63 70.98 90.89 
Human wage (Rp/hr) 70.23 89.42 73.19 94.56 
Animal wage (Rp/hr) 59.51 164.08 64.88 149.90 
Share of seed 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.04 
Share of nitrogen 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.15 
Share of human labor 0.60 0.72 0.63 0.77 
Share of animal labor 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Insecticide or 
pesticide expense 
(Rp) 388.04 1143.19 274.57 113.44 
Landholding (ha) 0.39 0.46 0.28 0.33 
Net paddy yield (kg) 684.33 1285.36 500.05 1181.08 
Number of samples 97 144 174 106 
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Table A3. Estimated partial elasticities of substitution among variable 
inputs, 1977 
Prices or wage 
rates of Seed Nitrogen 
Demand for 
Human labor Animal Labor 
Dry Season 
Seed ;TV -15. 48 4. 42 -2, .88 7, .50 
MV —4, .89 -3, .64 -4, .50 5, .54 
Nitrogen :TV 1. 53 -2. 29 0, .34 0, .30 
MV 0. 58 -1, .29 0, .32 0, .93 
Human labor :TV 0. 91 0. 90 -0. ,35 0. 95 
MV 0. 88 0. 84 -0. ,34 0. ,94 
Animal labor :TV 62. 93 -41. 85 -17. ,99 -31. ,31 
MV 42. 48 -6. 50 -23. ,79 -42. ,97 
Rainy Season 
Seed :TV 
MV 
-3.79 
-5.94 
0.38 
-8.46 
-9.89 
1.05 
-1.32 
1.0  
Nitrogen :TV 
MV 
0.97 
0.49 
-3.68 
-2.51 
-0.0/ 
0.70 
2.32 
0.70 
Human labor :TV 
MV 
0.92 
1.00 
0.84 
0.95 
-0.22 
-0.45 
0.83 
0.98 
Animal labor :TV 14.11 9.67 -47.36 -10.62 
liV 1.00 163.84 -37.47 -190.25 
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Table A4. Estimated partial elasticities of substitution among variable 
inputs, 1983 
Price or wage 
rates of Seed Nitrogen 
Demand for 
Human labor Animal labor 
Dry Season 
Seed :TV -19.22 
MV 2.79 
9.16 
2.98 
-9.00 
—11.36 
-11.12 
0.20 
Nitrogen :TV 
MV 
1.67 
1.35 
-1.74 
-2.09 
-1.65 
-3.28 
-0.94 
1.85 
Human labor :TV 
MV 
0.97 
0.88 
0.90 
0.76 
-0.14 
0.00 
0.97 
0.98 
Animal labor :TV -0.72 
MV -15.03 
-31.71 
19.77 
-11.70 
-9.43 
20.79 
-15.45 
Rainy Season 
Seed :TV -20.14 
MV -0.11 
14.98 
4.53 
-21.65 
-12.78 
4.68 
2.07 
Nitrogen :TV 
MV 
1.44 
1.63 -1.14 
-4.62 
-3.29 
1.44 
0.05 
Human labor ;TV 
MV 
0.94 
0.89 
0.79 
0.81 
-0.04 
-0.06 
0.98 
1.02 
Animal labor :TV 2.48 3.62 
MV —4.57 —4.44 
-1.79 
-2.32 
20.27 
-2.72 
Table A5. Simple correlation coefficients among factors of production in sample farmers 
-Dry Season-
Seed Nitrogen Phosphorous Human Animal Landholding Insecticide 
fertilizer fertilizer labor labor or pesticide 
expense 
Seed 1.00 0.62*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.04*** 0.53*** 0.11*** 
Nitrogen 
fertilizer 1.00 0.71** 0.63*** 0.21*** 0.84*** 0.43*** 
Phosphorous 
fertilizer 1.00 0.52*** 0.22*** 0.64*** 0.53*** 
Human labor 1.00 0.36*** 0.69*** 0.24*** 
Animal labor 1.00 0.22*** 0.09** 
Landholding 1.00 0.49*** 
Insecticide or 
pesticide expense 1.00 
. 
Seed 1.00 0.74*** 0.48*** 0.73*** 0.16*** 0.90*** 0.39*** 
Nitrogen 
fertilizer 1.00 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.25*** 0.78*** 0.52*** 
Phosphorous 
fertilizer 1.00 0.55*** 0.43*** 0.57*** 0.51*** 
Human labor 1.00 0.27*** 0.79*** 0.29*** 
Animal labor 1.00 0.24*** 0.12*** 
Landholding 1.00 0.42*** 
Insecticide or 
pesticide expense 1.00 
**Signifleant at "q.OS ~ 1.960. 
***Signifleant at "0.01 = 2.576. 
